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INTRODUCTION
More than twenty-five years ago, the American Bar Association’s
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement
studied lawyer discipline systems throughout the country and
pronounced the state of lawyer discipline “scandalous.”1 Using
language that suggested the horror of looking under a rock and
finding dark and slimy things, the Committee, known as the Clark
Commission, chronicled a host of deficiencies with underfinanced,
bar-controlled disciplinary systems that investigated relatively few
complaints, sanctioned few of the lawyers investigated, imposed
sanctions secretly and inconsistently, and protected the bar’s elite.2
The Clark Commission recommended a number of fundamental
changes in disciplinary enforcement, including statewide
1. See SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970) [hereinafter
PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT].
2. Id. at 1-2, 24-25, 175-78. The Clark Commission was named for its Chair, former
Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark. In the introduction to its findings on the state of lawyer
discipline, the Commission reported it found:
in some instances disbarred attorneys are able to continue to practice in another
locale; that lawyers convicted of federal income tax violations are not disciplined; . . .
that even after disbarment lawyers are reinstated as a matter of course; that lawyers fail
to report violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility committed by their
brethren, much less conduct that violates the criminal law; that lawyers will not appear
or cooperate in proceedings against other lawyers but instead will exert their influence
to stymie the proceedings; that in communities with a limited attorney population
disciplinary agencies will not proceed against prominent lawyers or law firms and that,
even when they do, no disciplinary action is taken, because the members of the
disciplinary agency simply will not make findings against those with whom they are
professionally and socially well acquainted; and that, finally, state disciplinary agencies
are undermanned and underfinanced, many having no staff whatsoever for the
investigation or prosecution of complaints.
Id. at 1-2.

centralization of disciplinary jurisdiction under the control of the
states’ highest courts.3
The Clark Commission’s scathing indictment of lawyer discipline
systems is widely credited with moving state courts and the organized
bar to action.4 By the mid-1970s, states began to review lawyer
disciplinary systems and initiated substantive and procedural
changes.5 A few years later, the ABA adopted procedures for lawyer
disciplinary proceedings.6 In 1986, the ABA also adopted the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”),7 which
attempted to provide a framework for the consistent imposition of
sanctions.8
Since the Clark Report, the ultimate responsibility for the
administration of lawyer discipline in most states has moved, at least
nominally, from the state bars to the state courts.9 State courts have
3. See id. at 8, 24.
4. The speed with which the movement occurred is, however, debatable. Compare Michael
C. Dorf, Note, Disbarment in the United States: Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1, 14 (1975) (noting that within five years of the Clark Report, almost half the
states had hired professional staff to work in their disciplinary agencies), with Eric H. Steele &
Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917,
942 (noting no significant changes in many jurisdictions since the Clark Report).
THE
5. See MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE:
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 146-47 (1988); Dorf, supra note 4, at
15 (discussing New York’s establishment of a Committee on Disciplinary Enforcement to study
the state’s disciplinary procedures and offer recommendations for improvement); William T.
Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22
PEPP. L. REV. 485, 536-37 (1995) (detailing the California Bar’s efforts to “clean house”); Steele
& Nimmer, supra note 4, at 942 (noting “extensive discussions and some reform” following the
Clark Report); Timothy K. McPike & Mark I. Harrison, The True Story of Lawyer Discipline, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1984, at 92, 94-96 (describing the ways in which lawyer discipline practices have been
“transformed”).
6. See ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (1979).
These standards streamlined the disciplinary process, included members of the public on
disciplinary boards and made the discipline process more public. By 1985, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, which were revised a
few years later to provide a single statement of ABA policy with respect to disciplinary
procedures. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Executive Summary
(1989). For the history of the development of these standards, see Mary M. Devlin, The
Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 92829 (1994).
7. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1986). The ABA House of
Delegates approved the most recent amendments to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions on February 4, 1992. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1991 &
Supp. 1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
8. See James Duke Cameron, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions—A Long Overdue
Document, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91, 94 (1987); see also Cynthia A. Kelly, Lawyer Sanctions: Looking Back
Through the Looking Glass, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 469, 476-77 (1988). For a discussion of the
jurisdictions that rely on the ABA Standards, see infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
9. See ABA Compilation of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures 1 (1996) (unpublished
compilation on file with American Bar Association) [hereinafter COLD]. In some states, this
movement is more theoretical than real. While the courts claim exclusive responsibility to
administer the state discipline systems, most state courts have delegated the authority to

become more actively involved in lawyer discipline.10 Most courts
appoint members of disciplinary boards rather than rely on bar
organizations for that function.11 Lawyer discipline systems are better
funded12 and more public than they used to be.13 More complaints
received by disciplinary agencies are investigated.14 Most state
discipline agencies have full-time professional disciplinary counsel
and investigators.15 Many of the state discipline systems are better
equipped to deal with the most common client complaints about
lawyers—such as fee disputes and failures to communicate—that
often were not formally addressed by lawyer discipline systems.16
Although serious questions remain concerning whether the current
state lawyer discipline systems are as effective as they could be,17 there
is little question that these systems are better in certain respects than
administer the system to another entity. In at least 13 states, the responsibility is delegated to a
“unified” or mandatory state bar. See id. at 1-2; see also infra note 41. Most lawyer disciplinary
agencies perform similar functions regardless of whether they are directly affiliated with the
state bar or are separately constituted agencies.
Disciplinary agencies typically have
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions and usually consist of statewide boards, hearing
committees, disciplinary counsel, staff and investigators. See COLD, supra, at 3-4. In a few
jurisdictions, the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are not housed within the same
agency. See id. at 3.
10. State court involvement takes many forms. In many states, it is reflected in the
establishment of disciplinary agencies that report to the courts. In a few states, courts
promulgate standards for imposing discipline on lawyers. See, e.g., FLA. STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1998). In some states, a single judge or an appellate court
reviews all recommendations of public discipline. See, e.g., COLO. R.P. REGARDING ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINE 241.15(b)(3); OHIO B.R. V §§ 6(L), 8(D).
11. In at least 31 states, the highest court appoints members of the disciplinary board. See
COLD, supra note 9, at Q 7B. The boards typically have statewide jurisdiction to propose rules
and procedures for disciplinary proceedings. In many states, the boards also perform appellate
review of the hearing committees’ findings and conclusions with respect to formal charges. See
id. at Q 10A, Q 13A.
12.
For example, in 1974 the California Bar allocated $1,092,780 to discipline, which
constituted 26% of its total annual general budget. See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 537 n.313. In
1995, the California Bar spent $29.7 million, or 73.9% of its total budget on lawyer discipline.
See Independent Auditors’ Report, CAL. B.J., Dec. 1996, at 20. But see COMM. ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY
xviii (1992) [hereinafter LAWYER REGULATION] (noting that absolute levels of funding have not
kept pace with the growth of the profession); Lawrence A. Dubin, How the Michigan Supreme
Court Can Better Protect the Public from Bad Lawyers: The Ball is in Their Court, 73 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 667, 676-80 (1996) (discussing continued inadequate funding of Michigan’s lawyer
discipline system).
13. See, e.g., LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at xiv.
14. In 1996, lawyer disciplinary agencies investigated more than 54% (64,763 of 118,891)
of the complaints they received. See STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 1996 4 fig. I (1998) [hereinafter SOLD 1996].
This represents a significant improvement from twenty years before, when more than 90% of all
complaints were dismissed without investigation. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 4, at 982-83.
15. See COLD, supra note 9, at 4, 26 (reporting that 41 state discipline agencies have fulltime disciplinary counsel and that 32 state discipline agencies have investigators).
16. See infra notes 120-21, 124-28 and accompanying text; see also Steele & Nimmer, supra
note 4, at 968, 974.
17. See, e.g., infra notes 29, 33-38 and accompanying text.

the systems studied by the Clark Commission.
While lawyer discipline systems are better according to certain
measures, one aspect of lawyer discipline that has been
underexamined is the sanctions imposed on lawyers by these
systems.18 Indeed, relatively little attention has been given in recent
years to the manner in which state lawyer discipline sanctions are
determined or to the consistency or efficacy of the sanctions
imposed.19
Yet even casual observation of the vague, often
unarticulated standards used by state decision-makers when imposing
discipline raises serious questions about whether sanctions could be
imposed fairly. As will be discussed later in this Article, the lack of
well-defined standards, the tendency to impose non-public sanctions
on lawyers, the failure to publicize the “public” sanctions, and the
amount of recidivism that seems to occur,20 also raise serious
18. Some commentators have focused broadly on the efficacy of state discipline systems by
considering measures such as the number and type of complaints, number and type of
resolutions, and speed of resolution. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 143-50
(1989); Gallagher, supra note 5, at 537-46; Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney Disciplinary
Process—1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique and Recommendations for Change, 62 U. CIN. L.
REV. 947, 1028 (1994). Others have explored the limitations of state lawyer discipline systems
that prevent them from addressing more misconduct. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer
Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 716-22, 737 (1981) (exploring
the failure of lawyer discipline systems to address lawyer competence); Ted Schneyer, A Tale of
Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 245, 247-54 (1998) [hereinafter Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems] (describing the inability
of state discipline systems to address problems arising from a law firm’s infrastructure); David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 822-30 (1992) (discussing
structural limitations of disciplinary controls). Commentators have made few efforts, however,
to look closely at the standards for imposing lawyer discipline sanctions or to examine the
fairness or efficacy of the sanctions imposed. The main exceptions are student commentary
focusing on a few cases in a single jurisdiction, see, e.g., Michael Goldman, Note, Discipline of
McLendon and Discipline of Peterson: Adding Chaos to Confusion in Washington Legal Ethics, 29
GONZ. L. REV. 187, 193-203 (1993/94) (criticizing the Washington Supreme Court’s disparate
decisions in cases regarding improper conversion of a client’s funds); Michele J. Woods, Note,
The Adoption of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions by the Alaska Supreme Court—In re
Buckalew, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 365, 371-72, 377-78 (1989) (identifying examples of inconsistencies
in Alaska disciplinary cases and considering the implications of Alaska’s adoption of the ABA
Standards), and proposals to expand the range of sanctions imposed on lawyers, see Sandra L.
DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and “Disclosure Advertising”: Towards a New Ethos,
72 N.C. L. REV. 351 (1994) (proposing that lawyers be required to self-advertise disciplinary
sanctions); Stephen G. Bene, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer
Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907 (1991) (arguing that monetary fines should be used
as an attorney discipline sanction). See generally Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law
Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31-37 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Professional Discipline]
(arguing that disciplinary sanctions should be imposed on law firms).
19. The failure to look closely at these issues is somewhat surprising in view of the
considerable scholarship examining the sanctions imposed on lawyers under Rule 11. See, e.g.,
Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50
SMU L. REV. 493, 501-04 (1997) (citing to extensive scholarship relating to Rule 11 sanctions).
20. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text; ABEL, supra note 18, at 148 (noting that
27% of New Jersey lawyers who were disciplined but not disbarred for stealing client money
were found to have stolen again); Dubin, supra note 12, at 695-96 (reporting a 75% recidivism

questions about how well the sanctions imposed on lawyers achieve
the basic goals of lawyer discipline: protection of the public,
protection of the administration of justice and preservation of
confidence in the legal profession.21
The failure to look closely at these issues may be due, in part, to
the mistaken belief that the problems with sanctions identified in the
Clark Report have since been adequately addressed by the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.22 The Standards were an
important first attempt to provide consistency and fairness in the
imposition of sanctions, and perhaps for that reason they were
warmly—and uncritically—greeted.23 Indeed, for more than a
decade, the ABA Standards have been the most commonly used
standards when imposing sanctions on lawyers. A review of the ABA
Standards and their application by the courts shows, however, that
their voluntary nature and their lack of specificity invite inconsistency
in their application. They provide little more than a loose framework
for approaching the sanctioning decision and, as a result, they leave
considerable room for bias in the process and for ineffective
discipline.
Before exploring the standards used to impose lawyer discipline
sanctions, one caveat is in order. It is difficult to obtain a clear
picture of the consistency, efficacy or fairness of these sanctions.
Inadequate record-keeping by many jurisdictions, differing reporting
methods,24 uninformative published opinions, private discipline,
limited empirical research25 and the failure to report much lawyer
rate among Michigan attorneys who received reprimands); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 4, at
997-98.
21. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 176.
24. The failure, until relatively recently, of many jurisdictions to maintain records of
complaints and the disposition of matters has hindered efforts to evaluate lawyer discipline
systems. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 4, at 920 n.2 (noting their inability to analyze the
historical pattern of disciplinary enforcement due to lack of data). This problem was only
partially addressed by the development in 1968 of the ABA National Discipline Data Bank,
which was established to receive reports from courts and disciplinary agencies of all formal
discipline imposed on lawyers. See PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at
158; see also LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at 83. Even the Data Bank is not entirely
reliable due to the failure of some jurisdictions to report their disciplinary actions. See Steele &
Nimmer, supra note 4, at 920 n.2; see also CENTER FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N, FIVE-YEAR REPORT FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASS’N NATIONAL LAWYER REGULATORY DATA
BANK, 1993-97 1-35 (undated) (on file with American Bar Ass’n) [hereinafter FIVE-YEAR
REPORT] (indicating that six states did not report 1996 sanctions to the Data Bank). Moreover,
the methods of reporting data often vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from
year to year, making comparisons difficult.
25. Data measuring attorney compliance with basic norms of professional conduct are
difficult to obtain. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 4, at 934. See generally JEROME E. CARLIN,
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 41 (1966) [hereinafter CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS]. As a result, there is

misconduct26 make accurate evaluation difficult. The available
statistics tend to be interpreted optimistically by the organized bar27
and pessimistically by critics of lawyer discipline.28 Even cautious
interpretation of the existing data indicates that while there have
been improvements in the states’ approach to imposing lawyer
discipline, much work remains to be done.
Part I of this Article identifies some of the problems with the
manner in which sanctions are currently imposed on lawyers, both in
states that purport to follow the ABA Standards and those that do
not.29 Part II identifies the goals of lawyer discipline, the sanctions
relatively little empirical research relating to actual attorney compliance with professional
responsibility rules or norms. But see id. at 42-48, 53-61; JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR
OWN 97, 155-64 (1994); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIS COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING
BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY 106-15 (1967); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME
(1985); Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81 (1994). There is also little empirical research
relating to the personal characteristics of lawyers who engage in misconduct or to the
prevalence of recidivism.
26. See ABEL, supra note 18, at 144; Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 665, 694-95 (1994); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 4, at 949, 957-60; Wilkins, supra
note 18, at 822-23.
27. See McPike & Harrison, supra note 5, at 92 (claiming that “[l]awyer disciplinary
practices have been transformed in the last 14 years from what was called in 1970 a ‘scandalous
situation’ to a sophisticated, effective system of self-regulation today”). See generally Gallagher,
supra note 5, at 545-50 (describing the efforts of the California Bar to defend the success of its
discipline system).
28. Lawyer discipline systems face many obstacles and it is easy to present statistics in a way
that paints a bleak picture of those systems. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 18, at 145-48 (describing,
inter alia, the number of complaints received about attorneys and the relatively small number of
sanctions imposed); Martin Garbus & Joel Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment: They Sit in
Judgment, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 48-54 (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1976) (comparing the
number of sanctions imposed to the number of attorneys admitted to practice). Sometimes the
numbers involving lawyer discipline are juxtaposed in ways that may not be entirely fair. For
example, comparisons of the number of sanctions imposed on lawyers to the number of
admitted attorneys may reflect a failure by the discipline systems to impose enough sanctions.
On the other hand, such comparisons may reflect that most lawyers do not engage in
misconduct.
29. While this Article focuses on the sanctions imposed by state discipline systems, it is
important to note that state systems deal with only a fraction of lawyer misconduct. This is true
for a variety of reasons. First, lawyers and judges are unwilling to report the misconduct of
other lawyers and even clients may have reasons for not reporting misconduct by their lawyers.
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 2; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer’s Duty to Report Another
Lawyer’s Ethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 979 & n.16 (1988); see
also supra note 26 and accompanying text. Second, state disciplinary agencies sometimes divert
complaints about lawyer misconduct to other agencies or label them in ways that place them
outside the jurisdiction of the disciplinary agency. See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 569-76
(describing the screening and diversion of complaints by the California State Bar’s intake unit);
see also infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. Third, structural, jurisdictional and
economic limitations on state discipline systems prevent them from addressing more
misconduct. For example, underfunding of the systems limits the degree to which they can be
proactive in investigating lawyer misconduct. The absence of rules permitting the disciplinary
authority to sanction law firms also limits the ability to address misconduct. See Schneyer,
Professional Discipline, supra note 18, at 7-11. Fourth, codes of conduct governing lawyers tend to

commonly imposed on lawyers, and the reasons for devising
standards for imposing sanctions. Part III reviews in some detail the
problems with the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and
their implementation by the courts. Part IV recommends ways to
draft standards so that they will better meet the goals of lawyer
discipline. The recommendations include the use of mandatory
standards rather than voluntary standards that may be disregarded by
decision-makers. The recommended standards would provide more
guidance to assist in categorizing lawyer misconduct and would
eliminate the consideration of certain factors in order to reduce the
opportunities for bias and unwarranted inconsistency. Standards
should also be drafted to promote the effective use of suspensions
and public reprimands, and to eliminate private sanctions. Finally,
standards should address the imposition of less conventional
sanctions, such as publicity and fines, which may be more effective
than some of the more frequently used forms of discipline.
I.

THE PROBLEM

To understand some of the problems with the imposition of lawyer
sanctions, it is useful to start with the statistics. There are over one
million lawyers with active licenses in the United States.30 In 1996,
state lawyer disciplinary agencies reported 118,891 complaints
concerning alleged lawyer misconduct.31 The actual number of
complaints was undoubtedly higher.32 Only about five percent of all

be vague and general, making it difficult to determine what conduct is unacceptable in certain
practice settings. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L
Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 650-64 (1994). State discipline
agencies shy away from pursuing cases in which the rules are unclear, due in part to concerns
about giving fair notice to lawyers who are subjected to the disciplinary process. See id. at 664.
Fifth, the availability of other client controls on lawyer misconduct, such as the threat of taking
business elsewhere or malpractice actions, address some lawyer misconduct. See Wilkins, supra
note 18, at 824-32. Finally, the willingness and in some cases, superior ability, of the federal
judiciary and federal agencies to discipline lawyers addresses some lawyer misconduct.
Notwithstanding the factors that keep many cases of lawyer misconduct out of state discipline
systems, it appears that more detected misconduct is handled within the state discipline systems
than by other bodies. The issues raised in this Article concerning the fairness and effectiveness
of lawyer sanctions have implications for other sanctioning bodies which presumably also seek
to impose fair and effective sanctions.
30. See SOLD 1996, supra note 14, at 4 fig. I.
31. See id. The 1996 ABA Survey defines “complaint” as “[a]ny information received by the
disciplinary agency regarding lawyer conduct that requires a determination as to whether the
disciplinary agency has jurisdiction . . . or whether sufficient facts are alleged that would, if true,
constitute misconduct.” Id. at app. pt. 1 (Terms and Phrases).
32. The actual number of complaints received by state lawyer discipline systems was higher
than 118,891 because ten states did not respond to the ABA’s 1996 Survey. See id. at 4 (noting
that Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, and South Dakota did not provide data).

complaints result in any sanctions against lawyers.33
It appears the sanctions imposed on lawyers are often light and
inconsistent.34 While the claim that discipline is “light” is essentially
normative, it can also be tested against how well the sanctions
promote the goals of lawyer discipline. Consider these facts: Private
sanctions—the lightest form of discipline—are imposed almost twice
as often as any other type of sanction.35 Lawyers often receive several
private admonitions before they receive any public discipline.36 If a
lawyer is suspended from practice, the period of suspension is
frequently so brief that it does not interrupt a lawyer’s practice.37 In
many of these cases, sanctions fail to achieve the primary goal of
lawyer discipline, which is protection of the public.38
These sanctioning practices are due, in large part, to the absence
of well-conceived standards for imposing discipline and to the biases
33. According to the ABA, state lawyer discipline systems received 118,891 complaints and
imposed 6411 sanctions in 1996. See id. at 4 fig. I, 9 fig. II. On average, it takes at least one year
from the receipt of a complaint until a public sanction is imposed. See id. at 19-23 fig. IV.
Consequently, many of the sanctions imposed in 1996 arose from complaints initiated in earlier
years. Nevertheless, the ratio of sanctions to complaints over the last few years has ranged from
five to six percent, suggesting that the estimate in the text is reasonably accurate. See STANDING
COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
1995 1-5 fig. I-pt. 1, 8-12 fig. II (1997); STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 1993-94 fig. I-pt. 1, fig. II (1996); STANDING
COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 1991-92 fig. I-pt. 1, fig. II
(1995).
The five percent figure does not include complaints that were referred to diversion
programs. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing state diversion programs
and other programs designed to deal with minor lawyer misconduct). Moreover, the figure
does not in itself indicate whether more sanctions should have been imposed. See supra note 28.
Analysis of the cases in which sanctions were not imposed would be required to conclude
whether the sanction rate is “too low.” Unfortunately, in most jurisdictions those files are not
publicly available.
34. The problem of inconsistency in the imposition of sanctions is discussed infra notes 61,
141, 164-74, 185-86, 194, 225, 240-41 and accompanying text.
35. In 1996, reporting state discipline systems imposed 2634 private sanctions. See SOLD
1996, supra note 14, at 9 fig. II. In contrast, there were 757 public reprimands, 1324
suspensions of varying length and 542 disbarments. See id. Certain jurisdictions display an even
greater preference for private discipline. See COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK STATE FOR THE YEAR 1996 1 (199697) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK STATE] (reporting public
discipline imposed in approximately 250 cases and private sanctions imposed in over 900 cases).
Six jurisdictions do not impose private sanctions. See infra note 329.
36. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
37. As discussed later in this Article, brief suspensions do little more than delay the
performance of legal work and sometimes they do not cause any interruption of a lawyer’s
practice. See infra notes 201, 305-06 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. Although I describe lawyer sanctions as
“light,” I do not contend that lawyer sanctions should, as a general matter, be more severe. In
some cases, light sanctions may be consistent with the goals of discipline. In other cases, light
sanctions may undermine those goals. See infra notes 110-14, 123-25, 210-20, 305-08, 325 and
accompanying text.

of those who determine the sanctions. In many of the most populous
states, sanctions are imposed on lawyers without the use of standards
that provide a framework for approaching the sanctioning decision
or for selecting the most appropriate sanction.39 Reinstatement to
practice following suspension or disbarment is often granted based
on ill-defined standards.40
The absence of standards leaves the sanctioning decisions largely to
the discretion of the bar, which remains heavily involved in the
discipline process.41 Indeed, in many states, lawyers—not judges—
continue to impose most lawyer discipline and their determinations
often are not reviewed by courts.42 Even when a court does review
39. For example, New York has virtually no written standards that guide the decision-maker
in the imposition of sanctions, except for rules specifying the sanctions for lawyers convicted of
certain criminal conduct. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4)(a), (f) (McKinney 1997). While Texas also
has rules specifying the sanctions for certain criminal conduct, see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 81.078(c) (West 1998); TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 8.05, and a court rule setting forth the
aggravating and mitigating factors that may be considered when imposing lawyer discipline, see
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.10, it has no other guidelines to guide the imposition of sanctions for
particular misconduct. New Jersey also has no clear standards, other than a few common law
rules suggesting presumptive sanctions for certain types of misconduct. See, e.g., In re Toronto,
696 A.2d 8, 11 (N.J. 1997) (stating that the court will ordinarily suspend an attorney convicted
of domestic violence); In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1157-58 (N.J. 1979) (noting that disbarment
is usually the only appropriate discipline for an attorney who misappropriates a client’s funds).
Illinois has only a few weakly articulated common law standards. See, e.g., In re Blank, 585
N.E.2d 105, 115 (Ill. 1991) (noting that commingling and conversion of client funds “may” be
grounds for disbarment absent mitigating circumstances). Pennsylvania has declined to adopt
common law standards, even for egregious misconduct. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Chung, 695 A.2d 405, 407 (Pa. 1997) (noting that the court has declined to adopt a per se rule
requiring disbarment for serious misconduct). In 1996, these five states reported having
356,562 lawyers with active licenses, which was approximately one-third of the lawyers with
active licenses in this country. See SOLD 1996, supra note 14, at 1-4 fig. I.
40. See infra notes 72, 313-20 and accompanying text. See generally Ann Davis, Toughening
Readmission Procedures, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at A1 (discussing the ease with which lawyers
gain readmission to the bar).
41. It appears that disciplinary counsel in more than 20 states are affiliated with the state
bar. See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, INC. DIRECTORY 6-20 (June 1998). Control
by state bar officials over disciplinary counsels’ budgets and personnel has in some instances
impeded the work and the prosecutorial decisions of disciplinary counsel. See LAWYER
REGULATION, supra note 12, at 29. In California, where the legislature established a bar-funded
Bar Court that is staffed by paid hearing judges, serious questions have been raised about the
Bar Court’s independence from the State Bar. See Lise A. Pearlman, Declare Independence, CAL.
LAW., Apr. 1996, at 27.
Although courts in other states have established separate disciplinary boards or agencies to
process, investigate and prosecute complaints against lawyers, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text, volunteer lawyers make up the majority of disciplinary hearing panels, see
COLD, supra note 9, at Q 20; LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at 8, and members of the bar
elite are often appointed to perform investigative and adjudicative functions, see, e.g., MD. R. 16705 (providing that state inquiry committee members and review board members are composed
mainly of lawyers selected by bar associations); infra notes 56, 60. While many states now
include members of the public on disciplinary hearing panels, the lay members are in the
minority. See COLD, supra note 9, at Q 20; MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT Rule 3A (1996). The effectiveness of lay members when serving on lawyerdominated panels is, in itself, a large and interesting topic.
42. Private sanctions are the most frequently used form of discipline, see supra note 35, yet

these determinations, they may be afforded great deference.43 Who
you are, where you practice, and who you know can directly affect the
severity of the sanction imposed and the lawyer’s ability to continue
the practice of law.44 The following tale of two classmates illustrates
the imposition of private discipline typically is not subject to review by courts, see, e.g., PA. R.
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 208(a)(6) (“A respondent-attorney shall not be entitled to appeal
an informal admonition, a private reprimand or any conditions attached thereto in cases where
no formal process has been conducted . . . .”). The imposition of public discipline by a hearing
panel often may be appealed to a higher disciplinary board, but may not always be appealed as
of right to a court. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 53(e)(1), (5); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753; MODEL RULES
FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 11(F) (1996) (providing that the court may,
within its discretion, review disciplinary matters); see also N.J. CT. R. 1:20-16(b) (stating that
leave of the court is required for review of sanctions other than disbarment); OR. B.R. 10.1
(providing that only sanctions exceeding a 60-day suspension must be reviewed by the court);
WASH. R. LAWYER DISCIPLINE 5.5 (stating that the Board’s imposition of reprimands is not
subject to further review). In some states, the courts only infrequently grant leave to appeal.
See, e.g., Marcy A. Hahn, Note, The Constitutionality of Michigan’s Attorney Discipline System, 43
WAYNE L. REV. 1565, 1572 (1997) (noting that the Michigan Supreme Court only rarely grants
leave to appeal).
There are, however, some state courts that are more actively involved in the adjudication and
review of discipline decisions. For example, in Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts, a single
judge hears or reviews most disciplinary cases that may result in public discipline. See ME. B.R.
7.2(b)(2); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01, § 1(2); MD. R. 16-709(b), 16-710(c). In a few states, all
recommendations concerning the imposition of public discipline are reviewed by the highest
state court. See, e.g., COLO. R.P. REGARDING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE § 241.15(b)(3); OHIO B.R. V
§§ 6(L), 8(D).
43. See In re Brady, 923 P.2d 836, 839 (Ariz. 1996) (explaining that the court gives “great
weight” to the Commission’s recommendations); Idaho State Bar v. Daw, 910 P.2d 752, 754
(Idaho 1996) (explaining that the court gives “great weight” to recommendations from the
hearing committee); In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816, 821 (Mass. 1996) (stating that the
recommendations of the disciplinary board are entitled to “great weight”); In re Ganley, 549
N.W.2d 368, 369 (Minn. 1996) (noting that “great weight” is afforded the referee’s
recommendations); State v. Wilkins, 898 P.2d 147, 150 (Okla. 1995) (explaining that the
recommendations of the Professional Responsibility Committee are given “great weight”);
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Monsour, 701 A.2d 556, 558 (Pa. 1997) (noting that the
findings and recommendations of the hearing committee are given “substantial deference”); In
re Pressly, 628 A.2d 927, 929 (Vt. 1993) (explaining that the court gives deference to board
recommendations on sanctions and will not set aside its judgment unless clearly erroneous); see
also In re West, 805 P.2d 351, 353 n.3 (Alaska 1991) (explaining that findings of fact by the
Board are entitled to “great weight”); In re Morse, 456 S.E.2d 52, 53 (Ga. 1995) (stating that the
court is bound by the review panel’s findings of fact when there is “any evidence” to support
them); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Tantlinger, 490 S.E.2d 361, 363 (W. Va. 1997) (stating
that substantial deference is given to the Committee’s findings of fact). But see Disciplinary
Counsel v. Lau, 941 P.2d 295, 297 (Haw. 1997) (stating that the court is not bound by findings
of the Disciplinary Board); In re Altstatt, 897 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Or. 1995) (noting that the court
reviews disciplinary matters de novo); In re Olson, 537 N.W.2d 370, 372 (S.D. 1995) (stating that
the Board’s recommendations are given “no particular deference”).
44. See Dubin, supra note 12, at 670-72 (describing a scandal that arose when disciplinary
investigations of prominent Detroit lawyers were improperly terminated); Paula A. Monopoli,
Legal Ethics and Practical Politics: Musings on the Public Perception of Lawyer Discipline, 10 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 423, 425 (1997) (discussing a disciplinary case suggesting that politically
connected lawyers obtained lenient treatment); Rhode, supra note 26, at 696 (noting that
sanctions are rarely directed at mainstream firms and organizations); Panels on Criminal Practice
Mull Need for Special Rules, 13 Laws. Manual on Prof’l Conduct (ABA/BNA) 164-65 (June 11,
1997) (reporting anecdotal evidence that criminal lawyers are more frequently investigated for
single act of neglect and receive more severe sanctions than other practitioners). See generally

some of these problems.
Daniel Cooper and Ilan Reich were two of the best and the
brightest of Columbia Law School’s Class of 1979. Both were Ivy
League college graduates and members of the Columbia Law Review.45
They left law school full of promise and within a relatively short time,
became partners in highly profitable Manhattan law firms.46
Within eight years after graduation, Reich pleaded guilty to
charges of insider trading based on confidential client information.47
He was sentenced to a one-year prison term and disbarred.48 A few
years later Cooper pled guilty to charges of overbilling a client by
$550,000; he avoided jail by cooperating with federal authorities, and
was suspended from practice for one year.49 Both men committed
felonies that, at a minimum, breached their professional and
fiduciary duties to their clients; both have since resumed law practice
in New York.
New York has an automatic disbarment rule for lawyers convicted
of crimes that would constitute felonies under New York law.50 Its
courts rarely readmit lawyers who have been disbarred under this
rule.51 In addition, New York suspends lawyers convicted of other
Garbus & Seligman, supra note 28, at 53-54 (noting the ease with which well-paid corporate
attorneys get away with ethics violations while attorneys serving the poor are disciplined far
more often); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too
Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 70, 89 (1995) (noting that federal prosecutors are
rarely disciplined).
45. See 12 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY NEW YORK CITY, PROFESSIONAL
BIOGRAPHIES SECTION 1359B (1998) (profiling Daniel Cooper) [hereinafter MARTINDALEHUBBELL]; see also 12 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY NEW YORK CITY, PROFESSIONAL
BIOGRAPHIES SECTION 1304B (1997) (profiling Ilan Reich).
46. Reich was a corporate take-over partner at Wachtell, Lipton, where he was reportedly
making $500,000 per year. See Steven Brill, Redemption?, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 4. Cooper
became a partner at Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, the
fourth largest law firm in the country. When that firm collapsed in 1987 and filed for
bankruptcy, he moved firms with his mentor, Harvey Myerson, who formed Myerson & Kuhn.
See Rita Henley Jensen, Novel Trial on Billing Set to Begin; How Will Alleged Practices at Myerson &
Kuhn Be Judged?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 1.
47. See In re Reich, 515 N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Div. 1987).
48. See Ann Davis, The Descent and Rise of Ilan K. Reich, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 4, 1995, at A1
[hereinafter Davis, The Descent and Rise]. Following his conviction, Reich was incarcerated for
seven months and then spent six weeks in a half-way house. See Brill, supra note 46, at 4.
Thereafter, he was employed by a Manhattan investor’s company, where he earned more than
$300,000 annually. See id.; see also Ann Davis, One-Time Outcast Returns to the Bar, NAT’L L.J., Dec.
18, 1995, at A5.
49. Cooper was sentenced to six months of home confinement, three years of probation,
and 200 hours of community service. See Today’s News Update, N.Y. L.J., July 22, 1992, at 1. He
received a one-year suspension from practice, retroactive to the time of his interim suspension.
See In re Cooper, 613 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (App. Div. 1994).
50. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4)(a) (McKinney 1997) (stating that any attorney convicted of a
felony shall upon such conviction cease to be an attorney). A “felony” is defined as a felony
under the laws of New York or any criminal offense committed in any other state which, if
committed in New York, would constitute a felony there. See id. § 90(4)(e).
51. Prior to 1979, there was no opportunity for readmission after automatic disbarment

“serious crimes” pending a determination of the appropriate
sanction.52 On one level, these rules help protect the public and
promote consistency because they deal swiftly with all attorneys who
have been convicted of serious crimes by removing them from
practice. Viewed more closely, however, it is clear that even in these
cases, sanctions are not applied consistently, in part because judges
and disciplinary boards identify with the upper echelons of the bar,
and the best and the brightest often get the breaks.
In Cooper’s case, his conviction arose from his submission of
fraudulent billing statements to a client over a two-year period while
he was a partner in the law firm of Myerson & Kuhn.53 He was
suspended from the practice of law immediately upon his federal
conviction of a “serious crime.”54 Following a hearing, which
included character testimony from a federal judge and a partner at a
large Manhattan law firm,55 the disciplinary committee hearing panel,
composed of two members of the bar elite,56 one other lawyer and a
layperson, recommended a one-year retroactive suspension—
essentially a sanction of “time served.” The court affirmed the
panel’s recommendation without a single reference to any standards
or to its own precedent, noting the panel’s finding that “the inflation

unless the conviction was reversed or pardoned. See id. § 90 Historical Note; see also In re
Glucksman, 394 N.Y.S.2d 191, 192 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that a disbarred attorney could
not apply for reinstatement without reversal of, or pardon from, his felony conviction); Edward
Albert, How 42 Lawyers Were Disbarred in New York, BARRISTER, Summer 1980, at 6, 40. Since
then, only a handful of lawyers who were automatically disbarred for felony convictions have
been readmitted. See In re Reich, Report and Recommendation of Hearing Panel of the
Departmental Disciplinary Committee, First Judicial Department of New York, at 30-31 & n.31
(June 19, 1995) [hereinafter Report of Reich Hearing Panel] (noting that since 1978, only five
attorneys who have been subjected to felony disbarment have been reinstated).
52. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4)(f) (McKinney 1997). The suspension continues until the
attorney shows cause why a final order of suspension, censure or removal shall not be made and
a final order is entered. See id. § 90(4)(g). A “serious crime” includes any criminal offense
denominated a felony under the laws of another state or the United States which does not
constitute a felony in New York. See id. § 90(4)(d).
53. In re Cooper, 586 N.Y.S.2d 250, 250 (App. Div. 1992).
54. See id. Cooper was convicted of “conspiring to devise a scheme to defraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371.” Id.
55. See In re Cooper, Report of Hearing Panel of the Departmental Disciplinary Committee,
First Judicial Department of New York, at 14-15 (Jan. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Report of Cooper
Hearing Panel].
56. Joseph Irom, the chair of the hearing panel, was the former president of the Bronx
County Bar Association. See Shawn Assael, New Chief Aims to Calm Bronx Court, MANHATTAN
LAW., Aug. 30-Sept. 12, 1988, at 1. Another panel member, Joan Ellenbogen, was former Chair
of the Executive Committee of the prestigious Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
She was also active in other bar associations and a former Commissioner on the Commission on
Judicial Nominations to the New York Court of Appeals. See 12 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra
note 45, at 384B. For a discussion of the close relationship between segments of the New York
City Bar and the state courts, see POWELL, supra note 5, at 149.

of billables was due in large part to the pressure put on the
respondent as a young lawyer by Harvey Myerson, a ‘father figure’ to
him at his law firm.”57 Cooper, who was thirty-eight years old and ten
years out of law school when younger lawyers blew the whistle on the
criminal conspiracy within his firm to overbill clients,58 has since
resumed the practice of law. His Martindale-Hubbell listing touts his
Ivy-League background and his one-year stints as a law clerk to a
federal judge and as counsel to the Manhattan Borough president. It
makes no reference, however, to his association with the Myerson law
firm, his criminal conviction, or his suspension from the practice of
law.59
Cooper’s tale illustrates some of the current problems with the
imposition of lawyer discipline sanctions. First, the disciplinary
committee hearing panel composed of members of the bar elite60
recommended the lightest sanction possible under the circumstances
of the case. Second, the court approved the recommendation, even
though it had previously imposed harsher sanctions for similar
misconduct.61 Third, the court does not refer to any standards when
57. In re Cooper, 613 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (App. Div. 1994). The court also noted Cooper’s
cooperation with the government in its investigation of Myerson, although the cooperation
apparently was not as swift as it could have been. See Report of Cooper Hearing Panel, supra
note 55, at 11.
58. See Jensen, supra note 46, at 1.
59. See 12 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 45, at 1359B.
60. Historically, bar associations have been composed of the bar elite. See ABEL, supra note
18, at 44-45; POWELL, supra note 5, at 7-16. Although bar associations have become more
heterogeneous, lawyers often seek bar membership precisely because of the perceived
opportunities it may provide for contact with members of the bar elite and with judges. Lawyers
who are active in bar discipline committees often find themselves in symbiotic relationships with
judges. These relationships may make it difficult for lawyers to disregard character testimony
from judges, and perhaps less obviously, for judges to disregard the recommendations of
lawyers who sit on hearing panels. For example, in In re Cooper, 613 N.Y.S.2d 396 (App. Div.
1994), one of the members of the hearing panel frequently served on court-appointed
commissions and was well-known to some of the judges who later considered and adopted the
panel’s recommendations. See supra note 56.
61. See In re Gieger, 572 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (App. Div. 1991) (disbarring a partner in a law firm
for overbilling clients); see also In re Kroll, 630 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (App. Div. 1995) (disbarring a
partner in a law firm for overbilling clients and other related misconduct). See generally In re
Shapiro, 644 N.Y.S.2d 894, 895 (App. Div. 1996) (permitting a partner in a law firm who
submitted false bills to clients to resign in lieu of disbarment). In Gieger and Kroll, the court
characterized the overbilling of clients as “conversion.” See In re Kroll, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 515; In re
Gieger, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 13. Although the court did not characterize Cooper’s overbilling as
“conversion,” it readily could have done so: Cooper deliberately overbilled the client; the client
paid the money; the money was used by the firm and not returned; and the client was forced to
seek the return of $500,000 in the Myerson & Kuhn bankruptcy. See Jensen, supra note 46, at 1.
Interestingly, it appears that New York lawyers who attempt to defraud their partners or
employers through billing schemes are sometimes sanctioned more severely than lawyers who
attempt to defraud their own clients. Compare In re Cooper, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (imposing a oneyear retroactive suspension for overbilling a client), and In re Segall, 638 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445
(App. Div. 1996) (imposing public censure for deliberately overbilling a client by $1.2 million),
with In re Chernoff, 611 N.Y.S.2d 6, 8 (App. Div. 1994) (imposing disbarment for secretly billing

imposing discipline and its opinion provided no basis for predicting
the likely outcome in future cases.62 Fourth, the public was left with
no easy way to learn of Cooper’s disciplinary history when he
resumed practice.63
While Ilan Reich was disbarred under the automatic disbarment
rule for felonies and was required to wait a statutory seven-year
waiting period for reinstatement,64 his tale is equally troubling in
certain respects. Since 1978, only five people had been reinstated to
the New York Bar following automatic disbarment for a felony
conviction.65 After Reich’s disbarment for tipping an investment
banker about twelve deals in which his law firm was involved,66 Reich
mounted a well-orchestrated public relations campaign involving a
dozen luminaries from Wall Street law firms to gain reinstatement.
Using testimonials from leading lawyers whom he barely knew, he
amassed an impressive record.67 He was helped in his reinstatement
campaign by his brother, a partner in one of Manhattan’s most
prestigious law firms, and by his employer, a wealthy Manhattan
investor.68
and collecting fees belonging to law firm), and In re Cea, 610 N.Y.S.2d 229 (App. Div. 1994)
(imposing disbarment on an in-house lawyer for secretly billing and collecting loan processing
fees due employer).
62. A later discipline case involving another Myerson & Kuhn lawyer who overbilled clients
suggests the court’s concern with comparably treating lawyers who worked with Myerson. Thus,
Mark Segall, a Harvard-educated lawyer who overbilled clients by $1.2 million was publicly
censured because, unlike Cooper, he cooperated with the government from the outset of its
criminal investigation. See In re Segall, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 445. In contrast, the following year the
court imposed a one-year suspension, with a requirement that the lawyer apply for
reinstatement, on a solo criminal practitioner who, while suffering from depression, overbilled
an assigned counsel plan in the amount of $6,000. See In re Stone, 657 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 (App. Div.
1997).
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(5)(b) (McKinney 1997) (providing that if disbarment was based
upon a felony conviction, the court may modify or vacate the disbarment after seven years).
65. See Report of Reich Hearing Panel, supra note 51, at 30-31 & n.31. It is not known how
many reinstatement petitions were denied because the court does not maintain statistics
concerning the number of lawyers who apply for reinstatement following automatic disbarment.
See Telephone Interview with Sidney Gribetz, Secretary, New York Appellate Division First
Department, Committee on Character and Fitness (Mar. 6, 1998).
66. Reich began providing inside information to investment banker Dennis Levine in
March 1980, and did so sporadically until August 1984. He abandoned the scheme shortly
before he became a partner in the firm. See Report of Reich Hearing Panel, supra note 51, at
16-19.
67. It has been reported that “[a]fter making dozens of cold calls to eminent names and
humbling visits to mentors and friends of friends, Mr. Reich has organized his application to
the bar the way he once plotted billion-dollar takeover defenses.” Davis, The Descent and Rise,
supra note 48, at A1. He managed to enlist testimonials from bar luminaries including
Alexander D. Forger, president of the Legal Services Corp., Evan A. Davis, former counsel to
then-Governor Mario M. Cuomo and a law partner of Reich’s brother, and former New York
City Police Commissioner Robert McGuire. See id.
68. Ilan Reich’s employer, Richard Bernstein, reportedly encouraged friends and at least

Reich may have also benefited from the fact that the chair of the
disciplinary hearing panel was well-connected in the Manhattan bar
and, like Reich, was a partner in a well-respected corporate takeover
law firm.69 The chair of the panel supported reinstatement and wrote
a lengthy dissenting opinion noting that Reich “has offered a
convincing explanation as to how he found it within himself to
engage in insider trading and how he has changed since the
commission of his crimes.”70 The other members of the hearing
panel, a solo practitioner and the panel’s only non-lawyer, disagreed
and recommended against reinstatement.71 Nevertheless, in a one
paragraph opinion which contained no explanation of its reasoning,
the New York court unanimously reinstated Mr. Reich.72 Reich
resumed law practice shortly after his reinstatement.73
This tale of two classmates illustrates some of the problems with the
imposition of sanctions on lawyers, even in a state that purports to
utilize consistent rules for the treatment of lawyers convicted of
serious crimes. In Cooper’s case, no discernible standards were used
when imposing sanctions and the sanction actually imposed was
inconsistent with the sanctions imposed in other New York cases.74 As
Reich’s case suggests, the chances for resumption of the practice of
law may depend on “whom you know,” not “what you did.”75
one of his own white-shoe lawyers to write recommendations on Reich’s behalf. See id.
69. Jonathan Lerner, the chair of the panel, is head of the litigation department at
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, one of New York’s most prestigious law firms. See 12
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 45, at 1336B. He has also been involved for many years in
the activities of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, see FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL,
SECOND CIRCUIT REDBOOK 1997-1998 1157 (Vincent C. Alexander ed., 1997), and undoubtedly
was acquainted with several of the elite lawyers who were writing letters to the panel on Reich’s
behalf.
Mr. Lerner has worked to improve the ethics of the bar for many years, and I do not mean to
suggest that his conduct was improper. Nevertheless, his acquaintance with some of Reich’s
supporters may have colored his views and his opinion in the case clearly reflects his ability to
see the world from Reich’s perspective.
70. Report of Reich Hearing Panel, supra note 51, at 42.
71. See Davis, The Descent and Rise, supra note 48, at A1. In recommending against
reinstatement they wrote, “[w]e were somewhat off-put by what appeared to be a ‘campaign’ for
reinstatement, supported by letters from prominent persons who had no particular knowledge
of Reich.” Report of Reich Hearing Panel, supra note 51, at 9.
72. See In re Reich, 636 N.Y.S.2d 674 (App. Div. 1995). The court’s failure to articulate its
reasoning was particularly striking in view of the observation of the chair of the hearing panel
that recent court decisions “do not provide readily discernible guidelines for evaluating such
petitions.” Report of Reich Hearing Panel, supra note 51, at 24.
73. See Ann Davis, Back to M & A Work, NAT’L L.J., July 15, 1996, at A4 (reporting that seven
months after his reinstatement to the New York State Bar, Mr. Reich had become of counsel to
a 40–lawyer corporate law firm).
74. See supra note 61.
75. While this Article identifies examples of possible bias in the imposition of lawyer
sanctions, I do not mean to suggest that all decision-makers are biased in favor of lawyers or in
favor of lawyers who practice in certain settings. Nevertheless, there is undeniably some bias at
work in the lawyer discipline process, and that bias typically works to the benefit of lawyers.

Moreover, when practice resumes, the general public is left with no
easy way to learn of the lawyer’s misconduct.76
Before further exploring the problems with the ways in which the
sanctions imposed on lawyers are currently determined—and the
problems with the ABA Standards, in particular—it is useful to
consider the goals of lawyer discipline and the sanctions used to
achieve these goals. Only with these goals in mind is it possible to
understand fully the shortcomings of the current approaches to the
imposition of discipline and to identify ways to draft more effective
standards for the imposition of sanctions on lawyers.
II. THE PURPOSE OF SANCTIONS AND STANDARDS
A. The Goals of Lawyer Discipline
Three reasons are typically cited for imposing discipline on lawyers:
first and foremost, protection of the public,77 second, protection of
the administration of justice78 and third, preservation of confidence
76. The sanctions imposed on Cooper and Reich were publicized at the time they were
imposed. See Reich is Disbarred for Role in Inside-Trading Scandal, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1987, at 8;
Today’s News Update, supra note 49, at 1. However, it is unlikely that most members of the public
would have an easy way of learning of these sanctions once the lawyers resumed practice. See
infra notes 332-33 (explaining why most clients are unlikely to find and read published notices
of discipline).
77. See, e.g., In re Merrill, 875 P.2d 128, 131 (Ariz. 1994); In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 12 (D.C.
1997); In re Brown, 674 So. 2d 243, 246 (La. 1996); Board v. Dineen, 557 A.2d 610, 614 (Me.
1989); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 692 A.2d 465, 472 (Md. 1997); In re Olson, 577
N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. 1998); In re Harris, 890 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Mo. 1994); In re Imbriani, 694
A.2d 1030, 1035 (N.J. 1997); In re Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 974 (Wash. 1990); ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 7, at Standard 1.1 Commentary.
78. See, e.g., In re Brady, 923 P.2d 836, 840 (Ariz. 1996); Statewide Grievance Comm. v.
Botwick, 627 A.2d 901, 906 (Conn. 1993); In re Chandler, 641 N.E.2d 473, 479 (Ill. 1994); In re
Quaid, 646 So. 2d 343, 350 (La. 1994); In re Hartke, 529 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Minn. 1995); In re
Bourcier, 939 P.2d 604, 608 (Or. 1997); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 1.1. In its
narrowest sense, the concern is with lawyers who subvert the judicial process by misrepresenting
the facts or law to the court, suborning perjury, or otherwise engaging in conduct that unfairly
interferes with the truth-seeking activities of the courts or the smooth functioning of the legal
system.
Viewed more broadly, the concern about protecting the administration of justice also reflects
an effort to preserve the public’s support for legal institutions. Lawyers, by virtue of their
education and their near monopoly on legal practice, continue to be viewed as the gatekeepers
to the law and the courts. While this may be changing as more lay people turn to self-help and
non-lawyers assume roles traditionally filled by lawyers, see generally Deborah L. Rhode, The
Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 214-16 (1990) (discussing
the increased market for legal services provided by laypersons), the concern remains that if
lawyers do not adhere to certain minimum standards of conduct and are not disciplined
appropriately when they fail to do so, respect for the law and legal institutions will be
undermined, see In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. 1988) (noting that stern sanctions
are needed to restore the public’s trust in legal system); In re Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 974 (Wash.
1990) (stating that sanctions must maintain public confidence in legal institutions and enhance
respect for the law).

in the legal profession.79 While most courts insist that the purpose of
lawyer discipline is not to punish lawyers,80 this assertion is probably
incorrect.81 In fact, many lawyer sanctions fit within classic definitions
of “punishment”82 and can be justified by the traditional utilitarian
79. While preservation of confidence in the legal profession is related to concerns about
protecting the administration of justice, see supra note 78, it is often cited separately. See, e.g., In
re Agostini, 632 A.2d 80, 81 (Del. 1993); In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 199 (D.C. 1990); In re
Hahm, 577 A.2d 503, 506 (N.J. 1990); In re Berk, 602 A.2d 946, 950 (Vt. 1991); In re Felice, 772
P.2d 505, 509 (Wash. 1989); Bene, supra note 18, at 912. In some cases the stated interest in
protecting confidence in the legal profession seems to reflect a separate concern about
preserving the professional status of lawyers. See, e.g., Emil v. Mississippi State Bar, 690 So. 2d
301, 327 (Miss. 1997) (voicing concern about the diminished status of lawyers and about the
need to preserve the dignity and reputation of the profession).
80. See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882) (stating that disbarment proceeding “is
not for the purpose of punishment”); In re Brown, 910 P.2d 631, 634 (Ariz. 1996); In re
Imbriani, 694 A.2d 1030, 1035 (N.J. 1997); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zdrok, 645 A.2d
830, 834 (Pa. 1994); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 1.1 Commentary; Kelly, supra
note 8, at n.6 (noting that the purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is not to punish
attorneys); Bene, supra note 18, at 912 & n.19 (noting that courts reject “punishment” of
attorney as a justification for discipline). But see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (noting
that disbarment “is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer”); In re Fordham, 668
N.E.2d 816, 824 (Mass. 1996) (stating that disciplinary sanctions constitute a punishment or
penalty); Stegall v. Mississippi State Bar, 618 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Miss. 1993); In re Rentel, 729
P.2d 615, 618 (Wash. 1986). See generally Gay v. Virginia State Bar, 389 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Va.
1990) (referring to lawyer sanctions as “punishments”); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Hobbs,
439 S.E.2d 629, 634 (W. Va. 1993) (considering what steps would “appropriately punish” the
attorney); Wilkins, supra note 18, at 806 (arguing that disciplinary agencies, following a criminal
justice analogue, mainly stress punishment and deterrence).
81. The claim that lawyer sanctions are not “punishment” appears in part to be a reflexive
restatement of case law going back to Lord Mansfield, see Ex parte Brounsall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1385
(K.B. 1778), and in part designed to avoid claims that lawyer discipline proceedings are entitled
to the rigorous constitutional protections afforded criminal proceedings.
The attempt to prescribe the circumstances under which stringent constitutional protections
should be afforded persons subject to state-imposed sanctions has proved exceedingly difficult.
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 778 (1997). The lawyer discipline process traditionally has
been viewed as not deserving the same protections afforded criminal punishment, but it is
afforded some protections. As the Supreme Court has noted, the issue is not “whether lawyers
are entitled to due process of law in matters of this kind, but, rather what process is
constitutionally due them in such circumstances.” Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 129 (1961),
overruled by Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); see also Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550 (holding that a
lawyer is entitled to notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard in a disciplinary
proceeding); Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514 (holding that privilege against self-incrimination is
available in disciplinary proceedings); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS
OF LAW AND ETHICS 791-92 (5th ed. 1998) (describing other due process rights afforded lawyers
in disciplinary proceedings).
82. Courts, philosophers and legal commentators have struggled to define the essence of
punishment. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 19-34
(1968); Steiker, supra note 81, at 781-82. In one frequently cited definition, punishment is
defined in terms of five elements which seem present in most lawyer sanctioning decisions:
(1) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant.
(2) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(3) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(4) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.
(5) It must be intentionally administered by an authority constituted by a legal system
against which the offence is committed.
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1968). This is, however, an incomplete

justifications of criminal punishment: incapacitation, rehabilitation,
and deterrence.83
Although the traditional approach to lawyer discipline follows a
quasi-criminal model,84 in recent years a consumer protection
approach to lawyer misconduct has emerged.85 The latter approach
recognizes that much dissatisfaction with lawyers arises from their
failure to perform legal services properly—often due to neglect,
incompetence, or failure to communicate with clients—and attempts
to respond to these problems in a manner that addresses consumer
interests. Increasingly, some of the sanctions imposed on lawyers
reflect a consumer dispute resolution approach to lawyer misconduct
and are based on theories of restitution and reconciliation.86

definition. At a minimum, “punishment” also connotes “a moral dimension of responsibility
and blame.” See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 99
(1994).
83. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES--LAW WITHOUT ORDER 106 (1973);
PACKER, supra note 82, at 39-58. Judicial uncertainty about whether to characterize lawyer
sanctions as civil or quasi-criminal further illustrates the relationship between theories of
criminal punishment and lawyer discipline. See generally Allen Blumenthal, Attorney SelfRegulation, Consumer Protection, and the Future of the Legal Profession, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 6, 18
n.16 (1994) (noting that courts have difficulty categorizing lawyer discipline proceedings as civil
or quasi-criminal); Dorf, supra note 4, at 18-22 (describing uncertainty regarding whether
disbarment proceedings are civil or criminal); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 4, at 926 n.12
(describing disciplinary actions as a quasi-criminal process). At different times, the United
States Supreme Court has characterized lawyer sanctions as both civil and quasi-criminal.
Compare Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. at 288 (stating that disbarment proceeding “is in its nature civil,
and collateral to any criminal prosecution”), with Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 551 (stating that
disbarment involves “adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature”). Other courts refer to
lawyer disciplinary proceedings as neither civil nor criminal, but sui generis. See, e.g., People v.
Wechsler, 854 P.2d 217, 221 n.2 (Colo. 1993); see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard
2.1 Commentary; Dorf, supra note 4, at 20-21.
84. In most states, disciplinary counsel serve as prosecutors with the power to subpoena,
investigate, and bring “charges” upon a finding of probable cause. See COLD, supra note 9, at
Q 39A, Q 40A, Q 41; Deborah M. Chalfie, Dumping Discipline: A Consumer Protection Model for
Regulating Lawyers, 4 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 4, 7 (Fall 1991). See generally MODEL RULES FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rules 4, 11, 14 (1996) (providing that disciplinary counsel
“shall perform all prosecutorial functions”).
85. Consumer advocates argue that the ideal consumer-oriented system is not a lawyer
discipline system, but rather a consumer protection system with responsibility to mediate
disputes. See Kay A. Ostberg, The Conflict of Interest in Lawyer Self-Regulation, PROF. LAW., Summer
1989, at 6, 9; see also Chalfie, supra note 84, at 4 (arguing that if consumer protection is key,
then lawyer regulation should not be modeled after the criminal justice system).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 123-28. As the discussion in the following section
demonstrates, all of the sanctions imposed on lawyers are designed, at least in part, to protect
consumers of legal services. None is purely retributive.

B. The Sanctions and Their Purpose87
1.

Incapacitating sanctions
The sanctions of disbarment and suspension have long been used
to discipline lawyers and protect the public through incapacitation.88
Incapacitation theory holds that punishment should protect the
public by physically confining the wrongdoer or taking other steps to
prevent the person from committing further wrongs.89 In the
criminal context, imprisonment, banishment, electronic surveillance,
and castration are all forms of incapacitation.90
Disbarment and suspension are incapacitating sanctions because
they are designed to prevent errant lawyers from committing future
wrongs by precluding them from practicing law during the period of
incapacitation. Disbarment terminates the lawyer’s status as a
lawyer.91 Suspension removes a lawyer from practice for some period
of time.92
The primary differences between disbarment and
suspension are usually the length of incapacitation, the requirements
for resuming practice,93 and the degree of the stigma attached to the
sanction.94
87. In this section, I describe the most commonly used disciplinary sanctions and the
reasons why they are employed. Some sanctions described below can be placed into more than
one category, but they have been grouped for ease of discussion with an eye toward their most
common use or most salient characteristic.
88. The sanctions of disbarment and suspension have been imposed on lawyers since the
medieval period. See Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of
Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 123-30 (1998). These sanctions have been used in this
country since colonial times. See GERARD W. GEWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS 1760-1840 8, 48, 61 (1979); see also
Gallagher, supra note 5, at 509 (describing colonial regulation of lawyers in Virginia).
89. See PACKER, supra note 82, at 48-50.
90. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1899 (1991).
91. As a practical matter, disbarments typically incapacitate for a minimum period of five
to seven years before a petition for reinstatement will be considered. See COLD, supra note 9, at
Q 56C; see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.2 Commentary. Eight states and the
District of Columbia can impose permanent disbarment without the possibility of
reinstatement. See COLD, supra note 9, at Q 56D.
92. The maximum length of suspension is usually no more than five years, although some
suspensions are “indefinite.” See COLD, supra note 9, at Q 57D.
93. In cases of disbarment, indefinite suspensions or, in most jurisdictions, suspensions of
more than a year, lawyers must apply for reinstatement and bear the burden of proof in such a
hearing. The burden typically includes a showing by clear and convincing evidence of
rehabilitation from the conditions or attitudes that caused the problem, compliance with
disciplinary orders, and competence to practice law. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at
Standard 2.3 Commentary, Standard 2.10 Commentary; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 132-33 (2d ed. 1986).
94. Although a lengthy suspension and disbarment may have the same impact on an
attorney’s livelihood, the condemnation associated with the sanction of disbarment is greater.
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.2 Commentary; WOLFRAM, supra note 93, at
128.

These sanctions are designed to protect the public and the
administration of justice by removing the bad actors from the
practice of law.95
Although the sanctions work through
incapacitation, they are believed to serve significant deterrent96 and
expressive functions97 as well. Incapacitating sanctions are typically
reserved for the “worst” types of misconduct: thefts of funds from
clients, fraud on the courts, crimes that seriously place in question
the lawyer’s integrity, and repeated wrongdoing even after discipline
has been imposed.98
2.

Expressive sanctions
The imposition of any sanction expresses a message to the errant
lawyer, other attorneys, and the general public about the level of
blame and social condemnation attached to the misconduct.99
95. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mitchell, 418 S.E.2d 733, 737 (W. Va. 1992) (noting
that disbarment “removes a bad lawyer from preying on an unsuspecting world”); Steele &
Nimmer, supra note 4, at 925; see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, Standard 2.2 Commentary.
96. See PACKER, supra note 82, at 39. Deterrence theory focuses on the “inhibiting effect
that punishment . . . will have on the actions of those who are otherwise disposed to commit
crime.” Deterrence theory posits that punishment is inflicted to deter future wrongdoing by
the person being punished (specific deterrence) and by others who might commit wrongs
(general deterrence). See id. According to deterrence theory, punishment is so unpleasant
that neither the individual who is being sanctioned nor those who observe the punishment
would engage in similar misconduct in the future because of fear of similar sanction. In recent
years, deterrence has been cited frequently as a justification for the sanctions of disbarment and
suspension. See, e.g., In re Retter, 885 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ariz. 1994) (stating that suspension is
necessary to achieve goals of deterring respondent and other attorneys from engaging in
unethical behavior); In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that
indefinite suspension will “serve as a warning” that future misconduct impinging on integrity of
legal system will not be tolerated). See generally Florida State Bar v. Pellegrini, 714 So. 2d 448,
453 (Fla. 1998) (explaining that bar discipline must be severe enough to deter others from
similar misconduct); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So. 2d 444, 445 (La. 1992)
(stating that attorney discipline protects the public by deterring attorney misconduct); In re
Concemi, 662 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Mass. 1996) (noting that the court must consider “what
measure of discipline is necessary to deter other attorneys from the same behavior”).
97. Punishment is a way in which society expresses its view that the wrongdoer did
something blameworthy. Through this expression, society reinforces its values. See SALTZBURG
ET AL., supra note 82, at 110. The forms and conventions of punishment are important because
the conventions underlying different sanctions signify different levels of condemnation. See
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 599-600 (1996). For
example, in the case of criminal punishment, incarceration expresses more condemnation than
fines or community service. See id. at 592-93. In the case of lawyer discipline, disbarment
expresses more condemnation than a public reprimand.
98. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standards 4.11, 4.21, 4.31, 4.41; see also Steele &
Nimmer, supra note 4, at 996-97.
99. See supra note 97. See generally David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic
Dimension of Criminal Justice, in 11 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 191, 193-203 (Austin
Sarat et al. eds., 1991); Kahan, supra note 97, at 593 (noting that punishment “is a special social
convention that signifies moral condemnation”).
Generally, the choice of sanctions reflects the relative seriousness of the wrongdoing. The
degree and form of affliction on the wrongdoer signals society’s view of the act. See id. at 598.

Although all sanctions are, in this sense, expressive, the term
“expressive sanction” is used here to describe sanctions that are
designed to achieve the goals of lawyer discipline primarily through
the message of disapproval they convey rather than through any
additional burden they may place on the lawyer. The two sanctions
most commonly imposed on lawyers—public reprimand and private
admonition100—are examples of expressive sanctions.
Public reprimands and private admonitions emerged early in this
century and are widely utilized today as a means of conveying
disapproval of lawyer conduct that did not seem to warrant
incapacitating sanctions.101 Indeed, these expressive sanctions have
become the sanction of choice in most discipline cases.102 Public
reprimands typically involve publication of the lawyer’s name, the
details of the misconduct and the fact that the reprimand has been
issued.103 The sanction derives its power from the value that lawyers
place on their reputations and the resulting humiliation in having
the misconduct publicized.104 Private admonitions, in contrast, are
used to convey disapproval concerning attorney misconduct that may
not be viewed as serious, but that nonetheless violates ethical
standards. Such admonitions usually are delivered in writing or
during a personal appearance before a court or disciplinary
authority.105 Private admonitions have little or no deterrent effect on

100. While the term “private admonition” is used here to describe any form of private
discipline, it is called an “admonition” in the ABA Standards, see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7,
at Standard 2.6, and is also known as a “warning” or a “private censure” in other jurisdictions,
see, e.g., ARK. PROCEDURES REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS § 7(D)(5); COLO. R.P.
REGARDING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 241.7(4).
101. Public and private reprovals were apparently used in California by the 1920s. See ABEL,
supra note 18, at 146 (noting that the California Bar issued 84 public and 77 private reprovals in
its early years). Nevertheless, it appears that many jurisdictions lacked private admonitions as
late as 1970. See PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 92. At that time the
Clark Commission noted the need to vest the power to admonish in all disciplinary agencies in
order to provide some method of dealing with “minor” misconduct. See id. The reasons for the
recommendation included concern about dismissing obviously meritorious claims that did not
warrant the expenditure of resources in formal disciplinary proceedings. See id. at 92-93. These
dismissals angered the public and failed to inform lawyers that the conduct engaged in was
unacceptable. See id. at 93-94.
102. See SOLD 1996, supra note 14, at 5-9 fig. II. In 1996, 2635 private sanctions and 814
public reprimands were imposed on lawyers in the reporting jurisdictions, for a total of 3449
expressive sanctions. In contrast, 2962 other sanctions were imposed. See id.
103. Public reprimands are delivered to the lawyer in writing or in person. See COLD, supra
note 9, at Q 59F. At a minimum, information about the reprimand appears in disciplinary
opinions that are available to the public. The reprimands often appear in legal publications as
well. See id. at Q 59J. For a further discussion of the publication of reprimands, see infra notes
330-33 and accompanying text.
104. See WOLFRAM, supra note 93, at 127.
105. See, e.g., COLO. R.P. REGARDING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 241.7; WASH. R. LAWYER
DISCIPLINE 5.5(b).

other lawyers because they usually are not publicized.106 They are
thought to promote specific deterrence and to provide a means of
maintaining a record of attorney misconduct.107
3.

Rehabilitative sanctions
Increased recognition of the pressures under which lawyers
practice today and the relationship of those pressures to lawyer
misconduct have heightened interest in the possibility of
rehabilitation and expanded the range of sanctions imposed on
lawyers. Rehabilitation theory is premised on the belief that human
behavior is mutable and that punishment should be used to influence
a wrongdoer’s behavior, primarily by providing opportunities for
reflection that actually change the wrongdoer’s attitudes and
actions.108 Although policy makers and the public now seriously
question whether much criminal behavior can be reformed, and
rehabilitation as a justification for criminal punishment has lost some
of its luster,109 the possibility of rehabilitation continues to influence
thinking about lawyer discipline. This may be due, in part, to a belief
that lawyers are more “reformable” than most persons who commit
crimes, and to the belief that lawyer misconduct can often be
attributed to short-term psychological problems or substance abuse,
and is therefore “treatable.”
106. See COLD, supra note 9, at Q 60D. Some jurisdictions simply list the number of private
admonitions imposed, accompanied by two or three word explanations of the types of
misconduct that occurred. See, e.g., Discipline Reports, 45 LA. B.J. 114 (1997). In a few
jurisdictions, some of the facts giving rise to the misconduct are published without the names of
the attorneys. The details about the misconduct are typically very sketchy. See, e.g., Disciplinary
Case Summaries, COLO. LAW., Jan. 1996, at 75-76; Discipline Corner, UTAH B.J., Nov. 1997, at 24.
107. See PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 94.
108. See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2, 12-13 (1981);
PACKER, supra note 82, at 53-55.
Shortly after the American Revolution, society began to focus on rehabilitation as one of the
goals of criminal punishment. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 77-78 (1993). The rehabilitation justification for criminal punishment
originally relied upon incapacitation. Penitentiaries were built to provide a way for criminals to
be removed from the evil forces in society and to reflect on the errors of their ways. See id. at 7782. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the belief in rehabilitation brought with it the
concept of probation. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 518-19 (2d ed.
1985). Other reforms during the 1800s that were based on rehabilitation theory included
suspended sentences and indeterminate sentences. See id. at 519.
109. The decline of rehabilitation as a justification for criminal punishment has been well
documented elsewhere. See ALLEN, supra note 108; Steiker, supra note 81, at 788-91. At the
same time, the continued interest in certain types of alternative sanctions indicates that
rehabilitation theory unquestionably continues to influence the imposition of criminal
sanctions. See Kahan, supra note 97, at 630-52 (discussing shaming sanctions as an alternative
penalty); Developments in the Law-–Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1894-1949
(1998) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (detailing alternative sanctions for drug offenders,
female offenders, and non-violent offenders).

Two commonly used rehabilitative sanctions are probation and
mandatory education in professional responsibility.110 Probation is
imposed when it is determined that a lawyer’s right to practice law
needs to be monitored or limited rather than revoked111 and when it
appears that the conduct at issue can be corrected. Terms of
probation may include supervision by another member of the bar,112
limitations on practice, audits of trust accounts, and periodic physical
or mental examinations.113
Requirements that lawyers take a
professional responsibility course or pass a professional responsibility
examination114 are also justified on the theory that a lawyer’s attitudes
and behaviors can be changed if the lawyer receives appropriate
instruction.
The influence of rehabilitation theory on lawyer discipline can also
be seen in the recent willingness to consider recovery from mental
disability, alcoholism and chemical dependency as a mitigating factor
when imposing discipline.115 Although personal problems have long
110. The use of “suspended” or “deferred” suspensions also reflects the impact of
rehabilitation theory on lawyer sanctions. See, e.g., In re Baxter, 940 P.2d 37, 42 (Kan. 1997); In
re King, 679 So. 2d 902, 903 (La. 1996); In re Riviera, 813 P.2d 1015, 1016 (N.M. 1991); Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Utacht, 689 N.E.2d 543, 545 (Ohio 1998); In re Fitting, 742 P.2d 609,
611 (Or. 1987).
111. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.7 Commentary. In 1996, 350 sanctions
of probation were imposed in the reporting jurisdictions. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 24,
at 15-16.
112. The level of supervision required can vary considerably. For example, in In re Hunter,
656 A.2d 203, 209 (Vt. 1994), the court ordered that during Hunter’s probation a member of
the bar acceptable to bar counsel was to perform a monthly review of Hunter’s caseload. The
court further required Hunter to file reports verifying this review and probation counsel was
required to make written recommendations regarding Hunter’s practice. See id. In contrast,
the court in In re Billewicz, 641 A.2d 368, 369 (Vt. 1994), merely required respondent to consult
with experienced members of the bar when doubts arose about ethical matters during the
period of probation. See id.
113. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.7 Commentary (stating that conditions
of probation may include periodic physical or mental examinations); see also In re Rivkind, 791
P.2d 1037, 1044 (Ariz. 1990) (requiring random drug testing and a “sobriety monitor”
responsible for ensuring that the lawyer attend AA and NA meetings); Florida Bar v. Rocha, 453
So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 1984) (ordering psychological testing and continued counseling as
recommended by a psychologist); In re Baxter, 940 P.2d at 42 (requiring mandatory
examination by psychiatrist on a quarterly basis); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Baas, 681 N.E.2d 421,
423 (Ohio 1997) (imposing random alcohol testing and examination by physician prior to
termination of probation).
114. See, e.g., In re Redondo, 861 P.2d 619, 624 (Ariz. 1993) (ordering as a condition of
probation that the lawyer take and complete a course on rules of professional conduct and pass
an examination on the subject given by the state bar); In re Bailey, 478 S.E.2d 131, 132 (Ga.
1996) (ordering indefinite suspension until attorney complies with conditions including
successful completion of the Georgia State Bar’s Ethics School); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7,
at Standard 2.8(e) (listing the bar exam and professional responsibility exam as sanctions which
may be imposed).
115. See, e.g., In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 324, 326-27 (D.C. 1987) (treating rehabilitation
from alcoholism as a mitigating factor); Allen County Bar Ass’n v. Chamberlain, 685 N.E.2d
1231, 1233 (Ohio 1997) (ordering that attorney receive only a public reprimand after
considering his efforts at rehabilitation); State v. Prather, 925 P.2d 28, 30 (Okla. 1996) (taking

been considered mitigating factors, the attitude toward drug and
alcohol addiction and mental disabilities historically was less
sympathetic.116 As mental illness has become better understood and
drug and alcohol abuse have come to be viewed as diseases rather
than intentional conduct, sanctions for serious misconduct have been
substantially reduced based on evidence that treatment has been
successful or will continue.117
4.

Consumer-oriented responses
Consumer-oriented responses to lawyer misconduct evolved from
the recognition that the practice of law is, in large part, a commercial
enterprise, and that consumers of legal services should be entitled to
the same types of protections afforded consumers of goods and
services. Beginning in the 1960s, and with increasing momentum
during the 1970s,118 a consumer-oriented approach to attorney
into account a lawyer’s attempts to treat his attention deficit disorder in the imposition of
discipline); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 9.32(i)(3) (listing recovery from mental
disability or chemical dependence as mitigating factors).
116. This attitude continues to prevail in some jurisdictions, at least where serious
misconduct occurs. See, e.g., In re Roth, 658 A.2d 1264, 1274 (N.J. 1995) (declining to consider
depression as a mitigating factor in a misappropriation case); In re Terner, 577 A.2d 511, 519
(N.J. 1990) (declining to treat drug rehabilitation efforts as a mitigating factor); In re Floyd, 468
S.E.2d 302, 304 (S.C. 1995) (refusing to permit evidence of depression to mitigate a sanction of
disbarment). See generally Grievance Panel v. Millstein, No. CV-940538618S, 1997 WL 345356, at
*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1997) (disbarring the attorney notwithstanding evidence of
rehabilitation from alcoholism); In re Hahm, 577 A.2d 503, 506 (N.J. 1990) (same).
117. See, e.g., In re Rivkind, 791 P.2d at 1043-45 (imposing a lesser sanction due in part to
evidence of rehabilitation); People v. Barbieri, 935 P.2d 12, 13 (Colo. 1997) (imposing a lesser
sanction based in part on the understanding that the lawyer would continue in therapy until
discharged); see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 9.32(i)(3) (providing for
mitigation when recovery is demonstrated by a sustained period of rehabilitation). In some
states, lawyer assistance programs designed to help lawyers with alcohol and substance abuse
problems are directly incorporated into the disciplinary scheme. See FLA. STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 10.1 (1998) (providing that attorneys accused of
personal use of controlled substances will be advised of the existence of Florida Lawyers’
Assistance, Inc., and that good faith, ongoing rehabilitation with F.L.A., Inc. will be viewed as
mitigation).
118. In the early 1970s, the Watergate affair, which involved several lawyers, raised serious
questions about lawyers’ ethics and their commitment to the public interest. See JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 263-308 (1976); see also Garbus & Seligman, supra note 28, at 47.
During this time, the emerging consumer-rights movement and legal services movement began
to work together to challenge some time-honored bar practices, revealing that the bar’s “ethical
rules” often served to preserve lawyers’ economic self-interests. See ABEL, supra note 18, at 229;
POWELL, supra note 5, at 156-60; see also Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 706-16, 721-28, 731-32 (1977) (arguing that the Code of
Professional Responsibility protects lawyers’ economic interests to the detriment of consumers).
For example, court challenges to lawyer advertising rules rocked some of the basic assumptions
about the law as a “profession” as opposed to a business. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977) (striking down ethics rules restricting advertising of legal services as violative of the First
Amendment); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (finding the ethical
practice of using minimum fee schedules violative of the Sherman Act).

regulation evolved both inside and outside the bar.119 The consumer
movement and bar self-studies broadened the conception of the
dangers to which consumers of legal services are exposed beyond
obvious ethical lapses, such as theft from clients and fraud on the
court.120 The new consumer orientation highlighted the need to
redress the most ignored but most common client complaints about
lawyers: neglect of client matters, failure to communicate and lack of
basic competence.121 Consumer advocates also criticized the stated
119. See Chalfie, supra note 84, at 4; Gallagher, supra note 5, at 535 & n.306. One sign of
public dissatisfaction was the formation in 1978 of Help Abolish Legal Tyranny (“HALT”), an
Organization of Americans for Legal Reform. HALT has been a vocal critic of lawyer selfregulation and of lawyer discipline, in particular. See Michael L. Prigoff & Howard Stern, The
New Jersey State Bar Association’s Task Force on the Disciplinary System, N.J. LAW., Oct. 4, 1993, at S1;
Kay Ostberg, Deputy Director of HALT, The Conflict of Interest in Self Regulation, Statement
Before the Comm’n on the Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement of the ABA (Aug. 4, 1990)
(on file with author).
120. Historically, discipline systems ignored or trivialized complaints about neglect and
overcharging unless the violations were repeated or egregious. See Chalfie, supra note 84, at 5
(noting that “[t]o rise to the occasion of a disciplinary violation the neglect must be repeated or
intentional, the overcharge must be unconscionable”); see also JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT
THE BAR: LAWYERS’ UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 200-02 (1978) (discussing
instances where grievance committees dismissed complaints regarding neglect and
overcharging); Martyn, supra note 18, at 716-17 (reporting that “only repeated acts of
misconduct constitute incompetence of sufficient severity to justify official action”); Steele &
Nimmer, supra note 4, at 923, 967-69, 996-99 (noting lack of attention paid to these
complaints). This may be due, in part, to the fact that disciplinary committees failed to
consider neglect and incompetence as ethical violations until recently, and therefore
complaints based upon those problems were not viewed as falling within the committee’s
jurisdiction. See generally LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at 11, 13.
In 1970, the Clark Commission noted the problem that disciplinary agencies lacked
procedures to dispose of “minor” misconduct such as failures to keep clients advised of the
status of their cases and isolated instances of neglect. See PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 92. By 1992, the ABA’s McKay Commission, which was charged
with reexamining the state of lawyer discipline, viewed this problem as even more critical. The
McKay Commission stressed the need to address consumer complaints that lawyers’ services
were overpriced or unreasonably slow and complaints that lawyers were incompetent or
negligent. See LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at xv.
121. See Martyn, supra note 18, at 723-43 (suggesting ways to address the bar’s failure to
respond to complaints based on lawyer incompetence); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 4, at 92324 (suggesting that an alternative definition of disciplinary agency’s function may be needed to
address complaints concerning the quality of legal services rendered); Kay Ostberg, Deputy
Director of HALT, Alternative Models of Lawyer Regulation, Statement Before the Comm’n on
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement of the ABA (May 4, 1990) (on file with author)
(suggesting alternative regulatory structure to address quality of service issues); see also LAWYER
REGULATION, supra note 12, at xv-xvi, 13 (noting the need for additional avenues to redress the
most common client complaints). For example, complaints involving neglect of clients,
unreturned calls and missed filing deadlines accounted for nearly half of all complaints in
Arizona. See Project Information Form, ABA E. Smythe Gambrell Fund for Professionalism
Application 1991-92 (on file with author); see also SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS: TEACHING AND
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 95 (1997) (noting that most complaints filed in New York City
describe neglect, poor service, and poor communication); Arnold R. Rosenfeld, The Bar
Disciplinary Process in Massachusetts, 79 MASS. L. REV. 180, 184 (1994) (noting that the largest
number of complaints received in Massachusetts allege neglect); Mark Chesire, More Lawyers
Facing Discipline Outgoing Member of Grievance Commission Questions Figures, DAILY REC. (Balt.),
Nov. 20, 1997, at 1 (reporting that “neglect, a lack of diligence or communication” is the most

objective of most disciplinary systems of maintaining minimum
ethical standards rather than protecting legal consumers.122
The recognition of the need to address consumer complaints
brought with it the realization that different disciplinary responses
may be required. Indeed, restitution and conciliation, rather than
punishment are the main goals of the consumer movement.123 Thus,
while consumer advocates continue to support the use, in certain
cases, of incapacitating sanctions to protect the public, the
conception of public protection has been broadened to address
complaints about the quality of legal services provided, and to
develop more efficient and cost-effective methods of dispute
resolution for clients.
Client complaints about lawyer services and fees are now being
addressed in two ways. First, lawyer discipline systems are addressing
these complaints with traditional disciplinary responses such as
expressive sanctions, probation and restitution.124 Completion of
lawyer skills and law office management courses are frequently a part
of the discipline imposed.125 Expedited procedures for handling
complaints of “minor misconduct” are used to resolve cases quickly
and with fewer resources than are devoted to other types of
complaints.126
Second, state courts and state bars are also increasingly establishing
programs outside of lawyer discipline systems to deal with “minor

frequent reason for disciplinary action in Maryland); Disciplinary Comm’n Annual Report, 1994-95,
RES GESTAE, Mar. 1996, at 14, 20 (noting that misconduct most often giving rise to grievances in
Indiana was “poor communication or non-diligence”).
122. See, e.g., Chalfie, supra note 84, at 5.
123. See id. at 6; Ostberg, supra note 121, at 7-9, 24-26.
124. Incapacitating sanctions are typically imposed only when there is complete
abandonment of client matters, a pattern of neglect, or a history of repeated neglect. See, e.g.,
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standards 4.41, 4.42.
125. See Drociak v. State Bar, 804 P.2d 711, 715 (Cal. 1991) (ordering completion of a law
office management course and submission of a law office management plan as a condition of
probation); Florida Bar v. Birdsong, 661 So. 2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 1995) (requiring lawyer to
complete law office management course); In re Lyles, 469 S.E.2d 670, 672 (Ga. 1996) (requiring
disciplined attorney to obtain a certificate from the Law Practice Management Program of
Georgia Bar within 90 days after reinstatement). Requirements that lawyers complete
additional Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) requirements or pass a bar examination are
also among the sanctions imposed on lawyers. See In re Nomura, SB-96-0005-D, 1996 Ariz.
LEXIS 8, at *4 (Jan. 26, 1996) (requiring the lawyer to take additional six hours of CLE in
ethics during each of two years of probation); Drociak, 804 P.2d at 715 (requiring the lawyer to
take a professional responsibility examination); In re Elmore, 934 P.2d 273, 276 (N.M. 1997)
(requiring the lawyer to complete 40 hours of CLE in bankruptcy law and to pass the MPRE to
be eligible for reinstatement).
126. See LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at 49-52 (discussing expedited procedures for
“minor misconduct”).

misconduct.”127 In some states, diversion programs provide the public
with a way to pursue certain types of complaints through mediation
or other non-disciplinary avenues.128
These programs typically
prescribe “remedies” but do not impose stigmatizing sanctions.129 Not
surprisingly, consumer groups contend that these programs should
not be administered by the bar.130

127. In 1992, the ABA adopted the recommendations of the McKay Commission that courts
establish a system of regulation consisting of component agencies including, but not limited to,
a lawyer discipline system, mandatory arbitration of fee disputes, and voluntary arbitration of
malpractice claims. See LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at 14-16. The Commission also
recommended the adoption of procedures in lieu of discipline to deal with “minor
misconduct,” including “minor incompetence” and “minor neglect.” See id. at 48-49.
128. For example, the Arizona State Bar has created a diversion program for complaints
involving office management issues which permits the transfer of such complaints to a
“probation-type program, freeing up the formal discipline system for more serious offenses and
providing education and rehabilitation for individual lawyers.” SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONAL COMMITTEE:
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, 117 (1996); see also ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 52(a)(11).
Tennessee has established “practice and professionalism enhancement programs” to which
eligible disciplinary cases may be diverted. See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9, §§ 30.1, 30.2. The Missouri
Bar has a Complaint Resolution Program for mediation of “minor” complaints that are referred
by the chief disciplinary counsel. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.10. California, the District of Columbia,
Florida, New Jersey, New York and North Carolina also provide for diversion of minor
disciplinary complaints. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.14 (West 1997); D.C. B.R. XI, § 8.1;
FLA. B.R. 3-5.3; N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(i)(2)(B)(i); N.Y. SUP. CT. R., 1ST DEP’T § 605.20(d)(2); N.C.
B.R., ch.1, subch. B, § .0112(i); see also MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
Rule 11(G) (1996) (discussing the Alternatives to Discipline Program which can include
arbitration, mediation, law office management assistance, lawyer assistance programs,
psychological counseling, continuing legal education programs and ethics school).
129. For example, in some states, probation imposed in diversion programs is not
considered a sanction. See ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 52(a), notes to 1995 Amendments; see also TENN.
SUP. CT. R. 9, § 30.9.
130. See Chalfie, supra note 84, at 7 (noting that programs controlled by lawyers result in an
intimidating system partial to lawyers); Ostberg, supra note 121, at 9 (same).
In fact, while some of these initiatives may prove to be a useful way to resolve good faith
misunderstandings between lawyers and clients, diversion programs should be closely
monitored to ensure that they adequately protect the public. One potential problem with the
diversion of complaints about lawyers outside the discipline system is that serious misconduct
may be diverted before the facts are fully known. In such cases, restitution or other nonstigmatizing remedies may satisfy the individual client, but the public may have no means to
learn of the lawyer’s misconduct and the lawyer may be undeterred from future wrongdoing.
These prospects are particularly troubling because lawyers may participate in a diversion
program on more than one occasion. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9, § 30.3 (indicating that
lawyers who have not been the subject of a diversion within the past five years may benefit from
a second diversion). In order to protect the public, clear rules are needed to guarantee that
only truly minor complaints are diverted from the discipline system and that stringent
guidelines are used to ensure that lawyers cannot repeatedly avoid the discipline system because
their misconduct is “minor.” Since diversion would typically occur before a finding of
wrongdoing, standards for diverting cases should be included in the state’s procedures for
disciplinary enforcement rather than in any standards for imposing sanctions on lawyers. See,
e.g., MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 11(G) (1996) (providing some
factors to be considered in determining whether to refer a lawyer to the Alternatives to
Discipline Program).

C. The Purpose of Standards
The array of sanctions that are imposed on lawyers and their
divergent purposes suggest the sanctioning process can quickly
become unpredictable if not unprincipled. Standards are needed to
help ensure that the sanctions selected in any case advance the basic
goals of lawyer discipline. Moreover, without standards, bias can
occur in the sanctioning process, different discipline may be imposed
in similar cases,131 sanctions may be imposed that are
disproportionate to the conduct at issue,132 and attorneys may not
receive meaningful notice about the likely consequences of engaging
in particular conduct.133 Thus, the need for considered decisionmaking, predictability, consistency, and fairness in lawyer discipline
make well-drafted sanctioning standards essential.
But while it is easy in theory to support the idea of standards for
imposing disciplinary sanctions, the devil is in the details and
agreement about specifics can be much harder to attain.134 For
example, consistency is considered one of the hallmarks of any fair
sanctioning system,135 yet “consistency” is an elusive concept that is
131. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 1 (noting inconsistent sanctions imposed for
convictions for failure to file federal tax returns); Kelly, supra note 8, at 470-76 (discussing
inconsistency in the imposition of lawyer discipline sanctions); see also supra note 61 and
accompanying text; infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
132. See In re Arrick, 775 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Ariz. 1989) (noting that in deciding sanctions the
goal is to prescribe discipline “consistent and proportional to that previously imposed in similar
situations”).
133. See In re Martin, 506 N.W.2d 101, 107 (S.D. 1993) (explaining that consistency in
discipline is needed so the practicing bar is aware of the consequences of a violation of
professional standards); see also Armour, supra note 19, at 510 (noting that “conduct of
lawyers . . . is less likely to be influenced by a rule that is unpredictable in its application”).
134. An example of this disagreement can be seen in the evolution of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Armour, supra note 19, at 502-07. An even more heated example
of disagreement over the specifics of standards can be seen in the controversy over the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and in the disagreement over the specifics of state sentencing
guidelines. Compare Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines] (discussing problems with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines), and Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101
YALE L.J. 1681 (1992), and David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal
Guideline Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 882 (1996), with Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of
Mercy Must Be Restrained and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996
WIS. L. REV. 679 (1996) (arguing that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are an improvement
over the system they replaced), and Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal Sentencing:
Beyond the Criticism, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1574, 1578 (1997) (arguing that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are not “too severe,” “too complex,” or “too rigid”). Compare also Albert W.
Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 723 (1993) (criticizing aspects of state
sentencing guidelines), with Kay A. Knapp, A Reply to Professor Alschuler, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 737
(1993) (defending aspects of state sentencing reform).
135. See, e.g., In re Chandler, 641 N.E.2d 473, 479 (Ill. 1994) (“[P]redictability and fairness
require consistency in the sanctions imposed for similar acts of misconduct.”); In re Curran, 801

sometimes difficult to measure136 and is impossible to attain fully.137
How much inconsistency should be tolerated or even encouraged
when imposing sanctions on lawyers is a subject that can be seriously
debated.138
Moreover, consistency alone will not yield fair or effective
sanctions. A “consistent” sanction for particular misconduct can
mask other inequality and may give rise to disproportionately heavy
sanctions in individual cases.139 For example, a rule requiring
disbarment of all lawyers who convert client funds would encompass
the lawyer who took $50,000 or $50; the senior lawyer who masterminded the conversion and the young lawyer who was directed to
effect it; and the lawyer who is a recovering alcoholic and the one
who is merely greedy.
Although consistent, the sanction of
disbarment may be disproportionately heavy for some of these
P.2d 962, 973 (Wash. 1990) (noting that inconsistent application of sanctions casts doubt on
basic fairness and efficiency of disciplinary system); Kelly, supra note 8, at 470 (noting that
courts generally agree upon the need for consistency in the imposition of discipline); Sarah A.
Hirsch, Comment, The Illusive Consistency: A Case for Adopting the ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions in In re Martin, 40 S.D. L. REV. 300, 323 (1995) (noting that consistency within
a jurisdiction promotes fairness and reliability).
A lack of consistency also obscures the message conveyed by lawyer sanctions: If certain
misconduct results in different sanctions in different cases, the sanction communicates nothing
about the level of social censure involved. See generally Garland, supra note 99, at 199.
136. Part of the difficulty is definitional. For example, “consistency” may refer to similar
treatment of lawyers who engage in similar misconduct or it may refer to similar treatment of
lawyers who manifest similar characteristics (e.g., depression or lack of remorse) or it may refer to
similar treatment of lawyers who cause similar types of harm. Other differences in individual
circumstances from case to case also make efforts to measure consistency in the imposition of
sanctions difficult.
137. Scholars have concluded that some inconsistency is inevitable in judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 19, at 537-38 n.185 (noting that the legal system tolerates
inconsistencies in decisions). Judicial inconsistency can be classified as follows: “(1) inevitable
inconsistency; (2) deliberate inconsistency; (3) bias inconsistency; (4) careless inconsistency;
and (5) defective information inconsistency.” Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate
Decisional Inconsistency: A Comment on Brilmayer’s Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 424, 427 (1986). In many cases, rules create either inevitable inconsistency or there are
institutional reasons for creating rules that permit deliberate inconsistency. See id. at 427-28.
The other three types of inconsistency are considered unacceptable and should be avoided. See
id. at 427, 429-31.
Empirical research also indicates that consistency is very difficult to attain. For example,
even the carefully calibrated Federal Sentencing Guidelines have not completely eliminated
unwarranted inconsistency in sentencing. See Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence
Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991-92, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 789, 804-18 (1997) (reporting that
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender and education continue to result in disparate
federal sentencing).
138. As Professor Wolfram has noted, consistency can “freeze a disciplinary system into a
level of sanctions that is too lenient or too severe.” WOLFRAM, supra note 93, at 125. Arguments
for consistency also assume—possibly incorrectly—“that ways can be found of isolating and
quantifying all relevant factors that influence discretion.” Id.
139. This point has been well-developed in the criminal sentencing context. See RICHARD G.
SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 11-34 (1979); Kevin Cole,
The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 1336, 1337-39 (1997).

offenders.
Nevertheless, consistency is important to the credibility,
effectiveness and fairness of any discipline system, and efforts to
achieve some measure of consistency are essential even if they do not
succeed in all respects. At the same time, however, fairness when
imposing sanctions requires some flexibility to account for the
inevitable differences among the individuals being sanctioned.
Consideration of the circumstances of the individual offender may
also help ensure that the sanctions selected will best serve the goals of
discipline. Yet, broad discretion to consider individual circumstances
can become an invitation to treat differently those with whom the
decision-makers identify. The challenge when creating standards for
imposing lawyer sanctions is to strike the best possible balance
between consistency and flexibility, keeping in mind the goals of
discipline and the possible biases of the decision-makers.
III. THE ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS
A. The Background
Until the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions were
adopted in the mid-1980s, there were no developed standards for
imposing sanctions on lawyers.140 The ABA Standards were drafted to
fill the need for “clearly developed standards” and to address the
perceived problem of inconsistent sanctions imposed on lawyers from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and inconsistencies within jurisdictions.141
Before drafting the Standards, the ABA Joint Committee on
Professional Sanctions (“Sanctions Committee”) extensively reviewed
all recently reported disciplinary opinions and it relied heavily on
140. Prior to 1986, the ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings did
not suggest specific sanctions for particular offenses. Standard 7.1 simply provided that the
sanctions should “depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, should be fashioned in
light of the purpose of lawyer discipline and may take into account aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.” See ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 6. At most, states had rules for dealing with convicted felons or common law rules
concerning conversion of client funds. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pattison, 441
A.2d 328, 333 (Md. 1982) (stating that absent extenuating circumstances, disbarment is the
sanction that should be imposed for converting a client’s funds); In re Wilson 409 A.2d 1153,
1157-58 (N.J. 1979) (concluding that public confidence in the court and the bar require
disbarment for misappropriation); supra notes 50-51.
141. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 1; Martha Middleton, Discipline Chaos: ABA to Try
to End Disparity, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1983, at 1810. For example, the Preface to the ABA Standards
notes that a lawyer convicted of tax evasion in one state might be reprimanded while a lawyer
elsewhere might be suspended for a year. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 1. The Preface
also contains numerous references to the problem of inconsistent sanctions and to the interest
in achieving consistency in the imposition of sanctions. See id. at 1-2; see also id. at Standard 1.3.

these court decisions when prescribing sanction levels for various
types of misconduct.142 The Sanctions Committee ultimately drafted
voluntary standards that were designed to achieve consistency in the
imposition of lawyer discipline while providing flexibility to consider
the lawyer’s individual circumstances.143
The framework of the ABA Standards requires courts144 to consider
the nature and effect of a lawyer’s misconduct and to make an initial
determination of the appropriate sanction for the misconduct before
considering “aggravating” or “mitigating” factors.145 To reach an
initial determination, the Standards require that the court consider
the ethical duty violated,146 the lawyer’s mental state and the injury
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.147 The ABA Standards then
preliminarily prescribe the sanction that is “generally” appropriate
for the misconduct.148
142. The Sanctions Committee examined all reported discipline cases from 1980 through
June 1984 and looked in depth at all reported decisions in eight jurisdictions from January 1974
through June 1984. See id. at 2. In each case, the Committee collected data concerning the
offense, the level of sanction imposed, the policy considerations identified and the aggravating
and mitigating factors noted by the courts. See id. at 3; see also Kelly, supra note 8, at 476-77
(describing the ABA sanctions project).
143. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 1-2. The Sanctions Committee designed the
Standards to promote:
(1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of sanction
in an individual case; (2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in
light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; (3) consistency in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among jurisdictions.
Id. at Standard 1.3. The Sanctions Committee sought to create standards that were not
analogous to criminal determinate sentences, but were instead guidelines giving courts
flexibility in each case. See id. at 6.
144. The ABA Standards refer to the factors the “court” should consider, but the Standards
are often used by disciplinary bodies as well as courts. See infra note 157 and accompanying
text. Because this section examines judicial use and interpretation of the Standards, it refers to
the conduct of “courts,” although most of the observations apply to any decision-maker with the
authority to impose sanctions in a lawyer discipline system.
145. The ABA Standards recommend either disbarment, suspension, reprimand, or a
private admonition for each type of misconduct it describes. See infra note 148. Although not
expressly prescribed for any particular misconduct, interim suspension and probation may also
be imposed. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standards 2.4, 2.7.
The Standards also list other sanctions and remedies that may be imposed, such as
restitution, bar examination, and educational requirements, although they provide little
guidance as to when imposition of those sanctions would be appropriate. See id. at Standard
2.8. The Commentary suggests that courts “should be creative and flexible in approaching
those cases where there is some misconduct but where a severe sanction is not required.” See id.
at Standard 2.8 Commentary.
146. Those duties are broadly categorized as duties to clients, the public, the legal system,
and the profession. See id. at 5. Within each of these categories the Standards identify the types
of duties that may be breached. For example, under Duty to Clients, the ABA Standards
separately address Failure to Preserve the Client’s Property (Standard 4.1), Failure to Preserve
the Client’s Confidences (Standard 4.2), Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest (Standard 4.3),
Lack of Diligence (Standard 4.4), Lack of Competence (Standard 4.5) and Lack of Candor
(Standard 4.6).
147. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 3, 5-6.
148. For example, ABA Standard 4.1 provides:

Once the court makes an initial determination of what the
appropriate sanction should be, it then may consider aggravating and
mitigating factors.149 Aggravating factors include, inter alia, the
existence of prior disciplinary offenses, a dishonest or selfish motive,
a pattern of misconduct, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial
experience in the practice of law.150 Mitigating factors include the
absence of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive, personal or emotional problems, inexperience in law
practice, character or reputation, and, under certain circumstances,
mental disability or chemical dependency.151 The Standards suggest
but do not require that courts consider these factors152 and do not
indicate how much weight these factors should be accorded.
B. Use of Standards by the Courts
The ABA Standards are the most frequently used standards for
imposing lawyer sanctions. A dozen of the highest state courts rely
heavily on the ABA Standards when imposing discipline.153 Four
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances . . . the following sanctions are
generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:
4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client
property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know
that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.
4.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing
with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing
with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 4.1.
149. See id. at 3.
150. See id. at Standard 9.22. Other factors that may be considered aggravating are multiple
offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, submission of false evidence, false
statements or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge
wrongful nature of conduct, indifference to making restitution, and illegal conduct. See id.
151. See id. at Standard 9.32. Other factors that may be considered mitigating include timely
good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of the misconduct, cooperative
attitude toward disciplinary proceedings, physical disability, delay in disciplinary proceedings,
the imposition of other penalties or sanctions, remorse, and remoteness of prior offenses. See
id.
152. “In imposing a sanction . . . a court should consider . . . the existence of aggravating or
mitigating factors.” Id. at Standard 3.0(d). The factors described as aggravating or mitigating
“may be considered” in aggravation or mitigation. See id. at Standards 9.22, 9.32.
153. Colorado, Georgia, and Washington courts routinely follow the ABA Standards when
imposing sanctions. See, e.g., People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138, 141 (Colo. 1997) (using the ABA
Standards to determine a sanction against an attorney); In re Swindall, 468 S.E. 2d 372, 373 (Ga.
1996) (“In determining the appropriate sanction to impose, we look to the [ABA Standards] for
guidance.”); In re Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 973 (Wash. 1990) (noting that the ABA Standards
govern all disciplinary cases in that jurisdiction). The Supreme Courts of Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Oregon, and Vermont often rely on the

other states have adopted their own standards based on the ABA’s
Standards.154 Several other state courts occasionally refer to the ABA
Standards as useful in determining an appropriate sanction155 or cite
to the Standards as persuasive authority.156 In addition, several state
disciplinary boards rely on the ABA Standards.157
ABA Standards. See, e.g., In re Beconovich, 884 P.2d 1080, 1084 (Alaska 1994) (noting that the
court was guided by the ABA Standards and its methodology); In re Riddle, 857 P.2d 1233, 1235
(Ariz. 1993) (noting that the ABA Standards are used by the court in determining the
appropriate sanction); In re Lassen, 672 A.2d 988, 997 n.12 (Del. 1996) (stating that the court
“often relies” on the ABA Standards when imposing sanctions); In re Atanga, 636 N.E.2d 1253,
1260 (Ind. 1994) (“In analyzing the appropriate sanction for lawyer misconduct, this court
relies heavily upon the [ABA Standards].”); In re Quaid, 646 So. 2d 343, 350 (La. 1994) (noting
that the court looks to the ABA Standards in determining appropriate sanctions); Mississippi
Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 910 (Miss. 1994) (noting that the court is guided by the ABA
Standards in determining an appropriate sanction); In re Hassenstab, 934 P.2d 1110, 1117 (Or.
1997) (noting that the court is guided by the ABA Standards and its own case law); In re Hunter,
656 A.2d 203, 207 (Vt. 1994) (noting that “in deciding upon the appropriate sanction, we rely
upon ABA Standards”).
154. See Preface to ALA. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1996) (stating that the
Alabama Standards are “based in large measure” on ABA Standards); Preface to FLA. STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1998) (adopting an “amended version” of the ABA
Standards); N.D. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Note (1996-97) (stating that the
North Dakota Standards are based on the ABA Standards); UTAH STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS, Summary (1997) (stating that the Utah Standards are based on black-letter
rules contained in the ABA Standards).
155. States that occasionally refer to the ABA Standards to determine lawyer sanctions
include Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, and Wyoming. See
Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Duffy, No. CV 93532399, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 472, at *3
(Feb. 25, 1994) (declaring that the ABA Standards are “[u]seful in the consideration of a
proper remedy”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lau, 900 P.2d 777, 782 (Haw. 1995)
(describing the ABA Standards as a “useful reference” to determine sanctions); In re Anderson,
795 P.2d 64, 67 (Kan. 1990) (noting the court’s previous reliance on the ABA Standards to
determine appropriate sanction); see also In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1994)
(considering the ABA Standards’ recommendation in a decision to disbar an attorney); In re
Howard, 912 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. 1995) (turning to the ABA Standards when “issue of discipline
remains [to be resolved]”); In re Gabell, 858 P.2d 404, 405 (N.M. 1993) (referring to ABA
Standards for recommendation on disbarment).
156. Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and South Dakota
courts have, on occasion, cited to the ABA Standards as persuasive authority. See Wilson v. Neal,
964 S.W.2d 199, 207 (Ark. 1998) (describing the ABA Standards’ list of aggravating and
mitigating factors as “useful” in determining appropriate sanctions); In re Dulansey, 606 A.2d
189, 191 n.5 (D.C. 1992) (citing the ABA Standards as persuasive in a disbarment decision); In
re Luongo, 621 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Mass. 1993); Tocci’s Case, 663 A.2d 88, 90 (N.H. 1995); In re
Claggett, 544 N.W.2d 878, 881 (S.D. 1996) (choosing not to adopt the ABA Standards, but
referring to them for guidance).
157. State disciplinary boards typically rely on the ABA Standards if the courts of the state
rely on them. See, e.g., In re Merrill, 875 P.2d 128, 130 (Ariz. 1994) (recognizing that because
the state court considers the ABA Standards, the Disciplinary Commission will as well); In re
Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 967 (Wash. 1990). Even in states where the courts do not routinely rely
on the ABA Standards, some disciplinary boards closely follow the ABA Standards. For
example, the Wisconsin Disciplinary Board “always” looks at the Standards. Although
Wisconsin case law carries more weight, the Board considers the ABA Standards “very
persuasive.” See Telephone Interview by Paul Croce with Gerald Sternberg, Administrator of the
Wisconsin Disciplinary Board (Sept. 4, 1997); see also In re Baxter, 940 P.2d 37, 40 (Kan. 1997)
(referring to the state court disciplinary panel’s examination of the ABA Standards in
determining the sanction); Dockery v. Board of Prof’l Responsibility, 937 S.W.2d 863, 866 n.6
(Tenn. 1996) (recognizing adoption of the ABA Standards by the Board); Board of Prof’l

The state courts that do not regularly rely on the ABA Standards
take varying approaches to the imposition of sanctions. Some of
those states have rules concerning the discipline to be imposed on
lawyers convicted of certain felonies,158 and common law presumptive
sanctions for conversion of client funds,159 but do not have welldeveloped rules or standards regarding the discipline for nonfelonious misconduct.160 A few states have adopted rules listing some
aggravating and mitigating factors that may be considered when
imposing sanctions,161 or have identified some general factors to be
considered when imposing discipline, but they do not attempt to
prescribe a framework for making the sanctioning decision or suggest
particular sanctions that should be imposed for particular
misconduct.162 A number of state courts resist articulating any
Responsibility. v. Vidakovich, 816 P.2d 885, 889 (Wyo. 1991) (reflecting that the Board of
Professional Responsibility relied on the ABA Standards in making a sanction
recommendation). See generally In re Kane, 13 MASS. ATT’Y DISCIPLINE REP. 321, 327-28 (1997)
(announcing new guidelines for imposing sanctions in neglect cases similar to the ABA
Standards).
158. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2503(a) (1997) (requiring disbarment of an attorney
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude); TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 8.05 (stating that an attorney
convicted of an “intentional” crime shall be disbarred); VA. SUP. CT. R., pt. 6, § IV, ¶ 13(E)(2)
(requiring disbarment or suspension of an attorney convicted of certain crimes); supra note 50
and accompanying text (describing New York’s automatic disbarment rule for lawyers convicted
of certain felonies).
159. See, e.g., In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 191 (D.C. 1990) (reaffirming that in virtually all
cases of misappropriation, disbarment is the only appropriate sanction); Louisiana State Bar
Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So. 2d 116, 122-23 (La. 1986) (discussing presumptive sanctions for
misuse of client funds); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pattison, 441 A.2d 328, 333 (Md. 1982)
(noting that absent extenuating circumstances, disbarment is the sanction which should be
imposed for conversion); In re Schoepfer, 687 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Mass. 1997) (reaffirming that
suspension or disbarment are the appropriate sanctions for commingling of funds); In re Olson,
577 N.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Minn. 1998) (stating that misappropriation of client funds usually
merits disbarment unless conversion was unintentional); In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1157-58
(N.J. 1979) (noting that mitigating factors will rarely override requirement of disbarment in
cases of misappropriation of funds); In re Pitts, 617 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (App. Div. 1994) (noting
court’s consistent penalty of disbarment for fund conversion); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Connaughton, 665 N.E.2d 675, 676 (Ohio 1996) (same).
160. Only California has adopted detailed guidelines for imposing sanctions on lawyers that
differ from the ABA Standards. See generally CAL. ST. B.P., TITLE IV, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY
SANCTIONS FOR PROF’L MISCONDUCT (1998). In some cases, those standards remove all
discretion from the decision-maker by mandating specific sanctions for certain misconduct
regardless of mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., id. at Standard 2.5 (stating that disbarment is
the penalty for violations of certain sections of the Business and Professions Code, regardless of
mitigating circumstances). While Georgia has rules that describe sanctions that “may” be
imposed for particular misconduct, see GA. B.R. & REGS. 4-102, the Georgia Supreme Court
typically relies on the ABA Standards when imposing sanctions. See, e.g., In re Quist, 483 S.E.2d
569, 570 (Ga. 1997).
161. In some states the list of aggravating and mitigating factors mirrors the factors set forth
in the ABA Standards, although the states have not otherwise adopted the ABA Standards. See,
e.g., N.C. B.R., ch.1, subch. B, § .0114(w)(1)-(2).
162. For example, Texas has adopted a court rule listing factors that shall be considered
when imposing discipline, which include some of the basic goals of discipline as well as

standards for imposing sanctions for particular misconduct, expressly
preferring a “case-by-case” approach.163
The case-by-case approach to lawyer sanctions typically assumes one
of two forms. In the first, a court attempts to achieve some
consistency in discipline cases by considering its treatment of lawyers
in “similar” cases.164 Such attempts are often unsuccessful because the
courts disregard seemingly similar cases,165 or cannot agree upon the
factors that should be considered when assessing similarity,166 or do
not consider the same factors important from case to case. As a
result, the quest for “similarity” is chimerical because it is often
possible to find both similarities to and distinctions from earlier
aggravating and mitigating factors. See TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 3.10. Ohio rules provide that
prior disciplinary offenses may justify an increased sanction. See OHIO B.R. V § 6(C). Other
state courts have, through court or common law rules, identified some general factors to
consider when imposing discipline. See, e.g., ARK. PROCEDURES REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT
OF ATTORNEYS § 8(F); In re Grzybek, 552 N.W.2d 215, 216 (Minn. 1996); People v. Farrant, 867
P.2d 1279, 1286 (Okla. 1994). None of these states has articulated detailed standards to guide
the sanctioning decision.
163. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Chung, 695 A.2d 405, 407 (Pa. 1997)
(declining to set per se rule and stating that each case must “be decided on the totality of facts
present”); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Boettner, 422 S.E.2d 478, 482 (W. Va. 1992) (declining
to set “a uniform standard,” preferring instead to consider facts in each case). See also, e.g., In re
Timpone, 623 N.E.2d 300, 309 (Ill. 1993) (noting that “each case is unique and must be
resolved with respect to its particular facts and circumstances”); In re Montpetit, 528 N.W.2d
243, 246 (Minn. 1995) (noting that inquiries into a suitable measure of discipline are subjective
and each case is different).
164. See, e.g., In re Chandler, 641 N.E.2d 473, 480-82 (Ill. 1994) (comparing discipline in
other cases to determine the proper sanction in the case before the court); In re Hartke, 529
N.W.2d 678, 683 (Minn. 1995) (looking to other cases for guidance as to the appropriate
sanction); In re Ruegger, 621 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (App. Div. 1995) (same); Oklahoma State Bar
Ass’n v. Meek, 895 P.2d 692, 700-01 (Okla. 1995) (considering facts and circumstances in other
cases when determining appropriate disciplinary sanctions). See generally In re Concemi, 662
N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (Mass. 1996) (stating that the standard is “whether [the] sanction imposed is
markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in similar cases”).
165. Although Colorado does not usually use a case-by-case approach, examples of this
approach can be seen in its decisions. For example, in People v. McIntyre, 942 P.2d 499 (Colo.
1997), the court imposed a six-month suspension on a lawyer who failed to file federal income
tax returns for three years and failed to pay federal withholding tax. The court in McIntyre cited
to People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992), in which a one-year suspension was imposed on a
lawyer who failed to file state and federal income tax returns for eight years, failed to pay
federal and state withholding taxes for one year, and used illegal drugs for a number of years.
The court never mentioned its decisions in People v. Borchard, 825 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1992)
(imposing public censure for failure to file a federal income tax return for one year and late
filing of taxes for eight years), or People v. Tauger, 893 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1995) (ordering public
censure for failure to file federal income tax returns for three years).
166. For example, in In re Chandler, 641 N.E.2d at 479-81, the Illinois Supreme Court
imposed a three-year suspension on a lawyer, who was a single mother, for submitting false
documents to obtain a home loan. The majority analogized her situation to another case in
which a lawyer received a three-year suspension for participating in a scheme to kick back onehalf of an annual retainer to an officer of a client company, reasoning that both cases involved
elaborate fraudulent schemes. See id. The dissent argued that the cases were dissimilar, because
the former did not involve the lawyer’s use of her profession to advance an illegal scheme and
pointed to another Illinois case in which two lawyers received a five-month suspension for
making false statements to obtain a loan. See id. at 488-89 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).

decisions, giving courts significant latitude to show that any case is
“similar to” or “different from” previous cases.167 Nevertheless, this
approach probably produces more consistency than the second “caseby-case” approach, in which courts decide each case on its own facts,
without much regard for precedent.168
Thus, almost thirty years after the Clark Commission noted serious
problems with the lack of uniformity in lawyer discipline,169 attorneys
continue to be sanctioned inconsistently. Moreover, even courts that
attempt to follow the ABA Standards reach inconsistent results in
seemingly similar cases.170 This occurs for a number of reasons mainly
attributable to problems with the Standards themselves.171
For example, under the ABA Standards, suspension is appropriate
when a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect when representing a
client and causes injury or potential injury.172 Nevertheless, it is not
unusual for courts to impose a public reprimand or private discipline
on lawyers who engage in a pattern of neglect of client matters.173 A
167. Of course, this problem pervades the common law system and cannot be eradicated
even with the most carefully drafted standards. Nevertheless, well-designed standards can
reduce unwarranted inconsistency from case to case.
168. See Gay v. Virginia State Bar, 389 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Va. 1990) (stating that precedents
are of little aid in deciding the punishment to be imposed and that each case must be largely
governed by its particular facts). See generally In re Randall, 562 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 1997)
(stating that the facts of each case independently dictate the appropriate discipline); Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Chung, 695 A.2d 405, 407 (Pa. 1997) (noting that each case is to be
decided on the totality of facts presented); Kelly, supra note 8, at 472-76 (describing courts’ use
of a “case-by-case-consider-all-the-circumstances” approach). According to a former chair of a
statewide grievance commission, this second “case-by-case” approach sometimes occurs at the
disciplinary hearing level because poor indexing systems make it difficult to determine what
discipline has been imposed by other hearing panels in similar cases.
169. See PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 175 (noting that “[i]t is
often virtually impossible to predict the extent of discipline that may be imposed by a court
through an analysis of prior cases concerning similar misconduct, because the cases often have
resulted in widely dissimilar sanctions”).
170. See, e.g., infra notes 174, 186, 240 and accompanying text.
171. See infra Part III.C. Wholly apart from problems with the language and the advisory
nature of the ABA Standards, inconsistency occurs because the courts at times analyze the
misconduct before them under a category that requires a lesser penalty rather than the category
that clearly should be considered. For example, a lawyer who knowingly submitted a false
statement on an application for admission to the bar was suspended under ABA Standard 6.12,
which addresses situations in which a lawyer knows false documents are being submitted to the
court, rather than disbarred under Standard 6.11, which addresses situations in which a lawyer
personally submits false documents with intent to deceive, or ABA Standard 7.1, which
addresses instances in which a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that violates a duty owed to
the profession. See In re Warren, 888 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Mo. 1994) (holding that such behavior
warranted a six-month suspension). But see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Joehl, 642 A.2d 194
(Md. 1994) (imposing disbarment).
172. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 4.42(b).
173. See, e.g., In re Gawlowski, 868 P.2d 324, 326 (Ariz. 1994) (imposing public censure for a
pattern of neglect involving four cases); In re Hunter, 656 A.2d 203, 209 (Vt. 1994) (ordering a
public reprimand and probation for neglect of three client matters); Discipline Corner, UTAH
B.J., Dec. 1997, at 31, 31 (imposing an admonition for failure to handle diligently four separate

pattern of neglect can result in a wide range of sanctions even within
the same state, even when the same number of client matters are
neglected, and even when the sanctioned attorneys previously have
been disciplined for similar misconduct.174
Obviously, comparing any two cases is difficult because the
underlying facts are never identical and differences in sanctions for
seemingly similar misconduct may be due to relevant, even important
differences in the facts of each case.175 The effectiveness of the ABA
Standards in promoting consistency and consideration of relevant
individual factors cannot be evaluated by a cursory comparison of
case results. Nor do such comparisons indicate how well the
Standards promote the goals of discipline. A closer analysis of the
framework and the specifics of the Standards as well as their
application by the courts is necessary to assess their usefulness.
C. Critique of the ABA Standards
The ABA Standards resemble the emperor’s new clothes: While
warmly greeted,176 it is readily apparent that something important is
missing. In fact, while the two-step framework of the Standards—
which separates the initial determination of the sanction from the
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors—is useful, the
Standards are in other respects conceptually flawed, confusing and
client matters); Discipline Corner, UTAH B.J., Nov. 1997, at 24, 24 (imposing an admonition for
failure to handle diligently two separate client matters).
174. See, e.g., People v. DeBaca, 948 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1997) (imposing a two-year suspension
for a pattern of neglect involving two clients); People v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 76, 77-78 (Colo.
1997) (ordering a one-year suspension for neglect and incompetent representation involving
two clients); People v. Archuleta, 898 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Colo. 1995) (imposing a six-month
suspension for neglect of client matters); People v. Harding, 937 P.2d 393, 395-96 (Colo. 1997)
(ordering a 30-day suspension for neglect); People v. Eagan, 902 P.2d 841, 841-42 (Colo. 1995)
(imposing a public censure for neglect of two client matters).
175. For example, the failure to file income tax returns typically results in public
reprimands or suspensions. See, e.g., People v. Borchard 825 P.2d 999, 1000 (Colo. 1992)
(holding that the failure to file a federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 warranted
public censure); In re Sandbach, 546 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 1988) (stating that failure to file state
personal income tax returns warranted a three-year suspension); In re Thompson, 463 S.E.2d
118, 119 (Ga. 1995) (ruling that conviction of willful failure to file a tax return under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7203 warranted a 120-day suspension); In re Mitchell, 681 So. 2d 339, 339-40 (La. 1996)
(ordering that failure to file tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 warranted a two-year probation).
Nevertheless, flouting the tax laws for extended periods has occasionally resulted in disbarment.
See In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 771 (D.C. 1990) (disbarring attorney who had failed to pay
federal income taxes for eleven years).
176. Some courts were quick to embrace the ABA Standards shortly after they appeared. See
In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 51-52 (Alaska 1986); In re Petrie, 742 P.2d 796, 803 (Ariz. 1987);
Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Krasnoff, 515 So. 2d 780, 782 n.1 (La. 1987); In re Bristow, 721 P.2d
437, 444 n.31 (Or. 1986); In re Rentel, 729 P.2d 615, 618 (Wash. 1986). But see Nancy Blodgett,
Mixed Reviews: ABA Discipline Standards Get Bouquets, Brickbats, 11 B. LEADER 25 (1986) (noting
that the National Organization of Bar Counsel and some state bars expressed reservations about
implementing the ABA Standards).

unworkably vague. As a result, these voluntary standards provide
virtually limitless flexibility, but they do not promote the considered
decision-making or provide the consistency sought by the ABA
Sanctions Committee.177 Moreover, the ABA Standards prescribe
some sanctions that do not adequately protect the public, and fail to
provide guidance for the use of other sanctions that may better serve
the goals of discipline.
1.

Problems with the initial sanction determination
The framework of the ABA Standards requires the court to first
reach an initial determination of the sanction in order to insure that
the court gives appropriate weight to the misconduct that occurred,
the lawyer’s state of mind and the injury the lawyer caused.178 In
theory, since the initial determination is based only on these factors,
the ABA Standards should yield similar initial determinations in
similar cases. In practice, this often does not occur because of the
difficulty of categorizing some misconduct, the Standards’ failure to
define adequately the meaning of “injury,” and the failure to specify
the appropriate length of suspensions for serious misconduct. In
addition, the initial determination often yields a private admonition,
which fails to promote the goals of lawyer discipline.
a.

Categorizing the misconduct

One reason why the ABA Standards do not effectively promote
consistent treatment of similar misconduct is that not all lawyer
misconduct fits neatly into one of the categories set forth in the
Standards. The ABA Standards rely on very general descriptions of
misconduct179 and attempt to elaborate on those descriptions in the
accompanying Commentary. At times, a lawyer’s misconduct can
seemingly fall within two different black-letter standards and the
accompanying Commentary confounds efforts to fit actual
misconduct into one of the black-letter standards.180 Categorization
177. See supra notes 141, 143 and accompanying text. The problems with the ABA
Standards are exacerbated by their advisory tone. The ABA sought to walk a fine line in
suggesting standards to the courts while not wanting to be seen as dictating rules to the
judiciary. Nevertheless, by stressing that the Standards promote flexibility, and by describing
the sanctions as only “generally appropriate” for violations of specific conduct, the ABA
decreased the likelihood that the Standards would be carefully followed.
178. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 512-13; supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
179. See, e.g., supra note 148.
180. The Commentary that follows each black-letter standard identifies the sanctions that
have been imposed for similar misconduct in reported cases, the policy reasons articulated by
the courts to support the sanctions, and a recommendation of the level of sanction for the
misconduct absent aggravating or mitigating factors. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 3.

can also be difficult because some misconduct does not fit neatly
within any category.
The problem of selecting between two black-letter standards arises
frequently in cases involving improper dealings with client funds. For
such an offense, the ABA Standards provide in pertinent part:
4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a
client.
4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or
should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and
181
causes injury or potential injury to a client.

Standard 4.11 does not explain what conduct by lawyers constitutes
conversion, but the Commentary to Standard 4.11 states that most
courts reserve disbarment for cases in which the lawyer “uses the
client’s funds for the lawyer’s own benefit.”182 The Commentary to
Standard 4.12 notes that “[s]uspension should be reserved for lawyers
who engage in misconduct that does not amount to misappropriation
or conversion” and that suspension is commonly used for lawyers who
“merely” commingle client funds with their own or “fail to remit
client funds promptly.”183 While these statements, read together,
provide some guidance as to when the sanction of suspension rather
than disbarment is appropriate, the Commentary to Standard 4.12
muddles the analysis by citing to a case in which the sanction of
suspension was imposed for misconduct which seemingly constituted
conversion or “use” of the client’s funds for the lawyer’s benefit.184
As a result, in the case of a lawyer who knowingly places client
funds into a general office account, uses the money for the lawyer’s
own purposes and does not return the funds until after disciplinary
proceedings commence, it is not clear how the conduct should be
categorized under the ABA Standards. Courts sometimes construe
this ambiguity in favor of lawyers by treating such conduct as “mere
The conflict between the Commentary and the black-letter standards occurs because the
Commentary is mostly descriptive of what courts have done rather than prescriptive about the
meaning of the black-letter standards.
181. Id. at Standards 4.11, 4.12.
182. Id. at Standard 4.11 Commentary.
183. Id. at Standard 4.12 Commentary.
184. The Commentary cites In re Salvesen, 614 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Wash. 1980), for the
proposition that most courts do not impose disbarment on lawyers who “merely” commingle
funds. Yet in Salvesen, the attorney “made a regular practice” of transferring client trust account
funds into his personal checking account for his personal use, leaving insufficient funds in the
trust account to disburse in accordance with his clients’ instructions. Id. at 1269 (Stafford, J.,
dissenting). In one instance, the lawyer did not use client funds entrusted to him to pay off a
real estate contract until after a complaint was made to the bar association about the
defalcation. See id. at 1268.

commingling” or failure to remit client funds promptly although the
funds may also have been “used” for office expenses or personal
purposes.185 Courts also differ over whether conversion occurs when
lawyers accept retainers from clients, do little or no work, and do not
return the fees.186 Since conversion is considered one of the most
serious breaches of a lawyer’s duties—and carries one of the most
unforgiving sanctions187—clarity about the conduct that constitutes
“conversion” is essential, and it is missing from the ABA Standards.
185. See People v. Schaefer, 938 P.2d 147, 150 (Colo. 1997) (suspending rather than
disbarring a lawyer who commingled $9,400 in client funds in an operating account, used funds
for other purposes, and ignored client requests to return any money until six months after the
client requested an investigation of the lawyer). See generally In re Redondo, 861 P.2d 619, 62324 (Ariz. 1993) (suspending a lawyer who used a client trust account for the payment of
personal and business accounts); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Young, 545 So. 2d 1018, 1022 (La.
1989) (suspending an attorney for endorsing a client’s name on a check and using the funds).
These courts seem willing to call the conduct something other than “conversion” so long as the
money is ultimately returned. But see People v. O’Leary, 783 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1989) (disbarring
a lawyer who converted by commingling client funds in an operating account, used funds for
other purposes and failed to repay); In re Allen, 493 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 1997) (allowing voluntary
surrender of a license to practice in exchange for an admission of conversion by a lawyer who
failed to repay).
The courts’ willingness to treat the use of client funds as something other than “conversion”
may be due, in part, to the excessive aggregation of different types of misconduct under the
ABA Standards. See generally Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 134, at 90408, 915-18 (describing the problems with aggregation of misconduct in federal sentencing).
For example, under ABA Standard 4.11, the knowing conversion of client funds can encompass
behavior ranging from the theft of client funds by forging a client’s signature on a $50,000
settlement check to the transfer of $500 of client funds to a law firm operating account to cover
payroll expenses. Courts may view the sanction of disbarment as disproportionately heavy in
the latter case, which may explain why some courts struggle to categorize the misconduct as
something other than “conversion.” See generally State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Meek, 895
P.2d 692, 698-99 (Okla. 1994) (distinguishing between “simple” conversion and “theft by
conversion”).
186. Compare People v. Holmes, 951 P.2d 477, 480 (Colo. 1998) (concluding that failure to
perform legal services after receiving payment is tantamount to misappropriation and warrants
disbarment), and People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. 1997) (characterizing the
acceptance of retainers and subsequent failure to perform duties as conversion and ordering
disbarment), and People v. Wallace, 936 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Colo. 1997) (concluding that a lawyer
who accepted retainers, failed to deposit them into a trust account, neglected client matters and
failed to return funds should be disbarred for conversion of client funds), with People v. Fager,
925 P.2d 280, 282-83 (Colo. 1996) (finding that a lawyer who accepted a client retainer, failed
to maintain it in a separate account, neglected the client matter and failed to return client
funds should receive a one-year suspension for dealing improperly with client property). See
generally People v. Rishel, 956 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1998) (finding that a lawyer who accepted client
retainers, neglected client matters, left the state and failed to refund fees should be suspended
for one year). In many cases, courts do not even consider whether lawyers who fail to refund
unearned fees have converted client funds. See, e.g., People v. Singer, 897 P.2d 798 (Colo.
1995); People v. Barr, 818 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1991); In re Lyles, 469 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 1996);
Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Jones, 570 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1990).
187. The Commentary to ABA Standard 4.11 notes that some courts have held that
disbarment is “always” the appropriate discipline when a lawyer knowingly converts client funds.
It also states that when a lawyer converts client funds for the lawyer’s own use, “only the most
compelling mitigating circumstances should justify a lesser sanction than disbarment.” ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 4.11 Commentary.

Unlike improper handling of client funds, which can fit within two
black-letter standards, a different problem arises when a lawyer’s
misconduct does not fit within any misconduct described in the
black-letter standards. This problem usually occurs because the
black-letter standards prescribe sanctions on the assumption that as
the lawyer’s mental state becomes less deliberate, actual or potential
injury also decreases.188 When this correlation between lawyer
culpability and client injury does not occur, courts are left to choose
between two black-letter standards which prescribe different
sanctions and do not describe the situation that actually occurred.
For example, a lawyer may knowingly fail to perform services for a
client,189 yet cause little actual injury. ABA Standards 4.41 and 4.42
address a knowing failure to perform services and recommend
disbarment or suspension where there is injury or potential injury.
Standard 4.44 addresses negligent failure to act with diligence and
prescribes an admonition where there is “little or no actual or
potential injury.” Where a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services
for a client but causes little actual or potential injury, there is a gap in
the Standards, providing courts with substantial leeway to impose very
different sanctions.190
b.

The definition of “injury”

The ABA Standards also provide inadequate guidance for making
the initial sanction determination because they do not define the
“injury” component with any precision. Under the Standards, a
finding of “injury,” “serious injury” or “potential injury” directly
affects the level of the initial sanction determination and results in
the recommendation of some form of public discipline.191 A finding
188. See, e.g., supra note 148.
189. “Knowledge” is defined as “the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result.” See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 7.
190. While the Sanctions Committee was aware that there “may” be cases of lawyer
misconduct that could not be easily categorized, it did not seem to contemplate the number of
cases in which it could occur and it provided no guidance for determining the appropriate
sanction in those cases. The Sanctions Committee instead noted that the ABA Standards are
not designed to propose a sanction “for each of the myriad of fact patterns in cases of lawyer
misconduct.” ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 6. In fact, the ABA Standards fail to provide
even general guidance for how to resolve whole categories of cases where intentional conduct is
present but injury is not, or vice versa. The Committee’s statement that the Standards provide a
“theoretical framework to guide the courts” and that the ultimate sanction will depend on the
presence or absence of mitigating factors, see id., gives the courts few clues as to how to decide
these cases.
191. The Definitions section states that “injury can range from ‘serious’ injury to ‘little or
no’ injury; a reference to ‘injury’ alone indicates any level of injury greater than ‘little or no’
injury.” Id. at 7. In general, the ABA Standards prescribe the sanction of disbarment for
serious or potentially serious injury and prescribe the sanctions of suspension or public censure

of “injury” can be particularly important because some courts
disregard “potential injury” altogether.192 Unfortunately, the failure
to define injury clearly has meant that different definitions are used
by different courts, depending in part on the result the court wishes
to achieve in any particular case.
For example, the ABA Standards define “injury” as “harm to a
client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which results
from a lawyer’s misconduct,” without indicating what types of “harm”
to clients may be considered.193 Courts agree that an actual monetary
loss constitutes “injury” under the Standards, but it is less clear
whether a lost monetary opportunity constitutes “injury.”194 The
courts differ even more significantly in their approach to nonmonetary harm. Some courts find “injury” to clients in the
inconvenience or psychic harm caused by unnecessary delay in
resolving a matter or in the very real anxiety that can occur when
clients are unable to obtain information about a matter from a
lawyer.195 Other courts do not appear to consider this to be “injury.”196
for injury or potential injury. Admonitions are reserved for cases in which there is little or no
actual or potential injury. See, e.g., id. at Standard 4.4.
192. “Potential injury” is defined as the harm that “is reasonably foreseeable at the time of
the lawyer’s misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably
have resulted from the lawyer’s misconduct.” Id. at 7.
The ABA Standards provide that “potential injury” can result in the imposition of serious
incapacitating sanctions. See id. at Standards 4.11, 4.21. Nevertheless, at times, courts disregard
potential injury, apparently so they can impose a lighter sanction. See, e.g., In re Redondo, 861
P.2d 619, 622 (Ariz. 1993); In re Henley, 478 S.E.2d 134, 137 (Ga. 1996); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Driscoll, BV No. 30, 1996 Md. LEXIS 133, at *34 (Oct. 8, 1996). See generally In re
Nomura, No. SB-96-0005-D, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 8, at *12-13 (Jan. 26, 1996) (declining to impose a
suspension because the client suffered potential rather than actual injury); In re Heald, 664
A.2d 248, 250-51 (Vt. 1995) (noting the potential for “catastrophic” injury to the estate but
imposing a reprimand because there was no “real” injury).
193. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 7. There are occasional statements in the
Commentary suggesting that non-monetary harm might constitute “injury” under the
Standards, see id. at Standard 6.11 Commentary (implying that lost time appearing in court may
constitute injury), but the Commentary makes no reference to emotional harm.
194. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court found “no real injury” where a lawyer failed
to convey to the heirs of an estate a $52,000 offer to purchase the sole asset of the estate when
the property was ultimately sold to another purchaser for its appraised value of $41,000. See In
re Heald, 664 A.2d at 250. But see In re Lyles, 469 S.E.2d 670, 671 (Ga. 1996) (finding injury
where lawyer’s neglect of a probate matter deprived the client of opportunities to sell estate
property); In re Hunter, 656 A.2d 203, 208 (Vt. 1994) (finding injury where a lawyer’s failure to
advise a client about the merits of his case resulted in a lost opportunity to accept a settlement
offer).
195. See, e.g., In re Schaffner, 939 P.2d 39, 41 (Or. 1997) (finding actual injury to a client in
the form of anxiety and frustration when a lawyer refused to return original documents); In re
Peterson, 846 P.2d 1330, 1343 n.38 (Wash. 1993) (stating that injury is probable because people
involved in lawsuit are often experiencing a period of emotional turmoil). See generally In re
Johnson, 936 P.2d 258, 260 (Kan. 1997) (noting time, money, and emotional strain caused by a
lawyer’s delay in adoption context).
196. See, e.g., People v. Berkley, 858 P.2d 699, 702 (Colo. 1993) (suggesting the actual harm

The Standards’ failure to indicate whether emotional distress
constitutes “injury” gives rise to disparity in the initial sanction
determination because so many complaints about lawyers arise from
neglect of client matters and poor communication,197 which can cause
clients serious emotional distress. Moreover, the failure to treat
emotional distress as “injury” often results in an initial determination
under the Standards that the appropriate sanction is an admonition,
which is a sanction that does not effectively promote the goals of
lawyer discipline.198
c.

Indeterminacy in the length of suspensions

The ABA Standards also invite disparate sanctions for serious
misconduct because they fail to indicate how courts should
determine the length of any suspension.199 Under the Standards, a
suspension may be imposed for a minimum of six months to a
maximum of three years, but the Standards provide no guidance to
assist in determining when longer or shorter time periods should be
employed.200 As a practical matter, a six month suspension for an
attorney with law partners has a much different impact on a lawyer’s
practice than a suspension for two or three years.201 Indeed, many
to a client was “slight” where a lawyer’s office failed to file or return original tax forms for ten
months, notwithstanding the client’s repeated efforts to resolve the matter); In re Cushing, 663
N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. 1996) (finding no “real harm” when a lawyer who was retained to pursue
a personal injury action failed to return phone calls or respond to letters during a seven-month
period, even though client suffered “needless anxiety”); In re Bourcier, 939 P.2d 604, 607 (Or.
1997) (finding no actual injury where a client was unable to communicate at all with his lawyer
about a criminal appeal). See generally In re Nomura, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 8, at *12-13 (finding no
actual injury to a client whose malpractice claim against a doctor was mistakenly dismissed with
prejudice by a lawyer who did not return files for several months despite repeated requests); In
re Belsches, 918 P.2d 559, 560 (Colo. 1996) (suggesting that harm must be “calculable”); In re
Hunter, 656 A.2d at 208 (suggesting no harm to persons who experienced frustration and
anguish due to lawyer’s failure to communicate and return files).
197. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 213-21 and accompanying text. In many cases in which lawyers breach a
duty to clients, some emotional distress is likely to occur. The failure to recognize client
emotional distress as “injury” under the ABA Standards sends the message that the treatment of
the client is unimportant so long as the client suffers no monetary harm. The better approach
would be to treat evidence of emotional distress as “injury,” both to reduce inconsistency in the
sanction determination and to afford appropriate weight to the importance of the client’s
feelings in the professional relationship.
199. Suspension from practice is typically prescribed when a lawyer knowingly engages in
misconduct resulting in actual or potential injury. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at
Standards 4.22, 4.32, 4.52, 5.22.
200. See id. at Standard 2.3 & Commentary. The ABA Standards also do not indicate
whether the length of the suspension should be calculated during the initial determination and
adjusted after considering aggravating or mitigating factors. Because this approach would
promote consistency in the initial determination of the sanction, the need to establish
guidelines for determining the length of a suspension is addressed here.
201. In a law firm, a lawyer’s partners can often perform the work that must be done for
clients during a six-month suspension and can obtain extensions for non-essential work. See

courts impose suspensions for the minimum amount of time in an
apparent effort to reduce the impact of the suspension on lawyers’
practices. For example, in Colorado, more than forty percent of all
suspensions imposed in 1996 and 1997 were for no more than a six
month period.202
The potential for disparity when imposing suspensions is even
greater than it appears because many courts impose suspensions of
less than six months.203 Even in states that purport to follow the ABA
Standards closely, a sizable percentage of suspensions are imposed
for less than six months204 and suspensions for as little as thirty days
are not uncommon.205 The absence of guidelines for determining the
appropriate length of suspensions within a fairly broad range invites
disparity and ultimately, ineffective discipline.
generally In re Roberts-Hohl, 866 P.2d 1167, 1171 (N.M. 1994) (noting that a suspension of less
than six months allows an attorney “to delay the performance of requested services”); In re
Schnitzler, 412 N.W.2d 124, 125 (Wis. 1987) (noting that the impact of short suspensions falls
mainly on clients). A six-month suspension can have a greater impact on solo practitioners, but
some courts have attempted to mitigate that effect. See In re Triem, 929 P.2d 634, 648 (Alaska
1996) (taking into account the fact that a lawyer was a sole practitioner when imposing a 90-day
suspension). See generally In re Garnice, 833 P.2d 700, 703 (Ariz. 1992) (imposing public censure
rather than suspension on a sole practitioner because any suspension would likely be
“devastating” for the lawyer’s practice). But see In re Neitlich, 597 N.E.2d 425, 429-30 (Mass.
1992) (rejecting the argument that a lesser sanction should be imposed on a solo practitioner).
202. Short suspensions may be imposed even when there is significant misconduct. See, e.g.,
People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 131, 137-38 (Colo. 1997) (imposing a six-month suspension for
conflict of interest in litigation and submission of false statements to the court with the intent to
mislead the court and others); In re Evans, 475 S.E.2d 645, 645 (Ga. 1996) (imposing a fivemonth suspension for failing to work on four client matters, resulting in the dismissal of a case,
and lying to the client about the status); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Jones, 570 So. 2d 1161,
1164 (La. 1990) (imposing a six-month suspension for a pattern of total neglect of seven client
matters, failure to disburse client funds properly, and failure to refund client fees until shortly
before a disciplinary hearing).
203. While the Standards state that any suspension should be for at least six months to
insure a real interruption in practice, see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.3
Commentary, many states that otherwise follow the ABA Standards place no minimum on the
length of suspensions, see, e.g., COLO. R.P. REGARDING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 241.7(2); GA. B.R.
& REGS. 4-102(b)(2); LA. R. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 19, § 10(A)(2); WASH. R.
LAWYER DISCIPLINE 5.1(b); see also COLD, supra note 9, at Q 57E (indicating that 20 out of 32
responding states had no minimum on length of suspension). Indeed, it does not appear that
any state has adopted the ABA’s recommendation that the minimum period of a suspension be
for six months. See id.
204. For example, my review of Colorado cases revealed that 30% of all suspensions
imposed in 1997 (10 out of 33) were for a period of less than six months.
205. For instance, Oregon has adopted a 30-day presumptive sanction for a single violation
of conflict of interest rules. See In re Morris, 953 P.2d 387 (Or. 1998). Other state courts that
follow the ABA Standards also occasionally impose 30-day suspensions. See, e.g., In re Plotkin,
Sup. Ct. No. SB-95-0065-D, 1995 Ariz. LEXIS 115 (Dec. 27, 1995); In re Brooks, 854 P.2d 776,
778 (Ariz. 1993); People v. DeLoach, 944 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1997); People v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 922
(Colo. 1997); Florida Bar v. Birdsong, 661 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. 1995); Florida Bar v. Poplack,
599 So. 2d 116, 119 (Fla. 1992); In re Felling, 679 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1998); In re Roche, 678
N.E.2d 797, 799 (Ind. 1997); Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Keys, 567 So. 2d 588 (La. 1990); In re
Felice, 772 P.2d 505, 510 (Wash. 1989).

d.

Overuse of admonitions

The tendency to favor lawyers in the disciplinary process is best
illustrated by the Standards’ treatment, and the widespread use, of
admonitions. Private sanctions make up more than forty percent of
all discipline imposed on lawyers,206 yet they provoke some of the
loudest complaints by the public about lawyer sanctions. From the
public’s perspective, admonitions permit lawyers to be treated
leniently behind closed doors and deprive the public of information
about a lawyer’s full disciplinary history.207
Under the ABA Standards, an admonition may be imposed in cases
of “minor misconduct” when the lawyer is negligent and there is
“little or no injury” to another.208 The stated rationale for the use of
admonitions is that a private sanction informs the lawyer that the
conduct is unethical, but “does not unnecessarily stigmatize a lawyer
from whom the public needs no protection.”209
This rationale ignores the evidence that the public often does need
protection from lawyers who engage in “minor” misconduct,210 and
effectively values the lawyer’s reputation over the protection of the
public.211 Yet it is unclear why concerns about protecting the lawyer’s
206.
207.

See SOLD 1996, supra note 14, at 9 fig. II.
See KAY A. OSTBERG, HELP ABOLISH LEGAL TYRANNY, ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE NATIONAL
SURVEY 11-14 (1990) [hereinafter HALT REPORT]; Chalfie, supra note 84, at 7.
208. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 1.2; see also id. at Standard 2.6
Commentary.
209. See id. at Standard 1.2 Commentary. Although not expressly stated in the Standards,
another argument for the use of private sanctions is that they facilitate the speedy disposition of
claims of minor misconduct which might otherwise be dismissed. See PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 92-93.
210. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. It appears that in practice, admonitions
are sometimes imposed on lawyers whose misconduct would not be considered “minor” by most
members of the public. See, e.g., Disciplinary Case Summaries, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 123-24
(imposing private sanctions on a lawyer whose neglect of a case resulted in dismissal for failure
to prosecute); Discipline Corner, UTAH B.J., June 1998, at 36, 38 (imposing an admonition on a
lawyer who received a fee to file a criminal appeal but failed to file the appeal). Admonitions
are also imposed when clients suffer real injury. See, e.g., Discipline Reports, 45 LA. B.J. 114, 114
(1997) (reporting admonitions imposed on lawyers who failed to refund any unearned portion
of fees); Discipline Corner, UTAH B.J., Feb. 1997, at 26 (imposing an admonition on a lawyer
whose failure to submit a timely answer in litigation caused the entry of a default judgment, loss
of the client’s truck, and additional attorneys’ fees of $1450 in an attempt to set aside the
judgment).
211. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.6 Commentary (noting the interest in
avoiding damage to a lawyer’s reputation when future ethical violations seem unlikely).
Concern for the lawyer’s reputation permeates all aspects of the ABA’s approach to lawyer
discipline. For example, concern about the lawyer’s reputation led the Clark Commission to
recommend making pending disciplinary proceedings a matter of public record only if the
charges were based on a conviction or if the attorney requested a public hearing. See PROBLEMS
IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 138-42. The ABA Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement go further, making disciplinary proceedings public after a finding of
probable cause. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 16A (1996).
Although the McKay Commission found that little or no significant harm would come to lawyers

reputation should outweigh the interest in protecting the public.
Admonitions are imposed only after lawyers have already received
some level of due process and have consented to the discipline or
been found to have engaged in wrongful conduct. In the absence of
evidence that lawyers are harmed by fully public disciplinary
systems,212 it is difficult to find unfair the possible reputational impact
of a low-level public sanction on those found to have engaged in
misconduct.
Not only is the rationale for admonitions weak, but the ABA
Standards fail to limit the use of admonitions in ways that adequately
protect the public. Although the Standards state that the sanction of
admonition should be imposed when there is “little or no likelihood
of repetition,”213 it is usually difficult or impossible to predict the
likelihood of repetition of misconduct by a lawyer.214 Some of the
black-letter standards attempt to address this problem by prescribing
an admonition only when there is an “isolated instance” of
misconduct, but others do not contain this limitation.215 Even if the
“isolated instance” standard is applied, the underreporting of lawyer
misconduct,216 and the difficulty of learning about private discipline
imposed elsewhere,217 make it difficult to determine whether a
from public disclosure of mere allegations and recommended fully public proceedings, the
recommendation was rejected by the ABA House of Delegates. See LAWYER REGULATION, supra
note 12, at 119-20; see also Burnele V. Powell, Open Doors, Open Arms and Substantially Open
Records: Consumerism Takes Hold in the Legal Profession, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 733-34 (1994)
(reporting on rejection of recommendation).
212. The McKay Commission found that the experience of Oregon, West Virginia and
Florida with fully open disciplinary systems revealed no evidence of harm to lawyers from
making complaints public. See LAWYER REGULATION, supra note 12, at 35. But see Powell, supra
note 211, at 734-35 (suggesting that the Commission’s findings may rest on incomplete
information).
213. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.6 Commentary.
214. I found no published empirical research addressing the characteristics of lawyer
recidivists. There is, however, anecdotal evidence suggesting that a number of lawyers who
receive admonitions will subsequently engage in similar misconduct. See infra note 218 and
accompanying text.
215. Compare, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standards 4.34, 4.54, 4.64 (prescribing
admonitions when there is an “isolated instance” of misconduct), with Standards 4.14, 4.24, 4.44
(making no reference to an isolated instance requirement).
216. See supra note 29. Indeed, the use of private discipline increases the likelihood that
additional acts of misconduct will go unreported because other clients may not consider
whether their lawyers have engaged in misconduct in their own cases or may be reluctant to
make claims against lawyers whom they believe enjoy excellent reputations.
217. Disciplinary agencies may be mistaken about the apparent “isolated” nature of the
misconduct because of poor reporting practices among jurisdictions. For example, private
discipline is often not reported to the ABA National Discipline Data Bank, which was
established primarily to facilitate the imposition of reciprocal public discipline. See Telephone
Interview with Nancy H.C. Gronland, ABA Data Bank Manager (July 29, 1998). In some states,
including New York, records of private discipline are placed in a lawyer’s disciplinary file, but
are not communicated to other jurisdictions without a court order. See Daniel Wise, Disciplinary

seemingly isolated instance of misconduct is truly a one-time
occurrence.
It appears, moreover, that private sanctions are imposed in cases
where the misconduct is not an “isolated” occurrence. In fact, private
admonitions frequently are imposed on lawyers who are known to
have been disciplined previously for misconduct. In Colorado, which
follows the ABA Standards as closely as any state, it is not unusual for
three, four or five private sanctions to be imposed on the same lawyer
for misconduct.218
These cases also suggest that the specific deterrent effect of
admonitions may be limited. Indeed, in two-thirds of all Colorado
Supreme Court lawyer discipline cases decided in 1996 and 1997, the
lawyer sanctioned had previously received at least one private
sanction.219 This figure is troubling but not surprising. Due to their
private nature, admonitions have little sting and convey a weak
message about the unacceptability of a lawyer’s conduct.
The failure of the ABA Standards to more carefully limit the use of
admonitions is especially troubling because private sanctions deprive
members of the public of the means to protect themselves.220 Most
Panels Urged to Share Data, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 1998, at 1.
218. See, e.g., People v. DeBaca, 948 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. 1997) (reporting five prior admonitions
for similar misconduct); People v. Hohertz, 926 P.2d 560, 565 (Colo. 1996) (noting five
previous admonitions); People v. Calvert, 915 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1996) (reporting five prior
admonitions); People v. Dolan, 873 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo. 1994) (noting four prior admonitions
for similar conduct); People v. Barbieri, 935 P.2d 12, 13 (Colo. 1997) (reporting four prior
admonitions); People v. Harding, 937 P.2d 393, 395 (Colo. 1997) (noting three prior
admonitions for similar misconduct).
Indeed, there are examples in many states of lawyers who have received more than one
private sanction before being publicly disciplined. See, e.g., In re Brown, 910 P.2d 631, 632 (Ariz.
1990) (noting three prior private sanctions); In re Melton, SB-96-0002-D, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 16, at
*9 (Feb. 27, 1996) (noting two prior sanctions for similar misconduct); Louisiana State Bar
Ass’n v. Noble, 568 So. 2d 563, 565 (La. 1990) (noting two prior private sanctions); Stegall v.
Mississippi Bar, 618 So. 2d 1291, 1295 (Miss. 1993) (noting four prior private sanctions); In re
Harris, 890 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Mo. 1994) (citing three prior admonitions). See also WASH. R.
LAWYER DISCIPLINE 5.5B(a) (allowing three admonitions in five years).
219. From 1996-1997, 82 lawyers out of 121 who were the subject of public discipline had
received private sanctions before receiving more serious public sanctions. While these numbers
suggest that some lawyers are not deterred by private sanctions, they must be interpreted
cautiously. It is not known how many lawyers who receive private sanctions are never again
disciplined, because the lawyers’ names are not published. This information has not been
tracked by the Colorado Supreme Court Office of Disciplinary Counsel. See Telephone
Interview by Alex Filotto with Michael Henry, Intake Attorney, Colorado Supreme Court Office
of Disciplinary Counsel (Jan. 6, 1998). Moreover, the numbers do not indicate whether public
expressive sanctions are more effective than private sanctions. In order to test this, one would
need to look at all Colorado lawyers who received public reprimands and then track their
future disciplinary experience. Unfortunately, the unavailability of private discipline records
makes it impossible for outside observers to do this.
220. To be fair, the overuse of private sanctions is not due entirely to the language of the
ABA Standards, which recommends against the use of admonitions if a lawyer has previously
engaged in the same or similar misconduct. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 8.4.
The problem is also due, in part, to the voluntary nature of the Standards and to the

claims of misconduct against lawyers resulting in admonitions are
claims arising from neglect of client matters, failure to communicate
with clients, and claims of incompetence.221 Imposing private
sanctions in these cases deprives the public of useful information
about whom to retain. In short, the ABA Standards too freely
recommend the use of admonitions, even though private sanctions
do little to protect the public or advance the other goals of lawyer
discipline.
2.

Problems with the aggravating and mitigating factors
The effort to achieve some consistency in the sanction
determination effectively ends with the ABA Standards’ treatment of
aggravating and mitigating factors. The language of the ABA
Standards—which states that the sanctions set forth in the black-letter
standards are only “generally appropriate” absent aggravating or
mitigating factors—invites courts to assume that the initial sanction
determination will routinely be altered by these factors.222 Yet the
ABA Standards provide virtually no guidance with respect to how to
treat these factors. Instead, they simply list the factors, mostly without
explanation that might encourage a thoughtful or nuanced approach
to their application.223
As a consequence, these factors are
reflexively—and inconsistently—invoked by the courts, even though
some of the factors would appear to deserve little, if any,
consideration. In addition, the ABA Standards provide no guidance
for the difficult task of weighing these factors, leaving this
determination entirely to the decision-maker.

institutional tendencies to favor lawyers in the disciplinary process.
221. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
222. Indeed, because at least one of these factors—the absence or presence of a prior
disciplinary history—is present in every discipline case, some adjustment of the initial sanction
determination is arguably justified in every case.
223. The Sanctions Committee determined which aggravating and mitigating factors might
appropriately be considered after examining the factors considered by the courts in past cases.
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 2. The Commentary following the Standards’ list of
aggravating factors simply cites to cases in which the factors were considered. See id. at Standard
9.2 Commentary. The Commentary following the mitigating factors is somewhat more
illuminating in that it briefly discusses the mitigating factors of restitution, personal and
emotional problems, physical and mental disability, and chemical dependency. Unfortunately,
it only cites to cases in which the other ten mitigating factors were considered. See id. at
Standard 9.3 Commentary.

a.

Some problems with specific factors
i. Experience in the practice of law

The aggravating factor of “substantial experience in the practice of
law” and the mitigating factor of “inexperience in the practice of law”
merit reconsideration. These factors are not defined by the ABA
Standards, and as interpreted by the courts, most lawyers can be
placed into either or both categories.224 As a result, these factors are
frequently considered in disciplinary decisions, regardless of their
relevance to the misconduct at issue.
Moreover, courts will
sometimes give great weight to these factors, and in other seemingly
similar cases they will not, resulting in disparity in the imposition of
sanctions.225
The justifications for treating substantial experience in the practice
of law as an aggravating factor are weak in many cases. The bar
admission standards in every state require applicants to demonstrate
knowledge of professional responsibility rules and admitted lawyers
are bound to abide by the rules regardless of their level of
experience.226 Although we might wish otherwise, there is little
evidence that lawyers who have been admitted for substantial periods
of time are more knowledgeable about these professional
responsibility rules or more sensitized to desirable ethical norms than
224. Compare People v. Hensley-Martin, 795 P.2d 262, 265 (Colo. 1992) (finding a lawyer
with six to eight years of practice “inexperienced”), with People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327,
1329 (Colo. 1997) (finding a lawyer admitted to the bar for six years had “substantial
experience”). See also In re Capps, 942 P.2d 588, 589 (Kan. 1997) (finding a lawyer admitted less
than seven years had “substantial experience”); In re Jones, 951 P.2d 149, 152 (Or. 1997)
(finding a lawyer admitted less than eight years had substantial experience); In re Hunter, 656
A.2d 203, 208 (Vt. 1994) (noting that a lawyer admitted to the bar for less than eight years had
“substantial experience”).
225. Compare People v. Sather, 936 P.2d 576, 579 (Colo. 1997) (finding that respondent’s
substantial experience in practice of law was a “significant aggravating factor” in a case involving
excessive charging of fees), and People v. Calvert, 915 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Colo. 1996) (treating
substantial experience as an aggravating factor in a case involving neglect of legal matters and
excessive fees), with People v. Hohertz, 926 P.2d 560, 565 (Colo. 1996) (failing to address a
lawyer’s substantial experience in a case involving neglect and charging of excessive fees), and
People v. Kardokus, 881 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Colo. 1994) (declining to mention substantial
experience as an aggravating factor in a case involving an experienced lawyer who neglected
client matters and charged excessive fees). Compare also People v. Murray, 887 P.2d 1016, 1022
(Colo. 1994) (disbarring an inexperienced solo practitioner who took on more business than
he could handle, resulting in a pattern of neglect of client matters), with People v. Fried, 898
P.2d 1066, 1068 (Colo. 1995) (ordering a thirty-day suspension for a pattern of neglect due, in
part, to inexperience).
226. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia require bar applicants to pass the
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (“MPRE”) for admission to the bar. The
remaining three states require applicants to pass a professional responsibility exam that tests
specifically on the state’s professional responsibility rules. See 1998 BAR/BRI DIG. (1998); see
also Whelan’s Case, 619 A.2d 571, 573 (N.H. 1992) (noting that attorneys are presumed to know
the rules of professional conduct).

their younger colleagues, and in fact, the reverse may be true.227 Nor
is there reason to believe that experience in the practice of law makes
lawyers better able to avoid misconduct arising from depression228 or
from drug or alcohol abuse than less experienced lawyers.229 Indeed,
as lawyers gain experience they often assume greater responsibilities
in law practice, which may make them more susceptible to substance
abuse.230 Thus, enhancing a sanction due to substantial experience is,
227. It is only in the last 20 years that serious efforts have been made to insure that lawyers
become informed about professional responsibility rules through the MPRE requirement and
that law school have required professional responsibility courses. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics
by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 39-41 (1992) (tracing the development of
professional responsibility requirements in the legal field). Young lawyers believe that
sensitivity to professional ethical concerns is learned mainly in law school. See Bryant G. Garth
& Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 479, 481,
483-86 (1993).
At the same time, there is evidence that the ethical climate in law offices can affect lawyers
negatively and can give support for ethical violations. See CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note
25, at 96. See generally FRANCIS K. ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBAUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC
PROFESSION 173 (1981) (stating that “[c]lose to 60% of the practicing bar rank lawyers in their
own offices as among the two most important sources” that have affected the resolution of
professional responsibility questions in the practice of law). The longer a lawyer has been a
member of a law office, the more the behavior of the lawyer conforms to the ethical (or
unethical) climate of the office. See CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 25, at 98.
Requirements in some states that all lawyers attend CLE courses in ethics may counteract the
effect of negative law office cultures, but the impact of such requirements is unclear.
228. A study of Washington lawyers revealed that 19% of them suffered from statistically
significant elevated levels of depression, but the number of years that the lawyers practiced did not
affect the percentage of lawyers who suffered from depression. See G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al.,
The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 233, 240-41 (1990).
229. See generally In re Smith, SB-00074-D, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 15, at *7 (Feb. 28, 1996) (noting
that experience in practice should not be considered an aggravating factor because there is no
logical expectation that experience will reduce the likelihood of addiction). But see State v.
Stevens, 866 P.2d 1378, 1379 (Colo. 1994) (justifying a lesser sanction for a relatively
inexperienced lawyer who used cocaine in contrast to a more heavily sanctioned lawyer who
had substantial experience in practice).
A study of Washington lawyers concluded that 18% of the lawyers who practiced from 2-20
years were problem drinkers and that 25% of the lawyers who practiced 20 or more years were
problem drinkers. See Benjamin et al., supra note 228, at 241.
Estimates of the percentage of lawyers involved in disciplinary proceedings who have
problems with alcohol or drug abuse range from 14% to 75%. See G. Andrew H. Benjamin et
al., Comprehensive Lawyer Assistance Programs: Justification and Model, 16 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 113,
118 (1992); Cynthia L. Spanhel, The Impact of Impaired Attorneys on the Texas Grievance Process,
TEX. B.J., Mar. 1989, at 312; Stephen Anderson, New Data Link Mental Impairment with Discipline,
ILL. ST. B. ASS’N NEWS, Mar. 1, 1994, at 3. Unfortunately, most state disciplinary agencies do
not systematically collect data reflecting the percentage of lawyer discipline cases in which
alcohol or drug abuse was a factor, see Telephone Interview with Donna Spilis, ABA LAP Staff
Director (July 29, 1998), but there is no question that alcoholism and substance abuse are
contributing factors in many lawyer discipline cases.
230. It appears that the typical lawyer discipline case involves a lawyer who is more than 10
years out of law school. See James Evans, Lawyers at Risk, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1989, at 45, 46-47
(showing that 82% of disciplined lawyers have practiced for more than ten years). See generally
Kelly, supra note 8, at 498 (indicating that most lawyers in the study who had converted client
funds had been in practice more than 10 years). A study of California lawyers disciplined in the
late 1980s revealed that 27% of the lawyers were in their early forties, which is a time when

in many cases, essentially retributive.
There are, obviously, problems that more experienced lawyers may
be better able to avoid than less experienced lawyers. For example,
more experienced lawyers may be better equipped to avoid
complaints based on claims of incompetent representation or poor
law office management controls,231 and may be more knowledgeable
about state court rules governing practice than their younger
colleagues.232
However, even in cases involving law office
management problems and incompetence, a lawyer’s potentially
greater knowledge and experience does not justify routinely
enhancing the sanction. Case loads can become unmanageable for
reasons that have nothing to do with experience. Claims of
incompetent representation can also arise for reasons unrelated to
the number of years a lawyer has practiced.233 While there may be
cases in which the lawyer’s substantial experience should be
considered relevant to the sanction imposed—such as where an
experienced lawyer persuades a younger lawyer to engage in
misconduct—these cases are relatively infrequent.234 The ABA
Standards’ failure to define and carefully circumscribe the situations
in which substantial experience in practice should be considered an
aggravating factor, and to encourage thoughtful application of the
factor in those limited categories of cases, invites unfair and
inconsistent results.
Similarly, inexperience in the practice of law should not be a
mitigating factor in many cases of lawyer misconduct. The goals of
lawyer discipline are not advanced by reducing the sanctions imposed
marital problems, financial strains and fading expectations can fuel mid-life crises. See Evans,
supra, at 46, 48. This may help explain the finding that those who have practiced longer appear
to be more susceptible to developing problem drinking than their younger colleagues. See
Benjamin et al., supra note 228, at 242.
231. These complaints might include, inter alia, neglect of client matters, failures to
communicate, and failures to maintain proper trust accounts.
232. State court rules concerning the limits on contingent fees, the terms of written retainer
agreements, and the requirements for establishing and reporting on client trust accounts are
not typically taught in law schools or tested on bar exams. Moreover, young lawyers who
practice in large hierarchical law firms may not learn of these rules in their early years of
practice. More experienced practitioners should come to know of these rules, particularly if
they practice with other lawyers, but may be less likely to learn of them if they practice alone
throughout their legal careers.
233. For example, case loads can become unmanageable due to the illness or the death of a
partner. Mental disability can contribute to claims of neglect and incompetent representation.
See, e.g., Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Villa, 570 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (La. 1990) (discussing the
effect of depression on a lawyer’s ability to function in an intense personal injury practice).
234. More often, increased experience and responsibility may create the possibility of
greater injury to clients. This possibility does not, in itself, justify treating substantial
experience as an aggravating factor under the ABA Standards because the Standards already
provide for the sanction to be enhanced if there is serious injury. See ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 7, at Standard 4.3.

on inexperienced lawyers who have willfully converted client funds,
submitted false documents to a court, or knowingly engaged in other
misconduct about which there can be no ethical confusion.235
Although there may be instances where inexperience in practice can
directly lead to disciplinary problems—such as neglect of client
matters, lack of competence or technical trust fund violations—these
situations typically only arise as a result of negligence, and the
sanction prescribed by the ABA Standards is usually no greater than a
reprimand.
Further reduction of the sanction to a private
admonition does not advance the goals of lawyer discipline.236 At
most, this mitigating factor should be considered in only limited
circumstances where the misconduct is directly attributable to
inexperience in order to avoid inconsistent and inappropriate
application of this factor.
ii. Absence of prior disciplinary record
The absence of a prior disciplinary record should not be treated as
a mitigating factor when imposing discipline on lawyers.237 Mitigation
due to lack of prior discipline sends the message to lawyers—who are
supposed to maintain high ethical standards—that they have behaved
in an exemplary fashion simply because they have not previously
been subject to discipline. In addition, in view of the reluctance to
report lawyer misconduct and the difficulty of otherwise detecting
it,238 the absence of a disciplinary record is not by itself proof of good
235. See, e.g., In re Leon, 524 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. 1994) (stating that inexperience in the
practice of law does not excuse theft or mitigate serious misconduct); In re Wilson, 409 A.2d
1153, 1157 (N.J. 1979) (noting that offense of misappropriation “should be clear even to [the]
youngest” practitioners); H. Furman, Punishing Ethical Violations: Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors, 20 COLO. LAW. 243, 245 (1991) (arguing that an inexperienced lawyer “should be as
fully informed as an experienced one”). But see Florida Bar v. McNamara, 634 So. 2d 166, 168
(Fla. 1994) (considering inexperience in practice as a mitigating factor where the lawyer
converted client funds); In re Muhammed, 655 So. 2d 325, 327 (La. 1995) (considering
inexperience in practice as a mitigating factor where the lawyer lied about receiving funds
intended for a client and converted them to his own use).
236. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text. While there may be situations in which
inexperience directly contributes to misconduct that draws a sanction greater than a reprimand
under the ABA Standards, these cases are relatively infrequent. For example, a young solo
practitioner may engage in a pattern of neglect of client matters, but be too inexperienced to
know how to deal with it. Under the ABA Standards, the initial determination would require
the sanction of suspension. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 4.42(b). In such
cases, it may be appropriate to consider inexperience and to impose supervised probation
rather than suspension.
237. It is, on the other hand, understandable why a prior history of disciplinary offenses
would be treated as an aggravating factor. A prior disciplinary history suggests that the level of
sanction previously imposed did not have the desired deterrent or rehabilitative effect and that
an enhanced sanction may be needed.
238. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; supra note 29.

conduct. Moreover, this mitigating factor is present in many
disciplinary cases,239 providing courts with significant latitude to apply
the factor inconsistently.240
The opportunities for disparate treatment of similarly situated
lawyers are compounded by the fact that under the ABA Standards,
the absence of discipline over a long career should be offset by the
countervailing aggravating factor of substantial experience in the
practice of law, but courts will sometimes give great weight to one and
virtually ignore the other.241 To avoid unwarranted inconsistency,
initial sanction levels should be determined based on the assumption
that they are being applied to lawyers who have not been previously
disciplined and the absence of prior discipline should not be treated
as a mitigating factor.
iii. Character and reputation
Character and reputation evidence is one of the most salient
factors in determining lawyer sanctions,242 yet the evidence frequently
has little probative value. It is also the most misused of all the
mitigating factors. Character and reputation evidence powerfully
239. In one study of lawyers who were disciplined for converting client funds, 85% had not
previously been disciplined. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 497, 499. My review of Oregon Supreme
Court opinions decided in 1996-97 revealed that 13 of 19 lawyers had not previously been
disciplined.
240. In some cases, courts give the absence of a disciplinary history great weight and in
other cases the courts may give the factor little consideration. For example, in In re Murphy, 936
P.2d 1269 (Ariz. 1997), the court was “greatly influenced” by the fact that a lawyer who used
confidential client information for his own benefit and violated rules against conflicts of
interest had practiced for 26 years with no prior discipline complaints. See id. at 1274. It relied
on this single “substantial” mitigating factor to outweigh several serious aggravating factors, and
reduced an initial sanction determination from disbarment to a one-year suspension. See id. A
year earlier, the same court gave no great weight to this mitigating factor when it suspended for
two years a lawyer who had practiced for over 25 years without being disciplined. See In re
Schroeder, SB-96-0004-D, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 14, at *13 (Feb. 26, 1996) (discussing a lawyer who
failed to avoid conflicts of interest and charged excessive fees). In Schroeder, the initial sanction
determination under the ABA Standards was no more than a suspension. The court’s
willingness to treat Murphy’s clean discipline history as a substantial mitigating factor, but not
Schroeder’s, may have been due, in part, to the fact that Murphy was a member of a wellrespected Phoenix law firm and Schroeder had left the law to work for a car rental company.
See Schroeder, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS, at *4.
241. The aggravating factor of substantial experience is often offset by the absence of a
prior disciplinary record. See, e.g., In re Frost, 863 P.2d 843, 854-55 (Alaska 1993); In re
Auerbach, SB-96-0019-D, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 35, at *7 (Apr. 1, 1996); In re Grant, 936 P.2d 1360,
1363 (Kan. 1997) (noting in each case a lawyer’s substantial experience in practice as an
aggravating factor and the absence of a prior disciplinary record as a mitigating factor). It is
not unusual, however, for the courts to ignore one of these factors when they are both present
in the same case. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 788 P.2d 95, 97 (Ariz. 1990) (considering no prior
discipline as a mitigating factor but not considering experience in practice as an aggravating
factor); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Driscoll, BV No. 30, 1996 Md. LEXIS 133, at *24 (Oct.
8, 1996) (same); In re Lancaster, 690 A.2d 863, 864 (Vt. 1997) (same).
242. Character evidence is one of the variables predicting that a lawyer who converted client
funds will not be disbarred. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 504, 507.

affects the sanctioning decision because the witnesses who provide it
are often well-regarded members of the bench and bar.243 Courts
often use such evidence to justify their decisions to treat wellconnected lawyers leniently,244 without regard for whether the
evidence provided is relevant to the misconduct at issue or likely to
predict a lawyer’s future actions.
Character and reputation evidence should be afforded little if any
weight in most discipline cases. The mere fact that a witness will
testify to the lawyer’s good reputation or to specific instances of good
conduct245 often does not merit mitigation of a sanction. While a
spotless reputation, if deserved, might help predict future conduct, a
good reputation can be due to the fact that lawyer misconduct is hard
to detect and that “bad facts” have not become widely known.
Moreover, character and reputation evidence is often provided by
people who have no knowledge of the specifics of a lawyer’s practice
or of the wrongdoing alleged.246 While the witnesses may have
243. For example, in Florida Bar v. Diamond, 548 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Fla. 1989), a lawyer
whose conduct merited disbarment under Florida’s standards was instead suspended for three
years based in part on the “abundant character testimony” including the testimony of the past
president of the Florida Bar and a past mayor of Miami Beach. See id.. See also Florida Bar v.
Clark, 582 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 1991) (suspending a lawyer rather than disbarring him based in
part on the testimony of several character witnesses including a Florida circuit court judge who
attested to the lawyer’s legal ability and his reputation for honesty and integrity); Louisiana
State Bar Ass’n v. Garraway, 520 So. 2d 400, 402 (La. 1988) (reducing a recommended sanction
due in part to testimony of judges). See generally supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
244. Character and reputation evidence is often considered in lawyer discipline cases. For
example, in 1996 and 1997, character evidence was considered as a mitigating factor in 40 out
of 88 Colorado Supreme Court discipline cases. In many cases, character and reputation
evidence appears to affect directly the court’s decision to reduce a sanction. See, e.g., Florida
Bar v. Hmielewski, 702 So. 2d 218, 221 (Fla. 1997) (suspending a lawyer for three years rather
than disbarring him due in part to “extremely strong character evidence”); In re Berk, 602 A.2d
946, 951 (Vt. 1991) (concluding that a lawyer who engaged in conduct that could have resulted
in disbarment under the ABA Standards should be suspended for only six months due in part
to character evidence); In re Johnson, 826 P.2d 186, 193 (Wash. 1992) (citing a lawyer’s
reputation for competence and integrity as one of two “important” factors which resulted in
decision to impose a 60-day rather than a six-month suspension). See generally People v.
Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo. 1994) (using a lawyer’s reputation for integrity to bolster a
finding of no willful conversion of client funds and to reduce the recommended three-year
suspension to a one-year suspension).
245. Generally, evidence of character or a trait of character is proved by testimony about an
individual’s reputation in the community or by testimony in the form of an opinion. See FED. R.
EVID. 405(a). Under limited circumstances, character may be proved by specific instances of
conduct. See id. at 405(b). While rules of evidence are only loosely applied in some disciplinary
proceedings, they are more closely followed in others. Compare COLO. R.P. REGARDING
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 241.14(d) (stating that hearings shall be conducted in conformity with
Colorado Rules of Evidence), with In re Quaid, 646 So. 2d 343, 348 (La. 1994) (noting that it
may be more appropriate in disciplinary proceedings to be guided but not confined by a strict
application of the rules of evidence).
246. See WOLFRAM, supra note 93, at 121-22; see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text. In addition, these witnesses often provide testimony because of sympathy or friendship for
the lawyer or for business reasons rather than out of concern for the disciplinary process. See

observed the lawyer sporadically, they are often not in a position to
know whether the misconduct was truly aberrational. Without this
knowledge, character and reputation evidence is largely irrelevant,
yet this evidence can have an enormous impact on the sanctioning
decision.247
For example, in In re Witteman,248 a lawyer was charged with several
ethical violations including failure to handle diligently a client matter
and then lying to the client about the legal status of the case after it
was dismissed. This same lawyer previously had been convicted of
failure to file a federal tax return and over the years had had four
separate client matters in which “he got in trouble and lied in an
effort to conceal what happened.”249 He had been sanctioned on five
previous occasions. Notwithstanding this record, the lawyer was able
to assemble, and permitted to file, twenty-two affidavits from judges,
lawyers and clients in his support.250 The court wondered aloud “how
a lawyer who is professionally well regarded by judges and lawyers . . .
has repeatedly gotten himself into the same type of predicament.”251
Nevertheless, the court suspended the lawyer for two years rather
than disbarring him, as had been recommended by the disciplinary
board and would have been appropriate under the ABA Standards.252
While lawyers are permitted to introduce this powerful—yet often
meaningless—evidence, courts fail to consider that character and
reputation evidence is, in the lawyer discipline context, often a oneway street that only benefits lawyers. The ABA Standards provide that
a sanction may be mitigated if there is proof of good character, but
do not provide for an increased sanction if there is proof of bad

WOLFRAM, supra note 93.
247. See supra notes 242-43; see also Florida Bar v. Seldin, 526 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 1988)
(rejecting the Florida Bar’s recommendation of disbarment in view of the absence of a
disciplinary record and favorable recommendations from civic leaders in his community); In re
Woodward, 661 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617-18 (App. Div. 1997) (rejecting the hearing panel’s
recommendation of disbarment due mainly to character evidence presented through four
witnesses and 23 character letters); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Chung, 695 A.2d 405, 40708 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting the recommendation of disbarment based in part on the testimony of
eight character witnesses who testified that a lawyer convicted of lying to the FDIC on several
occasions was “truthful”).
248. 737 P.2d 1268 (Wash. 1987).
249. See id. at 1270.
250. See id. at 1275.
251. Id. at 1270.
252. See id. at 1272; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standards 4.41, 4.61. In Witteman, the
court quoted extensively from judges’ affidavits describing the respondent and referred to the
character evidence as one of the three “principal” mitigating factors. See 737 P.2d at 1271-72.
The other two mitigating factors—the absence of dishonest motive (until the lawyer began
cover up efforts) and the “availability” of restitution—were weak, and the majority ignored
more substantial aggravating factors to reach its conclusion. See id.

character.253 Even if courts would consider this evidence, it is almost
never readily available. Victims and other clients who have not filed
complaints but who could provide information raising questions
about a lawyer’s character often do not learn about disciplinary
proceedings until they are concluded (if then).254
Moreover,
underfunded state discipline systems lack the resources to seek out
and investigate collateral “bad facts” that might affect the sanctioning
decision.255
If courts are going to consider character evidence, the
circumstances under which it is admitted should be carefully limited.
For example, character and reputation evidence should only be
admitted when a witness has substantial direct knowledge of the
lawyer’s day-to-day law practice, is aware of the misconduct alleged,
and is able to provide testimony that sheds light on character traits
placed in issue by the misconduct.256 In view of the difficulties of
253. In addition, courts usually sanction lawyers for the offense that is charged and proved
rather than for the “real” offense, which contrasts with the approach of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Thus, when courts impose sanctions on lawyers the only “bad” facts they typically
consider are facts relevant to the misconduct actually proved and any prior disciplinary history.
While prior disciplinary history can indirectly serve as evidence of “bad character,” it is much
more limited in scope than proof of good character. Moreover, in view of the underreporting
of lawyer misconduct and the low number of complaints that result in sanctions, see supra notes
26, 29, 33 and accompanying text, the availability of “bad character” evidence is, at a minimum,
very limited.
254. When a formal charge is filed against a lawyer it becomes a matter of public record, see,
e.g., MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 16(A) (1996), but it is rarely
publicized in a manner that is likely to come to the attention of the general public. Moreover,
there is no requirement that the lawyer notify other clients or other possible victims. The
notice requirements imposed on lawyers typically only arise after serious discipline has been
imposed. See, e.g., id. at Rule 27(A) (requiring a lawyer to notify all clients being represented in
pending matters that the lawyer has been disbarred, suspended or placed on disability inactive
status). Thus, other clients and victims are unlikely to learn of the disciplinary proceedings
against a lawyer unless and until public discipline is imposed.
255. See, e.g., Dubin, supra note 12, at 677-78 (noting that current resources available to
Michigan’s Attorney Grievance Commission do not allow for more than superficial
investigations and hastily prepared prosecutions).
256. In the lawyer discipline context, decision-makers are susceptible to influence by those
providing evidence and may be beholden to witnesses in one way or another. Broad statements
about reputation unsupported by first-hand knowledge of the lawyer’s practice should not be
permitted because they introduce too many opportunities for persons lacking detailed
knowledge about the lawyer being disciplined to influence unfairly the discipline process. In
addition, generalized claims that the lawyer enjoys a good reputation in the community
contribute little to the sanctioning decision. Instead, character evidence should be admitted
only if it sheds light on traits brought into question as a result of the misconduct.
A more difficult question is presented by evidence of a lawyer’s good acts that contribute to
society, including substantial pro bono work. See, e.g., In re Rivkind, 791 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Ariz.
1990) (characterizing respondent’s public speaking engagements regarding illegal drug use as a
mitigating factor); People v. Davis, 768 P.2d 1227, 1228-29 (Colo. 1989) (treating respondent’s
participation in a program that provided free legal services as a mitigating factor); In re
Merriwether, 561 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ill. 1990) (citing the respondent’s active involvement in civic
organizations and pro bono work as relevant mitigating factors); Office of Disciplinary Counsel

excluding the testimony of politically influential—but irrelevant—
witnesses, judges, elected officials and bar officers should not be
permitted to offer character evidence in lawyer disciplinary
proceedings unless the witnesses are current employers of the lawyers
charged with misconduct and their testimony relates to unique facts
that cannot be obtained from other witnesses.257 Even with these
limitations, character and reputation evidence should be afforded
relatively little weight in the sanctioning decision.
b.

The lack of guidance in weighing factors

The ABA Standards do not provide direction with respect to when
to use, or how to weigh, the twenty-three mitigating and aggravating
factors. The task of drafting standards that guide in the exercise of
this discretion is admittedly difficult, but the Standards are virtually
silent on this point.258 For example, the ABA Standards provide
almost no guidance as to how—or how heavily—any of these factors
should be weighed against the initial determination of the sanction.259
While the Reporter to the Sanctions Committee has stated that it was
the Committee’s intention that all mitigating factors be afforded less
weight than the lawyer’s mental state and the injury caused by the
misconduct,260 the Standards do not say this.
Indeed, in light of the purpose of the ABA Standards—to help
achieve consistency in the imposition of sanctions—the absence of
guidance with respect to these factors is striking. For example, the
Standards state that mitigating and aggravating factors “could” make
a sanction level other than the one arrived at during the initial

v. Chung, 695 A.2d 405, 407 (Pa. 1997) (noting respondent’s significant history of service to the
community and free legal aid to a non-profit organization as mitigating factors). While this
type of evidence could be characterized as character evidence, and is reasonably related to the
question of whether incapacitating sanctions or community service should be imposed, it
should not be used as a backdoor method through which influential witnesses can affect the
disciplinary decision. Instead, lawyers should be required to introduce this evidence through
their own testimony or through the testimony of those who supervise the programs in which the
lawyers have participated or through clients who have benefited from the pro bono work.
257. See generally In re Beconovich, 884 P.2d 1080, 1083-84 (Alaska 1994) (upholding a decision
to exclude general good character testimony offered by a member of the disciplinary board).
258. Professor Cynthia Kelly, the Reporter to the Sanctions Committee, predicted the ABA
Standards might be criticized for not providing greater guidance concerning the analysis of
aggravating and mitigating factors that may be present, but explained that the Standards are
simply a “general model” that would ensure consistency of analysis, while leaving room for
flexibility in the imposition of sanctions in a particular case. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 512.
259. The only exception is where there are instances of prior discipline. See ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 9.22(a). ABA Standard 8.0 specifically provides for
increased sanctions to be imposed where the attorney has previously received the prescribed
sanction level for the same or similar prior misconduct. See id. at Standard 8.0.
260. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 512-13.

determination appropriate,261 but they do not suggest when a
different sanction might be imposed. Thus, decision-makers are left
with great latitude to determine whether it is the mere existence of a
factor or its compelling nature that warrants a different sanction
level.
The ABA Standards also provide no guidance as to whether all
mitigating and aggravating factors should be afforded the same
weight.262 Although it may not be possible-—and would not be
desirable—-to predetermine the precise weight to be afforded each
factor, it would promote fair and considered decision-making to
know whether certain factors should be afforded more weight than
others.263 The difficulty of knowing how to weigh individual
aggravating or mitigating factors is exacerbated by the fact that there
are often several mitigating and aggravating factors in a single case.
Not surprisingly, courts applying the ABA Standards do little more
than identify factors they consider relevant in a particular case and
rarely attempt to articulate how they weigh these factors against one
another.264 In the end, the ABA Standards merely provide a
consistent two-step process for approaching the discipline decision.
The Standards’ failure to provide courts with more guidance in their
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors seriously
undermines efforts to achieve predictability and fairness when
sanctioning lawyers.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
None of the above criticisms should obscure the fact that the ABA
261. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 6.
262. The only discussion of the weight to be afforded any of the aggravating or mitigating
factors appears in the Commentary to Standard 9.32, which describes the weight to be given to
evidence of physical or mental disability or chemical dependency. See ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 7, at Standard 9.32 Commentary. That Commentary states that “if the offense is proven to
be attributable solely to disability or chemical dependency, it should be given the greatest
weight.” Id. If either is “principally responsible” for the offense, it should be given “great
weight.” See id. Lesser weights are assigned as causation becomes less clear. It is unclear,
however, whether the reference to weight refers to how this factor should be weighed against
the initial determination or how to weigh this factor against other factors.
263. As previously noted, this failure to provide guidance permits courts to give great weight to a
factor—such as the absence of prior discipline—in one case, while affording it no particular weight
in another, seemingly similar case. See supra notes 225, 240.
264. For example, in People v. Watson, 833 P.2d 50 (Colo. 1992), the court noted that
suspension was ordinarily the appropriate sanction for the misconduct at issue. The court also
noted the existence of five mitigating factors and three aggravating factors. It concluded
without explanation of the relative weight or impact of these factors that the appropriate
sanction was an 18-month suspension, stating, “[a]fter a review of the respondent’s misconduct
as contained in the stipulation and weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, we
conclude that a reasonably long period of suspension is warranted.” Id. at 53.

Standards are a useful step toward addressing some of the problems
with the imposition of sanctions on lawyers. Indeed, the absence of
standards in some jurisdictions gives rise to the greatest inconsistency
and opportunities for bias. Nor are these criticisms meant to suggest
that obvious and easy solutions are readily available. On the contrary,
the problem of how to write standards that promote consistency yet
permit flexibility has bedeviled judges, legislatures and scholars.265
The recommendations discussed below concerning the content of
standards assume that for the near term, the standards will continue
to be written on the state and not the federal level266 and that state
courts or judicial commissions will be responsible for this effort. This
is not necessarily the best arrangement.267 In light of the reluctance
of state courts to adopt written standards and to abide by them when
imposing discipline,268 state legislatures or their appointed agencies
arguably should draft the standards governing lawyer sanctions.269 As
265. Two recent experiences with this problem can be found in efforts to draft federal
sentencing guidelines and in the evolution of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See, e.g., Armour, supra note 19, at 500-04; Freed, supra note 134, at 1689-91, 1750-52; infra note
274.
266. In view of the calls for uniform federal rules of professional responsibility, see Fred C.
Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 345-72 (1994), efforts to draft Federal
Rules Governing Attorney Conduct for the federal courts, and predictions about federal
disciplinary commissions, see Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORD.
L. REV. 125, 127 (1991), it would seem that federal standards for imposing discipline—written
by a federal agency—might be more desirable. In fact, a careful legal process analysis of the
relative competence of federal regulators and the state courts to draft standards may reveal that
it should be preferable to allocate this task to federal regulators. See generally Ted Schneyer, Legal
Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORD. L. REV. 33, 38-47 (1996) [hereinafter
Schneyer, Legal Process] (describing the process of making these comparative assessments). I
have not attempted to perform such an analysis. My assumption is based only on current
political realities and on my belief that it is preferable for state courts to draft the standards—if
they will do so—because state court standards would probably be more sensitive to the balance
that needs to be struck than federally mandated sanctions, which may prove to be tougher and
less flexible than necessary to achieve the goals of lawyer sanctions. Indeed, the experience
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the United States Sentencing Commission suggests
that federal involvement is not likely to produce a nuanced approach to the development of
standards. See generally Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 134, at 918-23,
936-38 (describing the irrationality and inequality of outcomes under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines); Freed, supra note 134, at 1703-18, 1741-44 (explaining the problems with the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the United States Sentencing Commission); Robinson,
supra note 134, at 909-10 (describing how Congress’ contradictory directives resulted in
increased severity of federal sentences).
267. Nor is it inevitable. Admittedly, the ABA has consistently urged the courts to assert
their exclusive power to regulate lawyers, see, e.g., PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 1, at 10-18, and courts have attempted to do so, see Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent
Powers Doctrine, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 530-31 (1983). The reality, however, is that since colonial
times, legislatures also have been involved in the regulation of lawyers. See Alan F. Day, Lawyers
in Colonial Maryland, 1660-1715, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 146 (1973); see also JAMES HURST,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 278-79 (1950); Alpert, supra, at 531-32.
268. See, e.g., supra notes 160-63, 171 and accompanying text.
269. Legislators routinely set sanctions or ranges of sanctions in the criminal and civil
context and already set disciplinary standards for other professional groups including

a practical matter, however, it is doubtful state legislatures would
devote the time, effort or funding needed to draft such standards
well.270 Moreover, legislative involvement in this process may yield
overly rigid standards271 and may open the door to legislation of rules
governing the professional conduct of lawyers, which could
compromise lawyer independence. Without attempting to resolve
the important and difficult question of who should write these
standards,272 the recommendations that follow assume continued
judicial involvement in the drafting of standards, although these
recommendations could be implemented by legislatures or other
rule-making bodies, as well.
A. Adopt Clear and Complete Mandatory Standards
A useful starting point for drafting standards for imposing lawyer
sanctions can be found in criminal sentencing guidelines,273 which
physicians and accountants. See FRANK P. GRAD & NOELIA MARTI, PHYSICIANS’ LICENSURE AND
DISCIPLINE: THE LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 8-9 (1979)
(discussing regulation of the practice of medicine); Bene, supra note 18, at 918 (discussing
licensing and discipline in accounting and medical professions).
Moreover, state legislatures and their sentencing commissions have had more success with
devising criminal sentencing guidelines than the federal government. See Freed, supra note 134,
at 1742 (discussing successes of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines); Michael Tonry, The
Success of Judge Frankel’s Sentencing Commission, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 713, 717-20 (1993)
(describing the successes of state sentencing commissions and state sentencing guidelines).
Legislatures or their agencies may also be more likely to place the public interest before
lawyers’ interests when developing standards for imposing lawyer sanctions.
270. In most states, fewer than 200 lawyers are sanctioned each year by state discipline
systems. See SOLD 1996, supra note 14, at 5-9 fig. II. Given the scarcity of financial resources
and the other important issues confronting state legislatures, it is unlikely that legislatures
would be willing to devote the time or resources needed to draft well-conceived standards.
271. See infra note 274. Legislatures may be less sensitive than other rulemakers to the
competing demands on lawyers that can make lawyers’ ethical choices so difficult. They may
also be less sensitive than judges to the competing considerations faced by decision-makers
when imposing sanctions, and therefore less well-equipped to draft well-conceived standards
that guide the sanctioning decision.
272. I have mentioned only a few of the issues that should be considered when assessing the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of some of the possible drafters. The question of who
should write the standards is complex and necessarily raises the related questions of who should
discipline and regulate lawyers. These are questions that have long been debated and have
previously received serious scholarly attention. See, e.g., Martyn, supra note 18, at 734-43; Rhode,
supra note 26, at 694-70, 704-06; Schneyer, Legal Process, supra note 266, at 33-58; Wilkins, supra
note 18. These issues deserve and require separate treatment.
273. In some jurisdictions the term “sentencing guidelines” means rules that prescribe a
particular sentence or sentence range from which judges may deviate only when the case
presents unusual aggravating or mitigating factors. In others, it means broad sentencing ranges
with broad discretion to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. In still others, it can mean
“voluntary” guidelines that do not have the force of law. See Leonard Orland & Kevin R. Reitz,
Epilogue: A Gathering of State Sentencing Commissions, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 837, 839 (1993). The
distinction between “standards” and “guidelines” is, in some cases, little more than semantic.
See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz & Curtis R. Reitz, Building a Sentencing Reform Agenda: The ABA’s New
Sentencing Standards, 78 JUDICATURE 189, 192 (Jan.-Feb. 1995) (discussing the ABA’s decision to

have produced considerable scholarship on how to promote
consistency while providing the flexibility to consider relevant
individual circumstances.274 In certain respects, the problems that
arise when imposing sanctions on lawyers mirror the difficulties with
achieving fairness in criminal sentencing. For example, in both
contexts there is the problem of bias,275 the existence of an array of
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the need to choose among a
number of available sanctions that convey very different messages and
may differ in their deterrent and rehabilitative effects.
Ironically, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Sentencing
(“ABA Sentencing Standards”)276 provide a more useful starting point
for drafting standards for imposing lawyer discipline than do the ABA
Standards relating to lawyer sanctions. Like the ABA Standards for
use the word “standards” rather than “guidelines” because the latter would suggest similarity to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
274. The most well-known—and most criticized—guidelines are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which were mandated by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See 28 U.S.C. § 994
(1994). Those guidelines have been criticized as too rigid, too complex, too harsh, and too
susceptible to prosecutorial manipulation, see, e.g., Freed, supra note 134, at 1690; Robinson,
supra note 134, at 894-98, 909-10, but the critiques relate mostly to the structure and the
specifics of the Guidelines rather than to the idea of guidelines themselves. See Tonry, supra,
note 269, at 716. Many states have also adopted criminal sentencing guidelines, with somewhat
more success. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in the States: An Overview of the Colorado Law
Review Symposium, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 645, 648 (1993); Tonry, supra note 269, at 717-20.
275. The problem of light sentences for white collar criminals with whom judges could
identify as compared to the sentences imposed on other criminal defendants contributed to
calls for federal sentencing guidelines. See FRANKEL, supra note 83, at 23-24. Judges are even
more likely to identify with lawyers who are sanctioned than they are with the average criminal
defendant because most judges were at one time practicing lawyers.
The opportunities for bias against lower echelon offenders are also present both when
sanctioning criminal defendants and lawyers. Solo practitioners, who are on the bottom of the
lawyer status ladder, are prosecuted at a greater rate by disciplinary authorities than partners in
small firms. See Bruce L. Arnold & John Hagan, Careers of Misconduct: The Structure of Prosecuted
Professional Deviance Among Lawyers, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 771, 772-73, 776-77 (1992). They are also
disciplined more often than lawyers who work in other practice settings. See, e.g., Evans, supra
note 230, at 46-47 (reporting that approximately half of lawyers disciplined in California in 1988
were solo practitioners, although only 29% of California lawyers worked in solo practices). The
reasons for this are complex. For example, lawyers in solo practices encounter economic
pressures that may make them more likely to engage in misconduct. See CARLIN, LAWYERS’
ETHICS, supra note 25, at 73-74, 120-22. They are also more likely to have troubled clients who
present ethical problems, see id.; Arnold & Hagen, supra, at 287; Levin, supra note 25, at text
accompanying n.143, and their clients are more likely to file disciplinary complaints than more
sophisticated clients, see Wilkins, supra note 18, at 829 (noting that individual clients are more
likely than corporate clients to invoke the disciplinary system). In addition, solo practitioners
may not have the staff and office controls that enable other lawyers to avoid the most common
disciplinary complaints. They also have the fewest resources to fight prosecutions, see Evans,
supra note 230, at 47, and their cases do not present the difficulties of proof that arise when
prosecuting large firm lawyers, see Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 18, at 8-11.
Regardless of whether solo practitioners actually engage in wrongdoing at a greater rate than
the rest of the lawyer population, the opportunities for less forgiving sanctions for these lawyers
as compared to other lawyers is significant.
276. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA
SENTENCING STANDARDS].

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the ABA Sentencing Standards seek to
eliminate unwarranted disparity while permitting the courts to take
into account differences among offenders that warrant disparate
sentences.277
The ABA Sentencing Standards promote more
consistency in the initial determination of the sanction by
recommending the use of mandatory—not voluntary—standards.278
They also recommend that for each offense, standards should guide
courts to a “presumptive sentence,” which is the level of severity of
the sentence and the type of sanction to be imposed in the “ordinary
case.”279 Deviation from the presumptive sentence due to aggravating
or mitigating factors is permitted only when there is “substantial
reason” for doing so.280 If aggravating or mitigating factors exist, the
ABA Sentencing Standards recommend that guidance be provided to
the courts in the use of their discretion to choose a level of severity or
type of sanction different from the presumptive sanction.281
While the ABA Sentencing Standards provide a better model for
standards for imposing lawyer discipline than the existing ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, they are no more than a
starting point for the drafting of standards. Indeed, the ABA
Sentencing Standards are only meant to serve as a starting point for
the drafting of criminal sentencing guidelines. The drafters of the
ABA Sentencing Standards recommend that an independent,
intermediate governmental agency—typically a sentencing
commission—write detailed guidelines for use by the courts.282
277. See id. at Standard 18-3.1 & Commentary.
278. The ABA Sentencing Standards note that presumptive sentences should not be merely
advisory because voluntary provisions do little to promote the goals of determinacy. See id. at
Standard 18-3.1 Commentary. The Commentary supports its recommendation by citing
Michael Tonry’s findings that voluntary criminal sentencing guidelines typically had little or no
demonstrable effect on the sentences imposed. See id. at 41 n.5.
279. “Ordinariness” is defined as factual scenarios that most frequently come before the
courts, often in high volumes, of certain types of cases. See id. at 41.
280. See, e.g., ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at Standard 18-4.4(b)(iv).
281. See id. at Standards 18-3.2(b), 18-3.3(c).
The drafters of the ABA Sentencing Standards took pains to distinguish their approach from
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at xxv. For example, the ABA Sentencing Standards
base the initial determination on the “ordinary case,” while the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
use a “base offense” approach that requires a number of discrete factual determinations that
increase or decrease the guideline sentence in a mechanical, restrictive manner. In contrast,
the ABA Sentencing Standards permit more departure flexibility for aggravating and mitigating
factors. In addition, the ABA Sentencing Standards allow for greater consideration of the
personal characteristics of the offenders. See id. at xxv-xxvii.
282. See id. at Standard 18-1.3(a), (b). The ABA Sentencing Standards recommend a
permanent commission that would write the guidelines, collect information regarding
sentences imposed and adjust the guidelines as needed to control for unexpected disparity and
disproportionality. See id. at xxvi; id. at Standard 18-4.1 & Commentary.
As a practical matter, a commission for drafting lawyer discipline standards is unlikely to be

Although the ABA Sentencing Standards recommend that this
agency be legislatively created, this intermediate function could also
be performed by a judicially appointed body.283 In either case, when
drafting standards for imposing lawyer discipline, care must be taken
to select a truly independent commission and to insulate it so that it
will not draft standards that are unduly deferential to lawyers’
sensibilities or to judges’ discretion.284
Another reason why the ABA Sentencing Standards can only serve
as a starting point for drafting standards for lawyer sanctions is
because, obviously, they provide no guidance for categorizing lawyer
misconduct. As previously noted, the ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions are overly general and, at the same time, their
structure effectively excludes many fact patterns from fitting into the
black-letter standards.285 The ABA Sentencing Standards do not help
address this problem because criminal sentencing guidelines typically
define misconduct by reference to specific criminal statutes.286 In
contrast, no detailed method of categorizing lawyer misconduct now
exists in most states.287
funded by a legislature unless it is part of some larger reform. Far fewer people are subject to
lawyer sanctions by state discipline systems than are subject to criminal sentencing. Compare
SOLD 1996, supra note 14, at 9 fig. II (reporting approximately 6400 sanctions imposed by all
reporting state discipline systems), with BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE
COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS 1994, at 4 tbl. 1.1 (1998) (reporting 872,217 felony
convictions in state courts in 1994). Legislatures are likely to conclude that the imposition of
lawyer discipline sanctions does not justify the type of resources devoted to the calibration of
criminal sanctions by permanent sentencing commissions.
283. See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at Standard 18-4.6(a), (b) (allowing
the legislature to delegate the authority to draft sentencing guidelines to the judiciary).
284. Cf. ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at Standard 18-4.2 (recommending a
commission composed of lay persons and persons with varying perspectives within the criminal
justice system including judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and members of probation
departments and that members serve terms long enough to insure continuity but short enough
to allow for the regular infusion of new perspectives). Any commission established to draft
standards for imposing lawyer sanctions would unquestionably benefit from the continued
efforts of the ABA to draft model standards, although the model standards would need to be
scrutinized carefully to ensure that they do not favor lawyers’ interests over the interests of the
public. See generally Morgan, supra note 118, at 740 (noting that when there is conflict arising
from difficult ethical questions, the ABA tends to resolve it in favor of lawyers).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 179-83, 188-90.
286. The use of criminal statutes to define misconduct helps categorize similar conduct but
is not without its problems. The overlapping provisions of federal statutes permit the selection
of a different charge for the same misconduct, which can affect the ultimate sanction. See
Robinson, supra note 134, at 992-93.
287. In the majority of states, most lawyer misconduct is not governed by statute. But see
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6103, 6105, 6128, 6131 (West 1997). Instead, the rules regulating
lawyers are court rules. While some of those rules are quite detailed, such as rules concerning
contingent fee agreements, client trust accounts, and written retainer agreements, many track
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and are broadly drafted in terms of what lawyers
“shall,” “shall not,” and “may” do.
The generality and vagueness of the Model Rules make them unhelpful for categorizing
misconduct for the purpose of creating standards for imposing lawyer discipline sanctions. The

While no standards for imposing lawyer sanctions can anticipate
every fact pattern that may arise, the standards should, at a minimum,
clearly provide for the types of misconduct that frequently occur and
prescribe a method for determining the appropriate presumptive
sanction when there is no apparent fit. Commentary should provide
clear examples of the types of misconduct that fall within a particular
standard rather than describe what past courts have done. It may be
possible to use a revised version of the ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions if the black-letter standards are rewritten and made
more specific and less aggregated in their treatment of misconduct,288
the definitions are expanded,289 the Commentary is clarified, and
rules are provided for how to handle the problem of “no fit.”290
Alternatively, an example of a more detailed standard and
commentary is provided in the Appendix.
These changes, and the use of “presumptive sanctions” in the
manner prescribed by the ABA Sentencing Standards, should help
promote proportionality and consistent treatment of similar
misconduct in the “ordinary case.”291 In order to reduce bias and
unwarranted inconsistency in the ultimate sanction determination,
however, much depends upon the identification and treatment of
mitigating and aggravating factors. Departures from the presumptive
sanction should be permitted only when there are “substantial

vagueness and generality also make it difficult to determine precisely what type of conduct is
expected or prohibited in certain settings. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 29, at 650-64 (arguing
that the Model Rules are too vague and general to provide guidance on issues arising for
lawyers who represent the banking industry).
288. As previously noted, the aggregation of a range of conduct within a single standard can
lead to disproportionate sanctions. For example, the ABA Standard regarding conversion can
be read to apply to a variety of conduct that results in client funds being used by lawyers,
ranging from forgery of settlement checks or other theft of funds to poor accounting practices
to refusal to return an unearned fee. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. By
clarifying, and at times narrowing, the types of misconduct addressed in each standard, the
sanctions imposed will be more proportional. Sanctioning should also be more consistent,
because courts will have less incentive and less latitude to fit similar misconduct into differentlysanctioned categories.
289. For example, the definition of “injury” should be expanded to include emotional harm.
See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text. The definition of “serious injury” should be revised
to clarify the types of injury that would be considered “serious” and to indicate from whose
perspective the existence of “serious injury” should be assessed.
290. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. In fact, the ABA is currently working to
revise some of the black-letter standards and the Commentary. A draft of the proposed revisions
may be completed in 1999. See Telephone Interview with Ellyn S. Rosen, ABA Assistant Regulation
Counsel (July 30, 1998).
291. In contrast, the “initial determination” in the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, which only provides the “generally appropriate” sanction, invites the courts routinely
to adjust the sanction whenever faced with any of the 23 aggravating or mitigating factors. See
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 3.0 Commentary.

reasons” for departure.292 The commentary to the standards should
reflect that it is the compelling nature and not merely the existence
or number of aggravating and mitigating factors that should be
considered.293 Certain aggravating and mitigating factors listed in the
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions should be eliminated
because they are typically present in the ordinary case and they
encourage deviation from the presumptive sanction in a large
number of cases.294 Some of the remaining factors should be afforded
relatively little weight or should only be considered under carefully
prescribed circumstances.295
The reason for placing these limitations on discretion is not
because deviations are, in themselves, undesirable. Deviations from
the presumptive sanction are not undesirable if they are due to
factors that should be relevant to the ultimate sanction
determination.296
The problem with permitting routine and
unrestrained deviation whenever any one of a number of aggravating
and mitigating factors is present is that it presents increased
opportunities for bias and unwarranted inconsistency to creep into
the decision-making process due to factors that should be irrelevant to
the sanctioning decision.297
292. Under the ABA Sentencing Standards, when presumptive sentences are expressed in
ranges of severity, departure from the presumptive sentence is permitted when there is
“substantial reason” for the departure. See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at
Standard 18-4.4(b)(iv). This standard was chosen to distinguish the ABA Sentencing Standards
from the more rigid Federal Sentencing Guidelines and to provide courts with “meaningful
discretion” to consider individual circumstances. See id. at Standard 18-3.2 Commentary.
293. Standards should also provide guidance as to how to choose a different level of severity
or type of sanction if aggravating or mitigating factors are present. Cf. ABA SENTENCING
STANDARDS, supra note 276, at Standard 18-3.2(b) (stating that the agency should guide
sentencing courts in the use of discretion to choose a level of severity or type of sanction that is
different from the presumptive sanction).
294. Cf. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY ch. 244 cmt. II.D.201 (1996)
(refusing to include as aggravating or mitigating factors those which could apply to a large
number of cases). Some factors that are frequently present in lawyer discipline cases are
discussed supra notes 224, 239 and accompanying text.
295. For example, inexperience in the practice of law should only be considered when
ethical violations can be attributed directly to the inexperience. See supra note 236 and
accompanying text. Character or reputation evidence should also be greatly limited and should
be afforded less weight than other factors. See supra Part III.C.2.a.iii.
296. Of course, the question of which factors “should” be relevant depends upon the goals of
lawyer discipline.
297. For example, a study of drug sentences under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines revealed
that white defendants received more departures from the Guidelines and less severe sentences than
black or Hispanics, even after controlling for other relevant factors. Moreover, Guideline
departures increased the probability of not going to prison more for whites than for blacks or
Hispanics. See Albonetti, supra note 137, at 804, 814-18. This does not mean, however, that
guidelines do not work to reduce disparity. See generally id. at 793 (reporting research indicating that
state guidelines produced sentencing outcomes that were more uniform and less dependent on an
offender’s socioeconomic status). It does suggest that opportunities for departures from
presumptive ranges present opportunities for bias to creep into the sanctioning process.

Any new standards should also address the imposition of discipline
on law firms298 and should provide more guidance regarding some of
the less traditional lawyer discipline sanctions such as rehabilitative
programs, publication requirements, fines and community service.299
As discussed below, some of these alternative sanctions may be more
effective than traditional lawyer sanctions.300 Once again, the ABA
Sentencing Standards provide a useful starting point for drafting
standards regarding these sanctions.301 Any standards for imposing
lawyer sanctions should address whether, for each type of
298. New York and New Jersey courts now permit the imposition of discipline on law firms, see
N.Y. SUP. CT. R., 1ST DEP’T §§ 603.2(b), 603.4(a)(1); In re Ravich, Koster, Tobin, 715 A.2d 216 (N.J.
1998), and it seems only a matter of time before this idea takes hold elsewhere. Expressive
sanctions, probation, educational sanctions, fines and restitution are all appropriate sanctions in this
context. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 18, at 36-37. In certain cases, limitations on
areas of practice that incapacitate for periods of time may also be appropriate. The opportunities
for bias when imposing sanctions on the most elite law firms as opposed to smaller firms and those
that practice in less prestigious areas of the law are obvious. Carefully drafted standards for the
imposition of discipline on law firms are, therefore, needed just as much as standards for the
imposition of sanctions on individual lawyers.
299. Community service currently is imposed as a sanction on lawyers with relatively little
consideration of its effectiveness, its expressive message or its merit relative to other available
sanctions. For example, some courts impose a number of hours of community service on
lawyers, either of a legal or non-legal nature, see, e.g., Florida Bar v. Neckman, 616 So. 2d 31, 32
(Fla. 1993) (holding that the sanctioned attorney must perform 10 hours of community service
in the field of addictive diseases during probationary period); In re Burchett, 630 N.E.2d 205,
206 (Ind. 1994) (requiring the sanctioned attorney to perform 50 hours of community service);
In re Stier, 530 A.2d 786, 789 (N.J. 1987) (requiring the sanctioned attorney to perform the
equivalent of one day’s worth of community service per week), even though community service
as a sanction does not express strong condemnation of misconduct and its use as a sanction
seemingly devalues the positive meaning of community service, see generally Kahan, supra note
97, at 626-29 (making this same point about community service in the criminal sentencing
context). Moreover, little consideration seems to be given to the possibility that compelled
community legal service by lawyers who have engaged in misconduct may raise issues of whether
the service provided will be competent or zealous. See generally West Virginia State Bar v.
Mitchell, 418 S.E.2d 733, 737 (W. Va. 1992) (stating in dictum that community service must
involve representation of indigent persons in matters such as divorce, child abuse or juvenile
proceedings). At the same time, community service is more socially productive than a brief
period of suspension, and may have a greater deterrent impact than certain other sanctions. See
Rhode, supra note 26, at 701. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley et al., Between Two Extremes: An
Examination of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Community Service Orders and the Implications for U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 191 (1992) (reporting that recidivism is no higher
among incarcerated federal defendants than those who were sentenced to community service).
At a minimum, standards should provide guidance to help courts determine when and how to
impose this sanction in a manner that promotes the goals of lawyer discipline.
300. See infra text accompanying notes 335-45, 350-60.
301. The ABA Sentencing Standards provide that certain alternative sanctions, such as
compliance programs, economic sanctions and acknowledgement sanctions, can be imposed
alone or in conjunction with other sanctions. See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276,
at Standard 18-3.12(d). Compliance programs include programs of education, rehabilitation or
therapy. See id. at Standards 18-3.13(c), 18-3.14. Economic sanctions include restitution,
reparation, fines and community service. See id. at Standards 18-3.15, 18-3.16, 18-3.17.
Acknowledgement sanctions include court-ordered communications to the public of
information about offenders’ convictions and other facts about their offenses. See id. at
Standard 18-2.2(iii).

misconduct, the alternative sanctions may be used in lieu of
traditional sanctions or only in conjunction with those sanctions and
under what circumstances alternative sanctions are appropriate.
B. Make Sanctions More Meaningful and Effective
The sanctions most commonly imposed on lawyers—suspension,
public reprimands and private admonitions—are often not utilized
effectively in response to lawyer misconduct. To make these
sanctions more effective, standards are needed to guide discretion
with respect to suspension and to make expressive sanctions truly
public. Standards should also explicitly address the use of fines,
which may be more effective deterrents than some of the sanctions
traditionally imposed on lawyers.
1.

Clear standards for incapacitating sanctions
The sanction of suspension—the most commonly used
incapacitating sanction302—is not being employed in a manner that
promotes the basic goals of discipline. As previously discussed, the
ABA Standards recommend a minimum six month period and a
maximum three year period for suspensions, but provide no other
guidance for determining the length of a suspension for specific
misconduct.303 As a result, the length of suspensions for similar
misconduct can vary considerably, and is, as a practical matter, often
less than six months.304 Such an approach to the sanction of
suspension undermines the basic goals of discipline and the
credibility of the discipline system.
If incapacitation is necessary to protect the public from a lawyer,
incapacitating sanctions should truly incapacitate for some significant
period of time. Brief suspensions—meaning suspensions for less
than a six month period—do not effectively incapacitate: At best,
they simply delay performance of legal work305 and it is more likely
that they do not actually cause any interruption of practice.306 Even
302. In 1996, there were 1324 suspensions imposed as compared to 542 disbarments and 77
transfers to disability inactive status in the reporting jurisdictions. See SOLD 1996, supra note
14, at 9 fig. II.
303. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
305. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.3 Commentary; see also In re Roberts
Hohl, 866 P.2d 1167, 1171 (N.M. 1994). Moreover, in cases arising from lack of diligence or
poor case management practices, brief suspensions may simply exacerbate the problems as
work mounts in the lawyer’s absence. See In re Nomura, SB-96-0005-D, 1996 Ariz. LEXIS 8, at
*12 (Jan. 26, 1996).
306. See supra note 201. In view of the number of lawyers who are “caught” practicing
during longer periods of suspension, it is doubtful that most lawyers who are briefly suspended
really cease to practice altogether during the period of suspension. See, e.g., In re Brown, 910

with the best intentions, it may not be possible for lawyers to notify all
clients of the suspension, make arrangements for cases to be handled
competently by someone else, and remove themselves from the
practice of law altogether during very brief suspensions.307 Moreover,
the general deterrent effect of brief suspensions is questionable.308
Although brief suspensions serve an expressive function because they
signify more disapproval than a reprimand, the additional
disapproval conveyed by a brief suspension is difficult to gauge309 and
does not clearly outweigh the burden of the sanction on clients and
on the public.310
Standards must be written to insure that the sanction of suspension
is imposed consistently and in a manner that incapacitates for a
meaningful period. For each type of misconduct warranting a
P.2d 631, 634 (Ariz. 1996) (discussing a lawyer who was suspended for six months but neither
withdrew from representation nor advised the client of the suspension order); In re Baars, 683
N.E.2d 555, 556 (Ind. 1997) (reporting that a lawyer who was suspended for one year failed to
notify a client and continued to practice law); In re Hankin, 804 P.2d 30, 33 (Wash. 1991)
(noting that a lawyer who was suspended indefinitely for failure to comply with CLE
requirements continued to advise clients, appear in court, and accept fees). See generally In re
Thonert, 693 N.E.2d 559, 564-65 (Ind. 1998) (explaining that a lawyer’s 30-day suspension was
extended because his office staff engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during the
suspension in order to service clients); Deirdre Shergreen, D.C. Bar Counsel Bringing Criminal
Cases Against Sanctioned Attorneys, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at 1 (describing enforcement
actions taken against lawyers who flout suspension and disbarment orders). Indeed, some
clients probably encourage their lawyers to find ways to continue to perform legal work to avoid
the cost and delay of retaining new counsel.
307. See In re Figliola, 652 A.2d 1071, 1077 (Del. 1995) (concluding that brief suspensions
are impractical insofar as they do not allow adequate time for a lawyer to make proper
arrangements for the course of suspension). In Colorado, the court routinely imposes the
suspension 30 days after its order but even with this delay, a lawyer may not be able to transfer
completely the responsibility for all active matters before the period of suspension commences.
In other jurisdictions, courts do not always delay imposition of suspension, even when the
suspensions are brief. See In re Brooks, 854 P.2d 776, 781 (Ariz. 1993) (imposing an immediate
30-day suspension); In re Page, 955 P.2d 239, 243 (Or. 1998) (imposing a 30-day suspension
effective on the date of the decision).
308. Empirical research is needed to determine how well incapacitating sanctions deter
lawyers from misconduct. In theory, attorneys as a group may be more deterrable than the
average criminal because: (1) attorneys often engage in economic wrongdoing rather than in
“crimes of passion”; (2) lawyers as a group are more educated than the average criminal and
more careful when weighing the potential gains and losses; (3) attorneys are more risk averse
than the average criminal; and (4) attorneys have more to lose by committing wrongdoing. See
Bene, supra note 18, at 924-25. While it would seem that longer suspensions should have a
greater deterrent effect than very short suspensions because they place a significantly different
burden on a lawyer, empirical research is needed to determine whether this is true.
309. For example, it is unclear whether a 30-day suspension carries much more of a message
of disapproval than a public reprimand. Indeed, such a brief suspension may be so clearly
symbolic that it has little more expressive force than a reprimand.
310. Brief suspensions inconvenience the disciplined lawyers’ clients, see ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 7, at Standard 2.3 Commentary, and can also delay litigation and the completion of
other legal work in ways that inconvenience courts, other lawyers and their clients. While it is
true that any suspension has this effect, longer suspensions usually require clients to retain
other counsel to perform ongoing legal work and therefore serve a protective function.

suspension, standards should prescribe a presumptive range for the
length of suspension which is not so wide as to encourage markedly
disparate sanctions in the ordinary case. The exact length of
suspension within the range can then be determined based upon an
assessment of the underlying facts and any aggravating or mitigating
factors.311 If these factors present substantial reason for departure
from the presumptive range, or for a sanction other than suspension,
the standards should identify the circumstances under which this may
occur.312
Detailed standards should also be developed for the reinstatement
of lawyers after suspension or disbarment.313 Each year approximately
two-hundred lawyers are reinstated to practice by state courts
following reinstatement proceedings.314 The problem of lawyers
being reinstated too readily was identified almost thirty years ago by
the Clark Commission.315 Nevertheless, the ABA Standards do not
provide detailed guidelines for reinstatement. They note only that
the lawyer should demonstrate rehabilitation, compliance with
applicable disciplinary or disability orders and rules, and fitness to
practice law.316 Although lawyers who have been disbarred or
suspended for more than brief periods typically have engaged in the
311. This approach is derived from the ABA Sentencing Standards, which provide that when
presumptive sanctions are expressed in ranges of severity, sentencing courts should take into
account the material facts regarding the offense and the offender to determine the appropriate
sanction within the range. See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at Standard 184.4(b)(ii).
312. See supra note 293. For example, standards might prescribe that a presumptive
sanction of suspension can only be reduced to a public reprimand if the mitigating factors
present substantial reasons for departure and if there are no aggravating factors.
313. The ABA Standards state that lawyers who are suspended for more than six months
should be required to apply for reinstatement, see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standard 2.3
Commentary, but many states do not require reinstatement proceedings unless the suspension
is for a period of more than one year. See, e.g., COLO. R.P. REGARDING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
241.22(b); PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 218(a). An application for reinstatement is
always required to resume practice after disbarment. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at
Standard 2.2.
314. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 24, at 33-34. The ABA Data Bank Report does not
reflect the number of reinstatement petitions that are denied on a nationwide basis, although it
appears that in some jurisdictions more petitions are granted than denied. See ANNUAL REPORT
ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK STATE, supra note 35, at 1.
315. See PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 150-55 (“[S]ome
jurisdictions are more concerned with the personal predicament of the disbarred attorney than
they are with protecting the public, and they lower their standards in passing on applications
for reinstatement.”)
316. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at Standards 2.3, 2.10. Somewhat more detail is
provided in the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, which suggest how to
evaluate whether a lawyer who was suffering from a physical or mental disability, including drug
or alcohol abuse, has been rehabilitated. These rules do not otherwise provide guidance for
determining “rehabilitation,” except for noting that the lawyer must have the “requisite honesty
and integrity to practice law.” See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule
25(E) (1996).

most egregious misconduct, the standards for determining
rehabilitation and fitness to practice in many states are vague,317 and
the potential for bias is considerable.318 Stories of lawyers who
engaged in extremely serious misconduct yet easily gained
readmission to the bar provide fodder for critics of lawyer
discipline.319 Reinstatement standards are in themselves a broad
subject meriting separate treatment,320 but they should be included
within any standards for imposing lawyer sanctions.
2.

Increased use of truly public sanctions
The heavy reliance on private lawyer sanctions and the failure to
publicize effectively the “public” sanctions undermines the most
important goal of lawyer discipline: protection of the public. In
order for lawyer sanctions to protect the public, they must be known
to the public.321 Public discipline is also needed to promote public
confidence in the lawyer discipline system. Consequently, any
standards for imposing sanctions should make all discipline public.322
317. See, e.g., DEL. R. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 23(f) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of
“rehabilitation,” “fitness to practice” and “that the resumption of practice of law within Delaware will
not be detrimental to the administration of justice”); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 116(3) (requiring a showing
that the attorney has the “moral qualifications” for admission and that the resumption of practice
will not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration of justice or the public
interest); In re Reutter, 474 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Minn. 1991) (noting that “moral change” is the
“decisive factor” in reinstatement proceedings).
318. See, e.g., supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. The absence of well-developed
standards means that reinstatement is often heavily dependent on the quality of character
evidence presented by judges and other influential members of the legal community. See
Miriam D. Gibson, Comment, Proving Rehabilitation, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 243 (1995-96) (“The
type of evidence considered most frequently by the courts when determining whether an erring
attorney has been sufficiently rehabilitated is testimony or letters written by neighbors, friends,
associates and employers . . . .”). While this evidence may be highly probative in some
circumstances, it can be unduly influential in other cases because of the stature of the witness
rather than because of the content of the testimony. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying
text.
319. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 40, at A1.
320. See Fred P. Parker, Admissions and Reinstatement--A Comparison of Standards, 66 B.
EXAMINER 21 (1997); Anne Badgley, Note, Attorney Reinstatement Standards: A Proposal for Reform
in Washington State, 62 WASH. L. REV. 723 (1987).
321. The publication of lawyer sanctions protects the public by serving incapacitating and
deterrent functions. Incapacitation occurs because some consumers are likely to avoid lawyers
who have a history of disciplinary misconduct. Deterrence is likely because of the perceived
adverse impact that negative publicity has on a lawyer’s practice. See generally DeGraw & Burton,
supra note 18, at 380 (arguing that disclosure advertising of a lawyer’s disciplinary history would
have a deterrent effect).
322. The recommendation that all sanctions be public extends to all misconduct that
remains within an adjudicative discipline system, but not necessarily to all determinations within
diversion programs such as those described supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
Although the interests of consumers would be furthered by publicizing the outcome of disputes
resolved by mediation programs, the potential unfairness to lawyers because of the absence of
findings of fact and the interest in encouraging settlements in cases involving minor

Standards or other court rules should also require the publication of
a lawyer’s disciplinary history in a manner that is readily accessible to
the general public.
While these suggestions are hardly novel,323 it is sobering to note
that the most frequently used lawyer sanction remains the private
admonition.324 Private sanctions breed public suspicion and have
limited deterrent effect.325 Their primary justification—protection of
the lawyer’s reputation—is an inappropriate goal of a lawyer
discipline system. Even if reputational concerns were appropriate,
public expressive sanctions could be calibrated so that some convey a
relatively weak message of condemnation, only minimally affecting a
lawyer’s reputation.326
The argument that private admonitions are needed to dispose
quickly of complaints concerning minor misconduct also fails to
justify the widespread use of private sanctions.327 It is true that many
jurisdictions have adopted procedures that permit disciplinary boards
or disciplinary counsel to impose non-appealable private sanctions if
the attorney is willing to forego the filing of a formal charge.328 Little
misconduct outweigh the public’s interest in learning about the resolution of these disputes.
323. See, e.g., HALT REPORT, supra note 207, at 11-12; Chalfie, supra note 84, at 7 (criticizing
the use of “secret sentences” and advocating that more information be provided to consumers);
Martyn, supra note 18, at 737-38 (highlighting the need for publicity of lawyer sanctions and the
grievance system’s operations); Rhode, supra note 26, at 700 (discussing the need for increased
publicity of lawyer sanctions).
324. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 106, 219 and accompanying text. At most, private sanctions may
promote specific deterrence by warning the attorney who is sanctioned that the misconduct
engaged in is unacceptable. For some attorneys, this brush with the disciplinary process may
prove sufficiently unnerving that it deters future misconduct. For others, the private sanction
may seem like a “slap on the wrist,” and have no real deterrent effect.
The general deterrent effect of private discipline is negligible because other lawyers rarely
learn of it. See, e.g., Green, supra note 44, at 88-89 (noting that private sanctions do not deter
prosecutorial misconduct because other prosecutors do not learn how disciplinary bodies
interpret ethical rules). Although the ABA Standards recommend that the facts giving rise to
the admonition be published without the lawyer’s name, see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at
Standard 2.6 Commentary, these descriptions are not published in most jurisdictions and even
when they are provided, they are often very brief and extremely general, see supra note 106 and
accompanying text. Moreover, human nature suggests that publication without the names of
the attorneys involved lessens lawyers’ interest in reading the description of the misconduct
giving rise to admonitions. If the descriptions are not read, they cannot have a general
deterrent effect.
326. For example, a lawyer whose conduct did not merit a public reprimand could receive a
public “letter of caution.” This is not dissimilar from the practice in some jurisdictions of
having two tiers of private expressive sanctions. See COLO. R.P. REGARDING ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINE 241.7(4)-(5); PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 204.
327. The Clark Commission recommended that admonitory power be vested in all
disciplinary agencies because of a concern that in cases of minor misconduct, prosecution of a
formal disciplinary complaint “is unduly harsh, wastes the agency’s limited manpower and
financial resources on relatively insignificant matters and, particularly in large urban areas,
overburdens the courts.” PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 92-93.
328. See, e.g., PA. R. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 208(a). An admonition can only be

is known, however, about the extent to which private discipline is
needed to expedite the resolution of cases. Lawyers may consent to
discipline in order to receive the lowest level of public sanction and
to resolve quickly a disciplinary matter. Moreover, it is difficult to
justify the claim that private sanctions are essential to the effective
functioning of disciplinary systems when six states operate without
them.329
Changes are also needed to insure that public reprimands are truly
“public.” Since public reprimands place no burden on the lawyer
other than those that flow from publication of the sanction, they
must be made known to the public to deliver a meaningful expressive
message and to carry any deterrent force.
Currently, most
reprimands imposed on lawyers are publicized in court opinions or
bar journals, where only other lawyers see them.330 Even current
clients are not routinely notified of public reprimands imposed on
their own counsel.331 While notices of the names of sanctioned
lawyers and their misconduct appear in general circulation
newspapers in some states, it is questionable whether most clients
read these legal notices.332 It is even more unlikely that members of
the public who will seek legal services in the future will read or
remember these notices.333
In order to insure that consumers of legal services learn of public
imposed before the filing of a formal charge in about half of the states. See COLD, supra note 9,
at Q 60A.
329. Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, and West Virginia do not impose
private discipline. See SOLD 1995, supra note 14, at 8-12; COLD, supra note 9, at Q 60D; see also
FLA. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 1.2 (1998); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-9(c)(3);
W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY P. 2.9(c). Maine technically also does not impose private
discipline, but a Maine Grievance Commission panel may dismiss minor misconduct with a
“warning,” which is not “discipline,” but may be considered in subsequent disciplinary
proceedings as evidence of prior misconduct. See ME. B.R. 7.1(d)(4).
330. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 18, at 355 (describing how notices of lawyer discipline
are typically published in specialized journals or bar reports). For example, notice of a public
reprimand is published in bar journals in most states; only 15 states appear to publish notice of
the discipline in other newspapers. See COLD, supra note 9, at Q 59. A few states do not
publish notice of public reprimands in any manner. See id. at Q 59 I.
331. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 764; LA. R. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 19, §§ 10,
26(A); MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 27(A) (1996).
332. Legal notices typically appear on inside pages and are written in legal jargon that is not
appealing to the average reader. It is possible, however, that organizational clients may have inhouse counsel who would read such notices. It is also possible that the notices might be read in
smaller communities where people are more likely to know one another. It is unlikely,
however, that many clients in urban areas would take the time to read a listing of lawyers who
received public reprimands. Cf. Massaro, supra note 90, at 1931 (noting that a long list of
shaming sanctions in a local newspaper would be ignored).
333. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 18, at 359 (noting that the chance that a non-lawyer
who is seeking counsel will stumble across pertinent information in a local newspaper “is, at
most, a random possibility”).

reprimands—and a lawyer’s entire disciplinary history—publication
of this information should be required in places where current and
future clients are likely to see it. For example, disciplinary agencies
should publish bar discipline information in a manner that is readily
accessible to the public, such as through a toll-free telephone
number or an internet website that provides information about the
disciplinary history of lawyers.334 In addition, court rules concerning
lawyer advertising should make clear that lawyers who engage in
discretionary advertising335 such as print or electronic advertisements
or mailings, cannot list their bar admission dates in an open-ended
fashion, suggesting that they have engaged without incident in the
uninterrupted practice of law when they have in fact been suspended
from practice or disbarred for misconduct. When publicizing their
bar admission dates, lawyers like Cooper and Reich should be
required to disclose that they have not engaged in the uninterrupted
practice of law so as to avoid misleading advertising.336
The harder question is whether wider self-publication of lawyer
misconduct should be imposed as a lawyer discipline sanction.
Publication is not mentioned as a sanction in the ABA Standards,
although dissemination of decisions imposing sanctions is among the
tools courts may use in the Rule 11 context.337 Professors Sandra
DeGraw and Bruce Burton have suggested that lawyers should be
required to self-advertise the sanctions imposed on them for serious
wrongdoing and repeated misconduct, both to deter other lawyers
from misconduct and to address the information imbalance caused
334. For example, a website at <http://www.law.uh.edu/ethics> provides information about
public discipline imposed on Texas lawyers since 1995. Consumers in California can access the
State Bar of California’s website at <http://www.calbar.org> to determine whether a lawyer is
currently disbarred, suspended or on inactive status. It is also possible to obtain a lawyer’s past
bar discipline history by calling the California State Bar. For $10, members of the public can
also learn about a lawyer’s public disciplinary history from the ABA National Lawyer Regulatory
Data Bank, although the reliability of the search depends upon whether each jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is licensed reports to the Data Bank.
335. In their article proposing that lawyers be required to self-advertise the sanctions
imposed on them for misconduct, Professors DeGraw and Burton distinguish between
discretionary advertising, such as advertising in the yellow pages, and near-discretionary
advertising, such as the appearance of a name on firm letterhead. See DeGraw & Burton, supra
note 18, at 385-86. While some of the advertising they identify as near-discretionary is arguably
discretionary (e.g., listings in Martindale-Hubbell), the conceptual division is a useful one when
considering the scope of any requirement that lawyers self-advertise their sanctions.
336. See generally supra note 59 and accompanying text. Most states have adopted some
version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit false or misleading
communications about the lawyer and state that a communication is false or misleading if it
“contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.” See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 7.1(a) (1997). The publication of bar admission dates without reference to
reinstatement dates would seem to fit this definition of “misleading.”
337. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 18, at 373-74.

by the unavailability of lawyers’ disciplinary records and lawyers’
positive self-promotional activities.338 The self-advertising of sanctions
they suggest would appear on discretionary advertising and neardiscretionary advertising, such as letterhead and business cards, for a
specified period of time.339
While required self-publicity of lawyer sanctions probably can
withstand First Amendment scrutiny,340 it is not clear that this type of
sanction is desirable. Self-advertising of lawyer discipline could serve
significant consumer protection and deterrent functions, but it also
bears some resemblance to a shaming penalty.341 Although the
primary purpose of the self-advertising requirement would not be to
shame a lawyer, such a requirement would almost certainly humiliate,
because lawyers value their reputations in the larger community.342
338. See id. at 383-85, 388-89.
339. See id. at 384-89. Their proposal does not extend to requiring lawyers to buy
advertising for the purpose of disseminating news of their sanctions to the general public.
340. There is little question that if a lawyer engages in discretionary advertising, the lawyer
can be required to include certain information in the advertisement to insure the
advertisement is not deceptive. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985) (concluding that states may require disclosure of information in advertisements by
lawyers as long as the regulation is reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing
fraud). Even compelled self-publication of sanctions can be required of organizations as
administrative remedies and as criminal sanctions. See, e.g., ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra
note 276, at Standard 18-3.18 Commentary (providing for use of acknowledgement sanctions
for organizational offenders in criminal cases); Andrew Cowan, Note, The Scarlet Letters for
Corporations? Punishment by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387,
2395-98 (1992) (describing the use of adverse publicity in non-criminal cases). Thus, in all
likelihood, the self-disclosure requirements suggested by Professors DeGraw and Burton would
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
341. Scholars have resurrected discussions about forms of punishment in the criminal
context—such as shaming—which may provide a powerful expressive message and deterrent for
wrongdoers. See Kahan, supra note 97, at 630-52; Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame:
Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 648, 689 n.223 (1997); James Q.
Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). Shaming
sanctions take many different forms. For example, stigmatizing publicity is designed to magnify
the humiliation inherent in a conviction by communicating the conviction to a wider audience
by, for example, publishing the names of offenders in print or broadcast media. Literal
stigmatization stamps an offender with a mark or sign that invites ridicule, such as signs at the
residence of child molesters that warn others to steer clear. See Kahan, supra note 97, at 631-34.
Some forms of publication that warn the public of lawyer misconduct, such as Internet websites
and notices of discipline on letterheads and firm signs, are indistinguishable in form from
shaming sanctions. The intent to inform the public—as opposed to the intent to inflict shame
or to express condemnation—may be the only distinction between consumer-oriented selfpublicity requirements and shaming sanctions.
Although shaming sanctions are unusual in the lawyer discipline context, courts have
occasionally required apologies or sanctions akin to shaming penalties. See WOLFRAM, supra
note 93, at 139; see also In re Sandbach, 546 A.2d 345, 346 (Del. 1988) (seeking relief from
court’s sanction of community service that would “publicize the lessons of this case” and would
subject the lawyer to further embarrassment and humiliation).
342. While shaming sanctions are on the increase in the criminal context, see Massaro, supra
note 341, at 648, 689 n.223; Developments in the Law, supra note 109, at 1869, 1949, the sanctions
have been criticized on several grounds, including that they may be an ineffective deterrent, see

Indeed, the impact of this sanction on a lawyer’s self-esteem and
ability to resume law practice may outweigh its benefits.343 Selfpublicity requirements might prove to be less troubling, however, if
imposed on law firms, and could be highly effective in that context.344
Massaro, supra note 90, at 1917-28, 1936-43; Massaro, supra note 341, at 692-94. See generally ABA
SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at Standard 18-3.18 Commentary; Whitman, supra note
341, at 1087-92 (raising other concerns about imposing acknowledgement sanctions on
individuals). But see Kahan, supra note 97, at 646-49 (challenging the critiques of shaming);
Developments in the Law, supra note 109, at 1964 (citing studies indicating that conditions on
probation that are meant to shame offenders may serve as effective deterrents). Some of the
reasons why shaming may be ineffective when imposed on criminal defendants are less
applicable to lawyers. For example, lawyers, unlike some types of criminal defendants, usually
value their reputations within the larger community and may be more likely to respond to
shaming sanctions. See Massaro, supra note 90, at 1918 (noting that some criminal defendants
may be impervious to shaming penalties and that shaming best deters those who most fear
social disapproval). Lawyers also share norms including a well-defined ethical community and
high expectations of social responsibility. See generally Massaro, supra note 341, at 682
(discussing the importance of these shared norms for effective shaming sanctions); Schneyer,
Professional Discipline, supra note 18, at 35 (noting that the legal community is arguably a welldefined ethical community). Moreover, the legal community may be receptive to shaming
sanctions because, inter alia, it respects the decision-maker and probably shares agreement
regarding what punishments are embarrassing. See generally Massaro, supra note 90, at 1922-23
(noting that these cultural conditions of effective shaming are only weakly present in general
U.S. population). Finally, the reinstatement process for lawyers may be the type of reintegrative
ceremony that welcomes the offender back into the community and makes the shaming
sanction a positive rehabilitative experience. See generally id.; see also Massaro, supra note 341, at
694 (explaining that reintegrative ceremonies are important for the effectiveness of shaming
but no such ceremonies exist in the general population).
343. Shaming penalties raise concerns about proportionality and cruelty. See Massaro, supra
note 90, at 1937-43. For example, when a shaming penalty is imposed, it is impossible to gauge
or control the public’s reaction to it. See Whitman, supra note 341, at 1088-92 (“Once the state
stirs the up public opprobrium against an offender, it cannot really control the way the public
treats that offender.”). In addition, the stigma of shaming may be irreversible, particularly
among lawyers, who value their reputations. See generally Massaro, supra note 90, at 1937-43
(raising concerns about proportionality because the stigma of shaming may be irreversible).
Shaming penalties can also produce negative long-term emotional consequences for the people
who are shamed. See Developments in the Law, supra note 109, at 1957-58 (noting that shaming
sanctions can cause destructive anger and aggression in the affected individual).
Although critiques of shaming sanctions are troubling, they seem somewhat less compelling
when one considers that any public sanction evokes some uncontrollable responses toward the
offender. It is true, as Professor Tori Massaro argues, that there is something troubling about
state-enforced punishment that authorizes officials to seek out and damage an offender’s
dignity and self-esteem. See Massaro, supra note 90, at 1943. This argument is somewhat less
compelling, however, if shaming is not the primary goal of the self-publicity requirement, but
rather one of its consequences.
344. Self-publication of disciplinary sanctions may be a very effective deterrent for law firms and
would serve a significant public protection function. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note
18, at 33-36. See generally ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at 124-25 (noting the
purposes self-publicity requirements can serve when imposed on an organization as a criminal
sanction); Cowan, supra note 340, at 2398-2404 (describing the deterrent effect of adverse publicity
on corporations). Although the imposition of self-publication requirements on law firms might
raise fewer concerns about human dignity than would the imposition of publication requirements
on individuals, such concerns cannot be entirely disregarded. Partners in small partnerships, and
“name” partners in larger partnerships, may identify—and be identified—so closely with their firms
that they feel the sanctions imposed on the firm are equivalent to sanctions imposed on themselves.
Self-publication sanctions might humiliate those lawyers to the same degree as they would humiliate
a lawyer who is personally disciplined.

At a minimum, the question of whether to require self-publication of
sanctions is one that deserves careful consideration. If mandatory
self-advertising of discipline is utilized as a lawyer sanction, the
circumstances under which self-disclosure should be required, the
duration of the advertising and the forms it should take should be
clearly set forth in any standards for imposing sanctions and the
sanction should be systematically applied to maximize deterrent
impact and consumer protection goals.345
3.

Use fines with other discipline
Standards should also be drafted expressly to permit the
imposition of fines as a lawyer discipline sanction and to provide
guidelines for their use. The argument that fines should be used as a
lawyer discipline sanction is not new and has been well-developed
elsewhere.346 Fines are a well-established sanction in criminal law and
are an integral part of Rule 11 sanctions imposed on lawyers in the
civil context.347 Fines are also used by courts to discipline lawyers in
contempt proceedings and are imposed as a lawyer discipline
sanction in other countries.348 Although the current ABA Standards
do not list fines as one of the sanctions that may be imposed and at
one time discouraged their use,349 this approach is misguided.350 The
345. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 18, at 384. Professors DeGraw and Burton offer some
suggestions for the duration and content of the self-advertising of lawyer discipline history.
While I do not endorse the full scope of disclosure they suggest, the authors provide a useful
starting point for the crafting of standards concerning self-advertising of discipline.
346. See Bene, supra note 18 (arguing that fines are preferable to non-monetary sanctions for
lawyer misconduct); see also Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 18, at 31-33 (urging the use
of fines to discipline law firms).
347. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Supp. III 1997) (providing that criminal conspirators may be
fined); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (stating that a sanction may include an order to pay a penalty to
the court).
348. Courts do not hesitate to impose fines on lawyers for misconduct in contempt proceedings.
See, e.g., In re Baars, 683 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Ind. 1997); In re Thurston, 574 N.W.2d 374, 387 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997). In addition, fines have been used to discipline English lawyers since medieval times. See
Rose, supra note 88, at 59 n.258; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 93, at 141 & n.6. They are also used as
a lawyer discipline sanction in Canada and Norway. See Jon T. Johnsen, The Professionalization of Legal
Counseling in Norway, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 86 (Richard L. Abel et al. eds.,
1989); Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 18, at 32.
349. Fines were actively discouraged in the original ABA Standards, apparently on the
grounds they were too much like criminal punishment. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 2.3 Commentary (1986); ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS Standard 6.14 & Commentary (1979). The current
ABA Standards do not expressly list fines among the sanctions that may be imposed, but state
that sanctions may include “other requirements that the state’s highest court or disciplinary
board deems consistent with the purposes of lawyer sanctions.” See ABA STANDARDS, supra note
7, at Standard 2.8(g).
350. This approach does, however, reflect current practices. Fines are rarely used to sanction
lawyers in discipline cases in this country. See WOLFRAM, supra note 93, at 141. Only a few states
have court rules that explicitly permit the imposition of fines in lawyer discipline cases. See CAL.

use of fines should be addressed in any standards for imposing lawyer
discipline because fines, coupled with other sanctions, can be more
effective than those other sanctions used alone.
For example, fines should be a more effective deterrent than
restitution alone because restitution merely requires the wrongdoer
to repay what was taken, so the cost of detection is no higher than
what might be gained if the misconduct is not detected.351 Fines may
also provide more effective discipline in cases where enforcers may
prefer expressive sanctions because incapacitating sanctions are
viewed as too harsh, but where expressive sanctions alone may prove
too mild and ineffective from a deterrence perspective.352 In
addition, fines may be used in conjunction with incapacitating
sanctions to promote marginal deterrence.353
Indeed, fines may prove to be among the most effective deterrents
for lawyers. There is anecdotal evidence that monetary penalties
have a general deterrent effect on lawyers.354 Lawyers by virtue of
BUS. &. PROF. CODE § 6086.13 (West 1997); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 102(5)-(6). In 1996, only eight fines
were reported to the National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank by state discipline systems. See FIVEYEAR REPORT, supra note 24, at 13.
351. See Bene, supra note 18, at 922 & n.78 (explaining that fines make the cost of detection
higher than the benefits of the misconduct in the event the misconduct is not detected); see also
PROBLEMS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 98 (noting that an attorney who
converts funds is not effectively disciplined if merely required to repay funds because the
attorney risks little by wrongful misappropriation).
352. Little is known about the effectiveness of public expressive sanctions, but there is some
evidence that lawyers who receive reprimands are not deterred from engaging in future
misconduct. See Dubin, supra note 12, at 695 (reporting on a Michigan study showing that 75%
of respondents who received a reprimand went on to commit other acts of misconduct). Fines,
coupled with expressive sanctions, may permit enforcers to impose seemingly less harsh
penalties which have greater deterrent effect. See generally Bene, supra note 18, at 931-32
(discussing how fines provide enforcers with greater flexibility to impose more powerful
sanctions without being “too harsh”).
353. From a law and economics perspective, fines are generally preferable to incapacitating
sanctions because they merely transfer wealth and cause no loss of productivity. See Bene, supra
note 18, at 926. From this perspective, fines permit competent lawyers to continue to represent
their clients while still providing a powerful deterrent. See id. at 930-31. While this may be true,
given our rudimentary understanding of the deterrent force of fines and the fairness issues
discussed infra notes 357-58 and accompanying text, I believe fines should not be used alone
where it appears that incapacitation is needed to protect the public.
Fines may, however, be used in addition to incapacitating sanctions to promote marginal
deterrence. Marginal deterrence is, in essence, the ability to deter an offender who has already
engaged in wrongdoing from committing an even greater wrong. For example, fines can be
used to provide marginal deterrence in the lawyer discipline context when lawyers are already
subject to incapacitating sanctions. See generally In re Baars, 683 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Ind. 1997)
(fining a lawyer who practiced law while suspended from practice).
354. One example of this effect can be seen in the bar’s response to the settlements
negotiated by the Office of Thrift Supervision with the law firms of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hayes & Handler and Jones, Day and Reavis in connection with the Lincoln Savings Bank
debacle. Those multi-million dollar settlements spawned efforts by lawyers to educate
themselves about their disclosure obligations when representing clients before the Office of
Thrift Supervision and to implement internal measures to avoid a similar fate. See THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course

their training and experience should be better able to assess the risks
and costs of misconduct than most other groups and therefore
should be deterrable by appropriate monetary penalties.355 In
addition, because lawyers in larger law firms often make decisions
only after thorough discussion and analysis, fines may prove to be an
especially effective sanction for such firms.356
Most objections to the use of fines can be addressed by writing
standards that require the use of fines in conjunction with other
sanctions, not in lieu of those sanctions.357 This approach should
help insure that lawyers who are part of the bar elite will not be
permitted to “buy their way out” of non-monetary sanctions when
lower-echelon lawyers cannot.358 Moreover, any objection to fines on
the grounds that they are insufficiently condemnatory, while possibly
true in the criminal context,359 is less persuasive in the lawyer
discipline context, where brief periods of suspension, public
reprimands and admonitions make up the majority of sanctions
imposed and already convey a weak message of condemnation. The
imposition of fines in conjunction with incapacitating sanctions,
expressive sanctions and probation should strengthen the
condemnatory message conveyed by those sanctions and promote the

Handbook Series No. 779, 1992); Bettina Lawton Alexander & Thomas W. MacIsaac, Protecting
Yourself and Your Firm in the Representation of Insured Depositor Institutions: Lessons to Be Learned
from the Kaye, Scholer Case, in INSIDER TRADING, FRAUD, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C873, 1993). Although the payments by the law
firms were settlements and not “fines,” the effect of having to pay from the pocket was clear.
355. See Bene, supra note 18, at 924-25 (noting that attorneys are more highly educated then
the average criminal and that their work as counselors make them comfortable with cost-benefit
evaluations).
356. Moreover, as Professor Schneyer notes, fines “speak” a corporation’s language. They also
speak a law firm’s language. See Schneyer, Professional Discipline, supra note 18, at 32-33.
357. The objections to fines have not been well-articulated, but some of the objections are
addressed in Bene, supra note 18, at 932-33. One objection is a fairness argument that lawyers
should not be permitted to “buy their way out” of serious sanctions, because some lawyers are
less well-equipped to pay than others. A second possible objection, borrowed from the criminal
context, may be based on the view that the expressive message of fines is weak and insufficiently
condemnatory, sending the wrong message to the public and to other lawyers about the
seriousness of the misconduct. Cf. Kahan, supra note 97, at 620 (arguing that fines are
politically unacceptable as criminal sanctions because they are insufficiently condemnatory).
358. In addition, standards should provide that fines be imposed with an eye toward the
financial circumstances of the lawyer who is being disciplined. They should be set in an amount
that a lawyer can pay. See generally ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 276, at Standard 183.16(d); Section of Litigation, American Bar Ass’n, Standards and Guidelines for Practice Under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 121 F.R.D. 101, 125 (1988).
359. As Professor Dan Kahan has observed, when fines are imposed as the exclusive sanction
in the criminal context they are viewed not as a sanction that condemns, but as a “price,” which
is a detriment that an actor is required to endure in order to do what is permitted. See Kahan,
supra note 97, at 621. For this reason, fines are seen as trivializing the seriousness of
wrongdoing and denigrating the worth of the crime victim.

goals of discipline.360
CONCLUSION
This Article is a beginning attempt to identify and explore the
problems with the current manner of imposing lawyer sanctions by
state discipline systems. Too often, courts and disciplinary boards
impose discipline without reference to any discernible standards.
Even when standards are consulted, they are applied unevenly and
yield inconsistent results. Too many lawyers are permitted to engage
in repeated misconduct before they receive public sanctions. Too
little is known about the effectiveness of the sanctions that are
currently imposed.
It appears that the most frequently used lawyer sanction—the
private admonition—has little deterrent or rehabilitative effect.
Some of the other sanctions imposed on lawyers—including brief
suspensions and community service—are imposed without careful
consideration of the goals of discipline. Sanctions that have been
disfavored, such as fines, deserve treatment in any new standards for
imposing lawyer sanctions. Carefully drafted standards are also
needed to insure that diversion programs serve consumer interest
goals and do not become an ineffective form of private discipline.
Improvements in the standards for imposing sanctions are an
important first step toward addressing some of these problems, but
standards are of little value if they are not followed. Standards for
imposing lawyer sanctions must be mandatory, not voluntary. They
should be written to serve as a counterweight against any unconscious
bias on the part of judges and lawyer-dominated disciplinary boards.
They must be drafted to place protection of the public above
protection of the lawyer’s reputation or livelihood. Failure to place
protection of the public above other considerations will not only
doom any standards to failure. Such a failure will lead to a broadbased demand for sweeping structural changes in lawyer discipline
systems.

360. Cf. Kahan, supra note 97, at 650-51 (proposing in the criminal context to increase the
power of the condemnation expressed through fines by combining fines with short periods of
incarceration).

APPENDIX
A standard for the wrongful handling of client funds or property
might use the definitions of “knowledge” and “negligence” contained in
the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and provide:
STANDARD 1. Wrongful handling of client funds or property
Absent substantial reasons for imposing a different sanction, the
following sanctions shall be imposed in cases involving the wrongful
handling of entrusted client funds or property:
(a) A lawyer who knowingly misappropriates or converts entrusted
client funds or property shall be disbarred.
(b) A lawyer who knowingly engages in other unauthorized use of
entrusted client funds or property for the lawyer’s benefit or for the
benefit of a third party shall be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one to three years.
(c) A lawyer who negligently engages in unauthorized use of
entrusted client funds or property for the lawyer’s benefit or for the
benefit of a third party shall be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months to one year, unless the value of the funds or
property is less than $1000, in which case a public reprimand may be
imposed.
(d) A lawyer who improperly handles entrusted client funds or
property, or who fails to return entrusted client funds or property
promptly upon a lawful request for their return, or who fails to account
promptly to a client for entrusted funds or property, shall be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six months to one year or shall
receive a public reprimand.
(e) A lawyer who engages in unauthorized use of entrusted client
funds or property not otherwise covered in this Standard shall be
suspended from the practice of law for a minimum period of six
months, unless the value of the funds or property is less than $1000, in
which case a public reprimand may be imposed.
COMMENTARY
This Standard applies to client funds or property delivered to a
lawyer to be held in trust or safekeeping or funds or property conveyed
to a lawyer by a third party for a client’s benefit. It does not apply to
funds paid to a lawyer as fees or as retainers for services to be rendered,
or to any good faith fee disputes relating to the entrusted funds or
property, which are governed by Standard 2. In all cases of

unauthorized use or improper handling of client funds or property,
restitution shall be ordered in addition to the sanctions described in
this section.
(a) This section governs instances of conversion or misappropriation
by the lawyer. Conversion or misappropriation occurs when the lawyer
knowingly uses entrusted client funds or property without the client’s
consent and without the intention to return the funds or property.
Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, if the client demands
return of the entrusted funds or property, the failure to return the
funds or property prior to the filing of a disciplinary complaint shall be
construed as a use without intention to return the funds or property.
(b) This section governs other situations in which a lawyer knowingly
uses client funds or property for the lawyer’s benefit or for the benefit
of a third party, without the client’s consent. For example, a lawyer who
loans client funds to a third party, without the client’s consent but with
the expectation that the funds will be repaid, is subject to discipline
under this section. A lawyer who knowingly pays personal or office
expenses with entrusted funds with the intention to later repay those
funds to the client is also subject to discipline under this section. This
section does not apply to use of client funds or property arising from
negligent commingling of client funds or property with law office funds
or property, which is governed by Standard 1(c).
(c) This section governs the negligent use of client funds or
property. For example, a lawyer who negligently places client funds in a
general office account rather than in a client trust account and draws
on the general account below the dollar value of the client’s funds in
order to pay office expenses should be sanctioned under this section.
Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, a lawyer who uses
entrusted funds to pay personal expenses, or who transfers client funds
from a client trust account in order to pay office or personal expenses,
shall not be found to have acted negligently under this section and shall
be sanctioned under Standard 1(a) or Standard 1(b).
(d) This section governs any improper handling of entrusted funds
or property that does not constitute a “use” of client property.
Improper handling includes actions not authorized by the client that
place entrusted funds or property at risk of loss. For example, the
placement of entrusted client funds in an account other than a
properly maintained client trust account is governed by this section if
the amount in the account does not drop below the value of the client
funds. The failure to safeguard entrusted property from physical
damage or theft is also governed by this section.

The failure of a lawyer to return promptly entrusted client funds or
property following the conclusion of a client matter or a demand by a
client for their return shall also be sanctioned under this section. A
prompt return means a return within 60 days after the client has made
a demand for return or the lawyer should reasonably know that funds
or property should be returned.
This section also governs the failure of a lawyer to account promptly
to a client for funds or property delivered to the lawyer by a third party
for a client’s benefit or to account for entrusted funds or property
following a demand by a client for an accounting. A prompt
accounting means an accounting within sixty days after the lawyer
should reasonably know that an accounting is due the client.
When determining whether to impose a period of suspension or a
public reprimand under Standard 1(d), the court shall consider
whether the lawyer acted knowingly or negligently and shall also
consider the actual or potential injury, if any, to the client.
(e) This section governs any unauthorized use of entrusted client
funds or property not otherwise addressed in this Standard. The length
of the suspension shall be proportional to the sanctions imposed for the
misconduct described in Standards 1(b) and 1(c) and shall be
consistent with prior decisions in the jurisdiction.

